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SUMMARY
The main focus of this thesis was to design training to mitigate the effects of 
constraints underlying verbal insight problem solving. Concurrent verbal protocols 
were collected. Experiments 1 and 2 tested training that was specific to solving 
problems that were exemplars of trained categories. In Experiment 1, heuristic 
training was provided for two categories of constraint: those with ambiguous words 
and those with human names that should be associated with animals. Transfer was 
positive for novel problems within the two trained categories but not for problems 
outside. Experiment 2 improved performance on problems with ambiguous words 
once shortcomings in Experiment 1 were addressed. Experiment 3 tested training that 
was specific to solving functional fixedness verbal insight problems. An iterative 
process of considering many functions of individual items was successful in 
facilitating performance but not for problems outside. Experiments 4 and 5 
investigated the effectiveness of different types of generic training in facilitating 
solution of novel verbal insight problems. In Experiment 4, participants were trained 
to identify assumptions, which they made during problem solving and were 
inconsistent with the problem statement. In Experiment 5, participants were trained to 
iteratively consider different parts of the problem specification and to identify 
inconsistencies as in Experiment 4. Solution rate was improved in both experiments 
although instruction to explain and justify oneself during problem solving was also 
sufficient in facilitating performance in Experiment 5. Finally, Experiment 6 tested a 
novel method for identifying when a participant was constrained by an incorrect 
representation during verbal insight problem solving. The results supported that there
is variability in the nature of stereotypical constraints involved and demonstrated how 
training can be designed to induce restructuring or a shift in representation.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction to insight problem solving
The focus of this thesis is on a special form of problem solving entitled ‘insight 
problem solving’ and the overarching objective is to design training to facilitate 
solution of insight problems. This chapter begins with an introduction to the nature of 
insight problem solving and its importance. Next, training is discussed as a possible 
methodology for improving insight problem solving, which is followed by an 
overview of the thesis.
1.1. What is insight problem solving and how is it different?
Any form of problem solving entails generating novel solutions to problems 
that a person may never have encountered before, or has very limited or no knowledge 
of what is required to reach the correct solution (Dominowski & Dallob, 1995). Some 
well-known general definitions of problem solving include:
‘Problem solving is defined as any goal-directed sequence of cognitive 
perspectives.’ (Anderson, 1980, p. 257)
‘.. .cognitive processing directed at transforming a given situation into a goal 
situation when no obvious method of solution is available to the problem 
solver.’ (Mayer, 1990, p. 284).
Both definitions emphasise that problem solving involves cognitive processing to 
reach a particular goal, i.e., the solution. Further, Mayer’s definition notes that the 
solver may not know how to progress with problem solving to reach the solution.
However, insight problem solving is a special type of problem solving in that the 
solver defaults to a high probability habitual conceptualisation that acts as a major 
impediment to solution leading to an impasse, a state of mind of not knowing how to 
progress to attain the solution (Ohlsson, 1992). In other words, knowledge that is 
normally activated by the problem specification or context is not relevant and has to 
be rejected, and information in the problem specification has to be interpreted in an 
unusual way in order to reach the solution (Duncker, 1945; Gick & Lockhart, 1995; 
Isaak & Just, 1995; Mayer, 1995; Wertheimer, 1959). Insight problems are thus ill- 
defined, in that both the goal and steps for its completion are unclear and the solution 
possibilities are endless (Chrysikou, 2006).
The definition of insight is problematic (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008). 
Some propose that insight is characterised by the sudden illumination of the solution 
(Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987) whereas others have focused on the psychological 
processes involved in achieving insight, namely restructuring or representational 
change following an impasse (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; 
MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008; Ohlsson, 1992). Consequently, several definitions 
of insight have emerged. According to Mayer (1995, p. 3)
‘the term insight has been used to name the process by which a problem solver 
suddenly moves from a state of not knowing how to solve a problem to a state 
of knowing how to solve it.’
This definition notes that insight problem solving involves a sudden transition from 
not knowing to knowing the solution. However, it does not state that having insight 
will provide the solution to the problem; rather it places the solver on the correct
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solution path. A criticism of this definition is that Mayer did not specify the process or 
processes that underlie what he refers to as insight.
Dominowski and Dallob (1995, p. 33) contend that
‘ Insight will be characterised as a form of understanding (of a problem and its 
solution) that can result from restructuring, a change in a person’s perception 
of a problem situation.’
Ansburg (2000, p. 143) proposed that
‘Insight occurs when a solver restructures a previously intractable problem 
such that a new understanding of what needs to be done appears in the 
consciousness.’
The definitions of Dominowski and Dallob (1995) and Ansburg (2000) are similar in 
that both suggest insight occurs as result of restructuring, which may indirectly be 
suggesting the suddenness of solution as Mayer (1995). Dominowski and Dallob 
(1995) suggest restructuring results in a new ‘form of understanding’ but this does not 
necessarily mean that restructuring will result in insight. This problem is, however, 
avoided in Ansburg’s (2000) definition as restructuring must result ‘in a new 
understanding of what needs to be done’ to reach the solution.
Ohlsson (1992, p. 10) defined insight problems as those
‘... which have a high probability of triggering an initial representation 
which has a low probability of activating the knowledge needed to solve 
the problem.’
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Ohlsson’s (1992) definition is different to the aforementioned definitions as it focuses 
on why insight problems are difficult. It suggests that insight problems contain certain 
information within their specification that triggers a misleading representation that 
inhibits the information needed to solve the problem. Although not mentioned in his 
definition, Ohlsson (1992) also suggests that restructuring of the initial representation 
is required to facilitate solution.
Apart from Mayer’s (1995) and Ohlsson’s (1992) definitions, all the above 
definitions place importance on restructuring the faulty initial problem representation, 
without which solution is unattainable. This is what makes insight problem solving 
unique. The insight experience itself is characterised as follows: the solver is misled 
in his or her interpretation of a problem; the solver continues working on the problem 
until they reach an impasse in which problem solving ceases; the impasse is 
eventually overcome by a representational change and the solution of a problem 
occurs consequently (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Chronicle, MacGregor, & 
Ormerod, 2004; Fleck, 2008; Jones, 2003; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Ohlsson, 1984b, 
1992; Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002; Segal, 2004; Sternberg & Davidson,
1995).
One type of insight problem that has not been explicitly referred to as an 
insight problem is called a lateral thinking problem by DeBono (1967). This type of 
problem will be used extensively in this thesis and involves the requirement for 
representational change or restructuring to attain solution. An example is:
Anthony and Cleopatra are lying dead on the floor in an Egyptian villa.
Nearby is a broken bowl. There are no marks on their bodies and they were
4
not poisoned. Not a person was in the villa when they died. How did they die?
(Sloane, 1992, p. 13)
The above problem is difficult because the names Anthony and Cleopatra are 
commonly associated with humans. This high frequency response is unhelpful to 
finding the solution to this problem. Typically, the problem solver brings unwarranted 
assumptions to the problem that is based on their past experiences, which create 
unconscious biases that are unhelpful for problem solving (Ohlsson, 1984b). Thus, 
solvers draw unhelpful stereotypical inferences from the theme o f the problem or 
from certain words/phrases in the problem specification, which obstructs the 
production of the correct, insightful solution (Ohlsson, 1984b, 1992; Weisberg & 
Alba, 1981). This is an example of the effect of a negative habit (William James,
1890) or what Reason (1990) termed ‘strong but wrong rules ‘where a person tends to 
default to high frequency responses that are useful in most situations but can be 
inappropriate when applied to an unusual situation, which consequently results in an 
error. The solution that Anthony and Cleopatra are fish is only achieved when the 
unwarranted assumption that the names refer only to humans is removed (Ohlsson, 
1992).
The nine-dot problem (Scheerer, 1963) is a well researched visuo-spatial 
insight problem that has also been used to illustrate the role of assumptions leading to 
an incorrect problem representation. In this problem, nine dots are arranged in a three- 
by-three two-dimensional square and the goal is to link all nine dots using four 
straight lines without lifting the pen off the paper or without retracing any lines. The 
solution (see Figure 1.1) is only achieved once the solver abandons the assumption
5
that they cannot go beyond the imagined square boundaries to link all dots in four 
straight lines (Weisberg & Alba, 1981).
Figure 1.1. Solution to the nine-dot problem
Laboratory experiments investigating ‘fixation* in insight problem solving 
have also suggested that habitual directions can prevent the solver from changing their 
representation. The role o f ‘fixation’ has been investigated using ‘functional 
fixedness’ problems, which require an everyday object to be used in a novel way to 
attain solution (Duncker, 1945). For example, Duncker (1945) found that when 
participants were asked to fix a candle to a wall using a box of drawing pins, matches 
and a candle, participants fixated on the typical function of the box that blocked the 
generation of a novel function for the box to be used as a candle holder. That is, 
solvers tended to default to, and thus fixate on, the common function for an object, 
which impaired problem solving.
On the whole, insight problems are difficult to solve because inappropriate 
reliance on past knowledge and experiences make it particularly difficult to realise 
that the initial representation of the problem is incorrect. In other words, our strong 
thinking habits can impede solution to insight problems making the ever necessary 
representational change psychologically difficult.
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Despite our attempt to characterise the unique nature of insight problem 
solving, there is still much debate concerning whether insight problem solving 
represents a distinct type of problem solving involving unique processes, or whether it 
is achieved through the same processes as those involved in solving non-insight or 
analytic problems (i.e., problems that are solved by working incrementally towards 
the solution). There are four areas in which research has attempted to identify 
differences between insight and non-insight problems; metacognitions (Metcalfe & 
Wiebe, 1987), individual differences in cognitive abilities (DeYoung, Flanders, & 
Peterson, 2008; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005); the role of working memory (Ash & 
Wiley, 2006; Fleck, 2008; Lavric, Forstmeier, & Rippon, 2000); and neural activity 
(Luo & Nicki, 2003; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). Each of these will be discussed 
briefly below.
Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) tested whether insight and non-insight problems 
generate different metacognitive experiences. Participants in their study were required 
to give feelings of warmth ratings at 10 second intervals to indicate how near they felt 
they were to the solution when solving five insight and five non-insight problems. 
They found that participants showed awareness when approaching the correct solution 
to non-insight problems but were unaware of their progress towards the solution to 
insight problems until just before they reached the solution. These results were 
interpreted as suggesting that the solution to an insight problem occurs suddenly, as 
Gestalt psychologists argued, hence why solvers were poor at predicting how close 
they were to the solution. In contrast, non-insight problems require a more methodical 
approach to reach solution; therefore the solver is likely to have some knowledge 
concerning their progress. However, Weisberg (1992) questioned these results as raw 
data were used to report frequencies of insight problems whereas proportions were
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used for the non-insight problems. Nevertheless, these results suggest, although do not 
prove, that different processes may be involved in insight and non-insight problem 
solving.
Many attempts have been made to identify whether success on insight versus 
non-insight problems is determined by individual differences in cognitive abilities 
(e.g. DeYoung et al., 2008; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) 
investigated whether success on 24 insight (e.g., Nine-dot; Inverted pyramid, Ohlsson, 
1992; Marriage, Dominowski, 1994) and 10 non-insight problems (e.g., anagrams, 
Gilhooly & Johnson, 1978; Hobbits and Ores, Thomas, 1974; Tower of Hanoi, Egan 
& Greeno, 1974) was linked to measures of working memory, fluid intelligence, and 
fluidity and flexibility o f thought. Regression analyses indicated that fluid intelligence 
predicted success on non-insight problems, whereas fluidity and flexibility of thought 
predicted success on insight problems. When insight problems were categorised into 
verbal and spatial problems, it was found that success on spatial insight problems was 
predicted by figural fluency (the ability to generate spatial interpretations, r = .41). 
However, success on verbal insight problems was related to flexibility of thought (r = 
.32) and vocabulary scores (r = .41). Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) suggest that the 
latter finding is likely due to many insight problems containing verbal ambiguities 
that need to be identified and resolved to attain solution. An additional finding was 
that success on insight problems was better predicted by measures of strategic 
switching and inhibition (e.g., figural fluency). Therefore, it was inferred that 
executive processes o f switching and inhibition play a role in solving insight 
problems. That is, when the initial representation and approach lead to an impasse, a 
switch to an alternative approach takes place after inhibiting the unhelpful 
representation. However, a later study by Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) found that
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measures of inhibition and switching did not predict success on insight problems, thus 
suggesting that restructuring involves spontaneous processes.
A recent study by DeYoung et al. (2008) examined whether individual 
differences in three cognitive abilities were associated with performance on nine 
verbal insight problems (e.g., Inverted pyramid, Ohlsson, 1992; Marriage, 
Dominowski, 1994). The three abilities were convergent thinking (i.e., moving 
logically and linearly toward a solution), divergent thinking (i.e., non-linearly 
searching through memory and recognising a pattern), and breaking frame (i.e., 
abandoning a faulty initial representation and searching for a new one). Convergent 
thinking was assessed using the Wonderlic Personnel Test of intelligence, whereas 
divergent thinking was assessed using three of the Torrance Tests of Creativity 
(fluency, originality in responses, and flexibility i.e., the ability to switch between 
perspectives). Breaking frame was assessed using the anomalous card task in which 
participants were presented a series of normal playing cards on a screen and asked to 
describe what they saw. Within the trial an anomalous playing card (a black four of 
hearts) was presented repeatedly and the ability to break frame was indicated by the 
number of trials prior to the identification of the anomalous card. In other words, the 
higher the number o f trials before identification of the anomalous card, the lower the 
ability to break frame. Regression analyses revealed that all measures correlated 
significantly with insight, except for the originality index of divergent thinking. It was 
suggested that the ability to break frame is important to avoid persevering with an 
incorrect representation, while divergent thinking is necessary to generate elements of 
a new representation. Further, convergent thinking is helpful in identifying 
shortcomings in the existing problem representation or to validate novel 
representations. The association found between flexibility and insight provides added
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support for the suggestion made by Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) regarding the 
process of switching to overcome an impasse in insight problem solving. However, as 
only verbal insight problems were studied, generalisability of the results is limited.
Working memory is another individual difference variable that has been 
examined to differentiate insight and analytic forms of problem solving. Working 
memory is critical to cognition as it is used to store and manipulate information 
required for cognitive tasks such as language, comprehension, learning and reasoning 
(Baddeley, 1992), and is broken down into verbal and spatial storage units. 
Alternatively, short-term memory is used to hold a small amount of information that 
is readily available for a brief period of time. Whilst some researchers have reported 
working memory to be associated with analytic problems (Fleck, 2008; Gilhooly & 
Murphy, 2005; Lavric et al., 2000), others have reported an association with insight 
problems (Ash & Wiley, 2006). However, recently Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) 
suggested that working memory contributes to both insight and non-insight problem 
solving, although insight problems that require restructuring are likely to make more 
demands on working memory.
Lavric et al. (2000), Gilhooly and Murphy (2005), and Fleck (2008) reported 
similar findings in that working memory was related to analytical problems and not 
insight problems. Lavric et al. (2000) found that when participants performed 
Dunker’s (1945) candle problem (insight) and a version of the Watson’s Selection 
Task (analytical) either alone or whilst completing a working memory task that 
required counting the number of tones presented, the memory task disrupted 
performance on the analytical problem but not the insight problem. The authors 
concluded that because insight problems are ill-defined with an ambiguous problem 
situation, little planning takes place during solution attainment. In contrast, analytic
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problems have a clear defined problem space, allowing more opportunities for 
planning, which is dependent on working memory. However, these results need to be 
interpreted with caution as only one insight and one analytical problem was used. 
Hence, a study by Gilhooly and Murphy (2005), discussed earlier, used a larger set of 
insight versus non-insight problems and found that performance on Raven’s Matrices, 
a measure of working memory, predicted success on non-insight problems (r = .41). 
More recently, Fleck (2008) found similar findings to Lavric et al. and Gilhooly and 
Murphy using four insight and four analytical problems. In addition, Fleck found that 
verbal short-term memory was associated with insight problems, but this finding was 
less conclusive once individual problems were analysed. As no two insight problems 
are the same; it seems plausible that the demand on memory is likely to vary.
In contrast to the above, Ash and Wiley (2006) reported an association 
between working memory and (visuo-spatial) insight problem solving, although this 
finding was dependent on whether an insight problem had either a large or small 
search space to reach the solution. A configuration of six insight move problems (e.g. 
eight-coin, matchstick arithmetic) were manipulated to create many move available 
(MMA) and few move available (FMA) problems. MMA problems had a large 
problem space, which the solver needed to explore before reaching an impasse that 
triggered restructuring. In FMA problems, the initial representation allowed few or no 
moves, therefore the search through the problem space was limited, which in turn 
enabled the solver to reach an impasse and restructuring sooner. Regression analyses 
revealed that measures of working memory span (that demonstrate the ability to 
actively control and allocate attention) were correlated with success on insight 
problems with a large search space i.e., insight problems that involve a search phase
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and a restructuring phase, whereas the ability to control attention did not predict 
success on problems that only involved a restructuring phase i.e., FMA problems.
An alternative perspective was provided by Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) who 
argued that working memory should be involved in solving both insight and non­
insight problems because both require temporary storage of possible solutions. They 
also noted that previous studies in this area have used a limited number of test 
problems (Fleck, 2008) and, or, only one type of insight problem (e.g., Ash & Wiley, 
2006; Lavric et al., 2000), which limits generalisability of the findings. Gilhooly and 
Fioratou addressed these criticisms by using a larger set of insight (18) and non­
insight (10) problems to examine the role of verbal working and visuo-spatial working 
memory capacities (as measured by working memory measures) in solving insight and 
non-insight verbal and spatial problems. It was found that verbal working memory 
capacity predicted success on both verbal insight and verbal non-insight problems but 
not to either type of spatial problems. However, spatial working memory capacity 
predicted success on both spatial and verbal types of insight and non-insight 
problems. A possible explanation provided for the latter finding was that verbal 
problems may also induce spatial short-term storage processes during problem 
solving, for example by triggering strategies that are based on imagery. It was 
concluded that the internal representation of an insight or non-insight problem tends 
to be complex; therefore it needs to be held in working memory whilst the solver 
considers alternative interpretations or actions. Further, the key elements of the 
problem that require reinterpretation are likely to be held in working memory. This is 
likely to be the case for insight problems as they require restructuring to overcome an 
impasse.
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Finally, researchers have attempted to identify whether different neural 
activities are associated with success on insight and non-insight problems. Research 
suggests two important parts of the brain that are associated with insight problem 
solving: the hippocampus (Luo & Nicki, 2003) and the right hemisphere (Jung- 
Beeman et al., 2004). Luo and Nicki (2003) used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to show that when solution to insightful Japanese riddles (that had a 
surprising solution) was presented to participants, stronger activation occurred in the 
right hippocampus. The converse was true for non-insight riddles (that did not have a 
surprising solution). The authors concluded that the hippocampus is involved in 
restructuring in insight problem solving. In particular, they proposed three possible 
roles for the hippocampus. First, stronger activation for insightful solutions may be 
due to novel representations formed among already existing concepts. Second, the 
hippocampus may be involved in overcoming impasse. Third, stronger activation may 
be due to the formation of a new representation.
A further study by Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) demonstrated that the 
hippocampus is not the only brain region that is involved in restructuring. Participants 
in their experiments completed remote association tasks in which three words were 
presented and the task was to find the target that could be combined with the three 
words to form a new word or phrase (e.g., the word ‘cheese’ is associated with the 
following three words: ‘cottage’, ‘blue’, and’ ‘mouse’). After finding the solution, 
participants reported whether or not it was accompanied by an ‘aha’ experience i.e., 
whether the solution came to them suddenly. They found that solution was preceded 
by greater activity in the right anterior superior temporal gyrus, a region of the brain 
in the right hemisphere which is associated with making connections between 
information during comprehension. EEG activity was also greater in that region just
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before the insight solution was reported. It was argued that this brain region is 
responsible for linking mental concepts in a novel way and may promote 
restructuring. However, these results were based only on verbal problems which 
require contrasting with non-insight problems to obtain conclusive evidence that the 
right anterior superior temporal gyrus is in fact associated with insight problem 
solving.
In summary, research that has reported differences in metacognitive 
experiences (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987) during insight and non-insight problem 
solving is questionable due to criticisms of methodology or test problems used. 
However, studies of individual differences in cognitive abilities highlight that 
flexibility in thinking (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005) or divergent thinking (DeYoung et 
al., 2008) is predictive of success on insight problems. This is consistent with the 
notion that solution to insight problems are more likely to be attained once the solver 
considers alternative interpretations that go beyond the initial faulty representation. 
Research also suggests that working memory is linked to insight problem solving, 
particularly in facilitating restructuring (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Gilhooly & Fioratou, 
2009), which is a prerequisite to solving insight problems. Finally, neuroscientific 
studies also suggest that different brain regions are associated with solving insight and 
non-insight problems. In conclusion, the research discussed hitherto suggests that 
distinct processes are indeed involved in solving insight and non-insight problems.
1.2. Why is insight problem solving practically important?
There are many practical examples where a shift in representation is 
imperative but difficult to initiate because solvers repeatedly default to a habitual 
response, which in most occasions is the correct response. However, difficulties
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experienced in shifting the default response have resulted in disastrous consequences 
such as the David-Besse (1985) and Three Mile Island (1979) incidents. The author 
has research experience in the nuclear industry; therefore examples from this area are 
discussed below to demonstrate the detrimental effect of habitual responses on 
problem solving. In particular, examples concerning incorrect assumptions regarding 
instrument readings and plant faults are provided. It is proposed that the study of 
insight problem solving has important implications for understanding everyday 
problem solving and even catastrophes in which a habitual mode of representation 
results in assumptions that inhibit the production of the correct interpretation and 
solution of the problem.
For example, operators are very good at diagnosing routine problems within 
the nuclear plant that often involve a single fault yet operators encounter difficulties in 
diagnosing unusual faults, particularly those that are unusual and involve multiple 
faults. One suggestion for this finding is that habitual assumptions (e.g., symptoms are 
caused by a single-fault or that instrument readings are always valid) interfere with 
diagnostic reasoning. This was tested in a field study by Patrick, Gregov, Halliday, 
Handley, and O’Reilly (1999). Operations personnel were presented with three fault­
finding scenarios in a simulator of a plant control room. The scenarios consisted of 
one single fault (a small leak) and two multiple-faults: a) plant fault masked by 
instrument failure; and b) two leaks in the secondary circuit. In the first multiple-fault 
scenario, participants correctly identified a fault with the plant but when they checked 
the instrument panel, the instrument incorrectly indicated no such fault. However, 
despite this contradictory information, participants chose to reject their correct 
hypothesis and to believe the instrument reading. It can be inferred that the habitual 
experience that instruments readings are nearly always correct had a strong inhibitory
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effect on hypothesis generation. This is because participants generated the correct 
hypothesis several times due to the substantial evidence indicating a plant fault but 
they chose to reject it every time they viewed the instrument reading that did not 
corroborate their hypothesis.
The David*Besse nuclear power plant incident of 1985 in Germany is another 
example in which operators incorrectly assumed that instrument readings were valid 
in a multiple-fault situation. A capacitor failure caused a loss of main feedwater but 
the instrument incorrectly indicated that the pressure relief valve was shut when it was 
still open. Consequently, an operator attempted to start the emergency feedwater 
pumps but this error resulted in both pumps tripping. In this case it can be inferred 
that the operators’ action was based on the assumption that the valve reading was 
valid. Further, it appeared that this assumption was so strong that the operator did not 
attempt to validate the instrument reading by checking the pressuriser or the acoustic 
monitor.
Similarly, the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in USA in 
1979 was due to a combination of habitual interpretations, along with instrument 
failures, which resulted in a near catastrophe. Cooling water leaked as a relief valve 
was stuck open, which caused the core of the number two reactor to overheat. 
However, instrumentation incorrectly indicated that the pressure was high. Operators 
were trained to reduce the flow of coolant through the core when the pressure was 
high. This habitual response was triggered by the incorrect instrument reading, which 
under normal circumstances would have been the right action, but in this case was 
fatal. Another example is that operators incorrectly interpreted the indicator light was 
showing the relief valve to be closed when in actuality the light was indicating that 
power had been removed from the solenoid. This suggests that the operators were
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unable to overcome this wrong interpretation/representation although it conflicted 
with the instrument reading.
In summary, the above examples illustrate that solvers’ past experiences lead 
them to default to a high probability habitual response, which under normal 
circumstances is correct. However, in these examples, the habitual interpretation or 
representation was wrong, which solvers failed to recognise, even when faced with 
information that was contradictory. In such situations, the solver requires insight to be 
able to make the switch to an alternative representation. It is argued that these 
examples do not provide direct evidence that an incorrect habitual response is 
responsible for errors in problem solving. However, the solvers’ resistance to change 
even when faced with contradictory information would suggest that habits have a 
strong inhibitory effect that make the much needed shift in representation difficult to 
execute. Therefore, research on insight problem is of importance because it serves to 
inform our understanding of how the problem solver represents problems and how the 
generation of novel solutions may be facilitated. Next, the importance of training is 
discussed in different contexts including problem solving.
1.3. Training
There has been extensive growth in training research in the last 40 years and 
the benefits of training has been reported in occupational, educational, cognitive, 
design, military, and engineering domains to name a few (Aguinis & Kraiger, 2009; 
Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). ‘Training’ is defined as
‘the systematic acquisition of skills, rules, concepts, or attitudes that result in
improved performance in another environment.’ (Goldstein & Ford, 2002, p.l)
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Therefore, training is designed to promote transfer of learning such that a trainee is 
able to apply what was learnt during training to a different situation. To illustrate 
some of the benefits of training, this section begins with a brief overview of how 
training has benefited two different domains: organisations and aviation human 
factors. This is followed by a discussion of different theoretical formulations of 
transfer and how they dictate the design of training. It is suggested that training is 
only useful when trainees are aware of the relevance of their newly learnt skills in 
solving problems presented in a different context. As training has benefited a variety 
of domains, it is suggested insight problem solving may also be improved through 
training.
1.3.1. The benefits o f  training in different contexts
Aguinis and Kraiger (2009) recently reviewed the training and development 
literature since the year 2000 and reported many benefits of training, which 
corroborates the review of the training research literature conducted by Salas and 
Cannon-Bowers in 2001. That is, training works as it results in many positive 
benefits. This section briefly summarises some of the benefits training research has 
produced within organisations and aviation human factors.
The benefits of training reported within the organisational context include 
increased job performance, improvement in technical skills, increased declarative 
knowledge (i.e., knowledge about facts, meanings of words) and procedural 
knowledge (i.e., how to perform behavioural skills), as well as increased strategic 
knowledge (knowledge when to apply a particular skill) (cf. Aguinis &Kraiger, 2009).
Training has produced additional benefits in areas such as leadership, which 
are not necessarily unrelated to job performance. For example, Dvir, Eden, Avolio
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and Shamir (2002) conducted a longitudinal study field study, using a sample of 
cadets in the Israel Defense Forces, in which group leaders received transformational 
leadership training. A transformational leader is one that exhibits charismatic 
behaviours and is able to motivate and stimulate followers as well giving followers 
individual consideration. Results showed that followers of leaders who received 
transformational leadership training were motivated, reported increased levels of 
internalised moral values for the organisation, and were high in empowerment.
Another important area that has benefited from training research is aviation 
human factors. Air crashes such as the crash of the Boeing 737 at Kegworth (Ladkin,
1996) have consistently highlighted the need for training to reduce human error.
Safety and team-based training programs in this area have resulted in a reduction in 
time lost in dealing with injuries as well as improving team performance, respectively 
(Edkins, 2002). As teamwork is critical to achieving common goals in areas such as 
aviation, team-based training has received much attention. In particular, Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) training has been conducted using flight simulators to 
improve teamwork and communication. Studies that have addressed CRM training 
reported positive reactions to training by aircrews, increased knowledge of teamwork 
principles, aircrew communication and performance, as well as increased situation 
awareness (O’Connor, Flin, & Fletcher, 2002; Salas, Burke, Bowers, & Wilson,
2001).
In summary, research suggests that training is useful at an individual and team 
level across domains and thus further confirms the importance of training research. 
Research on insight problem solving have tended to focus on identifying the processes 
that lead to the attainment of insight with less focus on how insight problem solving
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can be improved through training. The subsequent sections summarise the transfer 
literature and the implications for the design of training.
1.3.2. Theoretical approaches to transfer
Transfer can either be positive (when previous habits or skills facilitate 
learning) or negative (when previous habits or skills interfere with the learning of new 
skills). Further, positive or negative transfer can take place during both the learning of 
new skills as well as during the performance of old skills (Patrick, 1992). Transfer and 
training invariably go hand in hand, thus the design of training is dictated by 
theoretical approaches of transfer, which are briefly summarised below.
Theoretical approaches to transfer consistently highlight the importance of 
ensuring similarities between training and test situations for positive transfer to occur. 
Thorndike and Woodworth (1901) proposed that transfer was determined by the 
extent to which two tasks shared ‘identical elements’ that were of a cognitive nature. 
Thus, if two tasks shared common methods, principles, and procedures, then positive 
transfer was likely to occur.
Support for the theory of identical elements came from Anderson (1987) and 
his theory of skill acquisition which was concerned with how procedural knowledge 
(knowledge about how to do something) was developed from declarative knowledge 
(knowledge about facts), and how it was turned into skilled performance using 
IF...THEN production rules. Anderson argued that the extent of positive transfer 
between two tasks was determined by the extent to which the production rules in the 
context of one task (i.e., training task) could be used in the performance of another 
task (i.e., transfer task).
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According to Judd’s theory of deep structure, transfer depends on the extent to 
which the learner notices underlying shared causal principles between two problems 
(Judd, 1908). Gick and Holyoak (1987) suggested the transfer was determined by the 
perceived similarity between the old and new situation. In other words, positive 
transfer will occur when two situations are perceived similar or identical and the 
responses required are similar. In short, although the above transfer approaches ignore 
the psychological nature of the skills required in completing tasks (Patrick, 1992), 
they all highlight that training and test problems must share similarities to promote 
positive transfer of training.
1.3.3. Factors that inhibit positive transfer o f training
Although the above theoretical approaches suggest that positive transfer will 
occur between two cognitive tasks that share ‘identical elements’ or components, this 
is not always the case. That is, successful performance on training tasks cannot be 
taken to assume that a trainee will be successful on test tasks. There are primarily two 
reasons for the lack of transfer between cognitive tasks, which have implications for 
the design of training in general as well as for training on insight problem solving. 
Firstly, trainees may lack awareness of the range of tasks or situations to which the 
newly learnt skill or procedure can be applied. As it was mentioned earlier, perceived 
similarity between two tasks is considered important in facilitating positive transfer. 
However, trainees may not perceive two tasks to be similar even when they actually 
are (Gick & Holyoak, 1987). Secondly, knowledge and skills are highly dependent on 
the context in which they were learnt, which make it difficult to facilitate positive 
transfer to another, new context (Patrick, 1992). The issue of context and transfer are 
discussed below.
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There are many examples which have demonstrated that the context can have 
inhibitory effects on the transfer of training (e.g., Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980; Schoenfeld, 1988). Examples from research on analogical problem 
solving (Gick & Holyoak, 1980) and mathematical problem solving (Bassok & 
Holyoak, 1989) are provided below to illustrate this point.
Analogical problem solving requires problem solvers to use similarities 
between the current problem (called the ‘target’) and a problem solved in the past 
(called the * source’) in attaining the solution. Gick and Holyoak (1980) employed 
Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem, in which a patient with a malignant tumour 
could only be saved by a special kind of ray. However, a ray of high strength destroys 
both the tumour and healthy tissues whereas a weak ray does not destroy healthy 
tissues but it does not destroy the tumour either. The solution was to destroy the 
tumour by attacking with many low intensity rays from different directions 
simultaneously. Only 10% of participants who were given the problem on its own 
reached the solution. Other participants were given three stories to memorise prior to 
completing the problem. One of these stories was structurally similar to the radiation 
problem in which a general captured a fortress by dispatching small platoons along 
many roads to attack simultaneously. When participants were given a hint i.e., that the 
story was relevant to solving the radiation problem, solution rate increased to 80% in 
contrast to 40% when no hint was provided. Thus, participants in the no hint condition 
tended not to make use of the analogue. This suggests that although relevant rules or 
strategies may be stored in long-term memory, there is no guarantee that they will be 
perceived as relevant and applied when the context is changed.
Bassok and Holyoak (1989) examined transfer of procedures learnt within an 
algebraic context to a physics context. They found that students who had leamt
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algebra could apply their knowledge to solve an isomorphic (structurally similar) 
physics problem. Thus, students had recognised the similarity between the problems 
that enabled them to apply their algebraic knowledge to solve a new problem. 
However, students who had learnt physics found it difficult apply their knowledge to 
solve an isomorphic algebra problem. Thus, learning to apply mathematics within the 
physics context did not prepare students to solve a more abstract mathematical 
problem in which the physics context was removed. This suggests that even if a 
problem solver has the right skills to solve a given a problem, a change in the problem 
context is likely to inhibit performance due to the reliance on past problem solving 
experiences.
In summary, theoretical formulations of transfer suggest that training and test 
tasks that are of a cognitive nature must share similarities in terms of structure, 
procedures, principals or method to facilitate positive transfer. However, trainees must 
be aware of the relevance of their new skills to a problem presented in a new context 
for positive transfer to take place. In other words, trainees must be able perceive the 
relevance of the training to solve test problems. Given that training has resulted in 
many benefits across a variety of domains, training designed to improve insight 
problem solving is needed, which is what this thesis aims to achieve whilst addressing 
the above issues.
1.4. Overview of thesis layout
The primary aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to the field of insight 
problem solving. This is done by examining theories of insight problem solving 
advocating the importance of representational change that is relevant to how training 
may be designed to improve success on verbal insight or lateral thinking problems.
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Also there is a lack of qualitative analysis of insight problem solving, which this 
thesis attempts to correct. Hence, the experiments reported here utilised concurrent 
verbalisations to gain an in-depth understanding of the process of insight problem 
solving, as well as to validate the effects of training.
The thesis is organised into nine chapters. The present chapter provided an 
introduction to insight problem solving, how it is different and why research in this 
area is of importance. It also discussed how training may serve to improve insight 
problem solving, which is the focus of this thesis. Chapter 2 provides a review of the 
different theoretical accounts of insight problem solving whereas Chapter 3 reviews 
the different methods for facilitating insight.
Chapters 4 to 8 form the empirical chapters of this thesis. Specifically, 
Chapters 4 to 7 report experiments that attempted to overcome habitual 
conceptualisations by introducing different training approaches to increase the 
probability of attaining the insight solution. The approach to training can either be 
specific or generic to test problems. That is, specific training concerns facilitating 
positive transfer to a particular problem for which training was designed (e.g., 
Burnham & Davis, 1969; Chronicle et al., 2001; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Weisberg 
& Alba, 1981), whereas generic training concerns facilitating transfer to not only the 
particular problem for which the training was designed but also to novel insight 
problems (e.g., Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Chrysikou, 2006; Dow & Mayer, 
2004; Wicker, Weinstein, Yelich, & Brooks, 1978). Therefore, Chapters 4 and 5 
focus on specific training to promote transfer to verbal insight problems as much of 
the research has been restricted to the consideration of visuo-spatial problems 
(Burnham & Davis, 1969; Chronicle et al., 2001; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004;
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Weisberg & Alba, 1981). Chapters 6 and 7 focus on generic training to promote 
transfer to a wider range of verbal insight problems.
Chapter 8 forms the last empirical chapter in this thesis. It reports an 
experiment that tested a novel method to determine whether problem solving is 
impaired as result of an incorrect representation, other than by asking someone to 
solve a problem. The aim of the experiment was to determine how powerful an 
incorrect representation is, and consequently, to determine the degree of difficulty on 
a given verbal insight problem.
Chapter 9, which is the final chapter, summarises the findings, implications 
and limitations of the thesis and makes suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of problem solving theories relevant to achieving insight
This chapter provides a review of problem solving theories that may serve to increase 
our understanding of insight. It begins with a review of Newell and Simon’s (1972) 
Problem Space Theory and how its applicability is limited to well-defined problems. 
This is followed by a critical evaluation of insight problem solving theories including 
Gestalt Theory (Kohler, 1924; Wertheimer, 1945), Representational Change Theory 
(Ohlsson, 1992), Restructuring Change Theory (Knoblich et al., 1999,2001), and 
Progress Monitoring Theory (MacGregor et al., 2001). It is concluded that 
representational change is critical to solving insight problems.
2.1. Problem Space Theory (Newell & Simon, 1972)
Newell and Simon’s (1972) Problem Space theory has been instrumental in 
understanding general problem solving. Although it is not a theory of insight problem 
solving per se, it is of interest to evaluate this theory in the light of its relevance to 
insight problem solving. An outline of this theory is provided below followed by a 
discussion of the type of problem in scope to this theory.
According to Problem Space Theory, problem solving centers around the 
problem space, which consists of knowledge states i.e., the initial state of the problem, 
the goal state, all possible mental operators or moves that can be applied to a state to 
change it to a different state, and all of the intermediate states of the problem. The 
solver creates an internal representation of a problem, referred to as the initial state, 
and problem solving entails applying operators to reduce the distance between the 
initial state and goal state, and a number of intermediate states are created along the
26
solution path. Newell and Simon also proposed that problem solving is constrained by 
working memory limits, and the speed at which information is retrieved from long 
term memory. Hence, heuristics or rules of thumbs are used to reduce the number of 
alternative solutions possible during problem solving although the use of a heuristic 
may not always yield results.
Problem Space Theory has been used to successfully explain problem solving 
in well-defined problems such as the Tower of Hanoi (Anzai & Simon, 1979) and the 
missionaries-cannibals (Thomas, 1974) problem. In the former problem, subjects are 
presented with three pegs where the first peg consists of three discs of decreasing size 
i.e., the initial state, and the solution or goal state is to pile the discs in the same order 
in the last peg. The rules are that only one disc can be moved at a time and a larger 
disc cannot be placed on top of a smaller one. In the missionaries-cannibals problem, 
the task is to transfer three missionaries and three cannibals across a river on a boat. 
The boat is small, therefore up to two people can be taken across at any one time and 
the boat must be accompanied by someone when returning to the other side. However, 
at no point can there be more cannibals than missionaries on one side of the river or 
the cannibals would eat the missionaries. The rules in both problems therefore restrict 
the possible number of operators that can be applied at each point of problem solving.
There are three main differences between these problems and insight 
problems. Firstly, the Problem Space Theory conceptualises the Tower of Hanoi in 
terms of clear initial and goal states, which are used as a basis for planning a series of 
problem solving moves. Information about the states of a problem can be used by the 
theory to predict the size of the problem space. In contrast, for example, the verbal 
insight Anthony and Cleopatra problem cannot be represented in terms of well 
defined initial and goal states. Therefore, the size of the problem space for this insight
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problem is dependent on the problem solver’s representation, which is influenced by 
their past habits and knowledge. Secondly, the Tower of Hanoi has clear rules, which 
minimise the potential operators that can be applied, and thus guide problem solving. 
In contrast, the Anthony and Cleopatra problem is not bounded by any such rules. 
Finally, the Tower of Hanoi has clearly defined operators or moves that can be 
applied to reduce the distance between problem states as the solver progresses through 
the problem space until the goal state is reached. General heuristics can be used to 
reduce the possible number of alternative moves, thus directing the solver towards the 
goal state. However, the more ambiguous nature of the Anthony and Cleopatra 
problem makes it difficult for the solver to define a problem space that can be broken 
down into states that can be acted upon. There are no clear operators that can be used, 
particularly as success on an insight problem is dependent on the solver recognising 
and correcting an inappropriate problem representation.
In conclusion, the differences between insight problems and the problems in 
scope to Problem Space Theory suggest that this theory is more applicable to 
understanding well-defined move problems that can be explicitly represented in terms 
of knowledge states. More importantly, the initial representation of a well-defined 
problem is defined by the initial state of a problem at the outset. On the other hand, 
insight problems are ill-defined with no clear states, therefore what the problem solver 
brings in terms of their own experiences and knowledge interacts with the 
presentation of the problem, and together these two factors determine the initial 
representation which in turn influences subsequent problem solving. Despite the lack 
of applicability to insight problems, Problem Space Theory has paved the way for 
insight theories such as MacGregor et al.’s (2001) Progress Monitoring Theory, which 
is discussed in Section 2.5 in this chapter.
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2.2. Gestalt Theory (e.g., Kdhler, 1924; Wertheimer, 1945)
Gestalt Theory was originally applied to understanding perception, with 
particular emphasis on searching for patterns and interpretations within data or 
elements. Gestalt psychologists (Duncker, 1945; Kohler, 1969; Wertheimer, 1945) 
later applied the theory to understanding human problem solving. This section will 
outline key distinctions made by Gestalt Theory, which was directly concerned with 
insight and how it might be facilitated. It will be argued that despite shortcomings, 
Gestalt Theory has been influential in stimulating later theories of insight problem 
solving that focus on the importance of restructuring or representational change.
Gestalt Theory is based on the idea of how people organise or ‘group’ 
elements of a visual stimulus in order to view it as whole (Wertheimer, 1922). The 
basic principle followed by Gestalt psychologists is that the whole is greater than that 
sum of its parts. That is, viewing something as a whole has greater meaning than 
viewing it by individual parts. The idea of ‘grouping’ was used by Gestalt Theory to 
make two important distinctions in understanding problem solving. Firstly, the role of 
reorganisation or restructuring in problem solving was emphasised (e.g., Maier,
1931). A solver must reorganise how they perceive a problem or parts of a problem in 
order to increase the probability of solution attainment. Secondly, a distinction was 
made between two types of thinking: reproductive thinking and productive thinking 
(Wertheimer, 1923). Reproductive thinking entails using previous experiences or 
solutions to solve a new problem. However, productive thinking is considered more 
complex as it requires the solver to produce a new organisation (representation) of the 
problem elements to attain solution. That is, a novel restructuring of the problem is 
required that enables the solver to perceive the problem in a way that was not 
considered initially in order to overcome an impasse during insight problem solving.
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The Gestalt view contends that reproductive thinking may impede problem solving as 
the initial interpretation/representation of a problem may result in the solver fixating 
on aspects of a problem (Duncker, 1945; Luchins, 1942), thus preventing novel 
interpretations that might lead to a solution. As a consequence, productive thinking is 
required to view the problem in a novel way before progress can be made.
What also distinguishes Gestalt Theory, from other theories of insight problem 
solving, is the argument that insight results from the sudden reorganisation of one’s 
understanding of the problem, without the awareness of the solver, and that it is 
accompanied by the so-called ‘aha’ experience. This ‘aha’ experience is what Wallas 
(1926) labelled as illumination (when a creative idea suddenly emerges in one’s 
head), which was proposed to be the third phase in a series of four phases of creative 
problem solving.
In short, Gestalt Theory characterises insight problem solving by three criteria: 
firstly, a problem is solved suddenly via a ‘aha’ experience; secondly, it is solved after 
a period of impasse or no progress; and thirdly, a problem must be approached in a 
new way that enables restructuring of the problem (Weisberg, 2006). Evidence for the 
‘aha’ experience largely comes from the observation of the apparent suddenness of 
the emergence of the solution after a period of no progress (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 
2004; Kohler, 1925; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). For example, Kohler (1925) observed 
that apes encountered an impasse during problem solving (e.g., attempting to reach an 
unreachable banana from a cage), which was followed by an apparent sudden 
restructuring of the problem, and hence achieving the solution (e.g., reaching the 
banana by joining two sticks together). Further support in human problem solving was 
reported by, for example, Maier (1931) using the two-string problem. In this problem 
participants were taken into a room containing several objects (e.g., poles, pliers) and
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two strings that were hanging from the ceiling. The task was to tie the two strings 
together yet the strings were far apart such that the participant was unable to reach one 
string whilst holding onto another. The insightful solution was to attach pliers to one 
of the strings and to swing it like a pendulum, thus allowing one string to be held 
whilst catching the other on its upswing. Participants found this problem difficult until 
the experimenter appeared to accidentally brush against the string to produce a 
swinging motion. Maier concluded that the participants initially reached an impasse 
after which the hint triggered reorganisation or restructuring of the problem to 
produce the correct solution. Furthermore, most participants who reached the solution 
after observing the hint reported that they had not noticed the experimenter brush 
against the rope.
Support for the ‘aha’ experience also comes from the previously mentioned 
study by Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987) who found that participants’ warmth ratings (i.e., 
ratings of how close they thought they were to the solution) increased as they 
approached the solution to search (algebra) problems. In contrast, warmth ratings for 
anagrams and insight problems were stable prior to solution, at which point they 
increased sharply. It was concluded that this provided support for the ‘aha’ experience 
in insight problem solving as solution to the insight problem came suddenly to the 
solver, which is argued to be the result of restructuring the problem. However, 
although the participants did not perceive their solution to be gradual for insight 
problems, it does not necessarily imply that it was not. Moreover, a general criticism 
of this study and indeed others is that there is no direct evidence that restructuring had 
in fact occurred. Such evidence is problematic and it will be argued later in this thesis 
that some indirect evidence can be gleaned from the collection and analysis of 
concurrent verbal protocols.
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A later study by Weisberg and Alba (1981) used insight problems such as the 
nine-dot problem (Scheerer, 1963) to directly challenge the Gestalt view that solution 
to insight problems arises suddenly as a result of restructuring. Gestalt psychologists 
contend that the nine-dot problem is difficult because people ‘fixate’ on the square 
formed by the dots and therefore incorrectly assume that they cannot go beyond this 
square. It follows that telling participants that they can go beyond the boundaries of 
the square should facilitate restructuring, and therefore the insight solution. Weisberg 
and Alba tested this hypothesis but found no training effect unless this instruction was 
accompanied by a hint that gave away part of the solution e.g., giving the first line of 
the solution (Experiment 1). It was argued that the instruction to remove the alleged 
fixation, in the form of an unwarranted assumption, was not sufficient in facilitating 
insight. Further, it was observed that the solutions were not sudden and direct but 
were preceded by a number of failed attempts, thus contradicting the suddenness of 
solution proposed by Gestalt Theory. A similar argument was made by Novic and 
Sherman (2003) who suggested that success on the nine-dot problem was likely to 
occur after several (failed) attempts at drawing lines that connected the dots.
Weisberg and Alba concluded that the Gestalt terms of ‘fixation’ and ‘insight’ were 
unhelpful in explaining the processes involved in solving insight problems. Instead, 
emphasis was placed on the role of problem-specific knowledge (e.g., solution related 
hints) in triggering restructuring to facilitate solution success.
Durso, Bea and Dayton (1994) used the following verbal insight problem to 
investigate the suddenness of solution following restructuring or representational 
change:
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A man walks into a bar and ask for a glass of water. The bartender points a 
shotgun at the man. The man say ‘Thank you’ and walks out. What was going 
on? (Durso et al., 1994, p. 95)
The solution to this problem is that the man had the hiccups, therefore the bartender 
startled him with the gun which cured the hiccup. This solution is argued to occur 
suddenly once solvers make sense of the problem (Dayton, Durso, & Shepard, 1990). 
In Experiment 1, after completing the problem, participants rated the relatedness of all 
possible pair-wise combinations of 14 terms that were associated with the problem. 
Some terms were mentioned explicitly in the problem (e.g., bartender - man), some 
were objects found in a bar (e.g., TV - pretzel), and some were related to the solution 
(e.g., surprise -  remedy). It was found that non-solvers rated words mentioned in the 
problem highly whereas solvers rated words that were related to the solution more 
highly. These results were interpreted to indicate that solvers had a different mental 
representation to non-solvers. However, as ratings were taken retrospectively, these 
results do not provide conclusive evidence for representational change. In particular, it 
was not known whether differences in the ratings were due to differences in the 
solution process or due to differences in subjects’ initial representation (Ash, Cushen, 
& Wiley, 2009)
Subsequently, participants in Durso et al.’s Experiment 2 were asked to judge 
critical pairs of words, as indicated by Experiment 1, on five occasions: before and 
after they heard the problem, every 10 minutes during problem solving until the 
problem was solved, and immediately after the solution was reached. Participants 
judged two insight pairs (e.g., surprise -  remedy, relieved -  thank you), two related 
pairs (e.g., bartender -  bar, shotgun -  loaded), and two unrelated pairs (e.g., pretzel -
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shotgun, TV -  remedy). It was not clear why ‘remedy’ was used in one of the insight 
and unrelated pairs. Six filler pairs were used to disguise the aim of the experiment. It 
was found that relatedness ratings for ‘insight pairs’ changed as the solver progressed 
to the problem solution, which was interpreted to suggest that the solver’s 
representation of the problem changed during problem solving. Thus, ratings on the 
first two occasions were dissimilar, then moderately similar on the next two 
occasions, and then highly similar after solution. No change in ratings was observed 
for the related and unrelated pairs. In other words, participants rated related pairs as 
related and unrelated pairs as unrelated to the problem on all five occasions. These 
results were interpreted to suggest that even successful solvers begin with an incorrect 
representation, but more importantly, restructuring did not occur suddenly, as 
proposed by Gestalt psychologists.
There is a notable similarity between the studies of Durso et al. (1994) and 
Metcalf and Wiebe (1987) as both collected judgment ratings during problem solving 
in an attempt to demonstrate representational change. However, the results were 
contradictory in that the former reported evidence against the Gestalt view of the 
suddenness of solution whereas the latter was in support of this view. Ash et al.
(2009) noted that the research by Durso et al. was confounded by design issues which 
question the conclusiveness of their results. Firstly, they did not compare the results 
with a problem that did not require restructuring. Secondly, participants in their study 
were allowed to ask the experimenter questions that required either a yes or no 
response. Thus, it was possible that the participants had gained additional information 
that was not available in the problem statement, which may reflect the gradual 
changes in similarity ratings rather than a change in representation per se. Finally, it 
was not known whether the pairs of critical concepts served as an indirect hint to
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those who solved the problem. Although Durso et al. used verbal ratings that could be 
subject to biases or indeed have no relationship to on-going representations, their 
study however made a promising attempt to demonstrate representational change 
during insight problem solving.
In summary, Gestalt psychologists argued that problem solving was more 
complex than simply reproducing learned responses. Particular emphasis was placed 
on the importance of understanding the structure (i.e., the relationship among parts) of 
the problem (Wertheimer, 1922) in a novel way to overcome an impasse. Unlike 
Gestalt Theory, the Problem Space Theory (Newell & Simon, 1972) focuses on the 
step by step process of searching for a solution path that connects the initial state to 
the goal state in well-defined problems. The most distinguishing feature of Gestalt 
Theory is the conceptualisation of insight as the sudden appearance into 
consciousness which is accompanied by a ‘aha’ experience following the 
reorganisation or restructuring of the problem. Indeed, studies do appear to show 
support for the suddenness of solution which is consistent with achieving insight (e.g., 
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kohler, 1925; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987), although this is 
extremely difficult to validate. However, studies that challenge this view have 
demonstrated that the insightful solution is often preceded by several unsuccessful 
solution attempts during problem solving (Durso et al., 1994; Weisberg & Alba,
1981). In other words, it is argued that the problem solver accumulates partial 
information at each solution attempt which in turn facilitates insight. Indeed, Ohlsson 
(1992) noted that even Gestalt psychologists acknowledged that the full (correct) 
solution to an insight problem may not occur at once. Further, research in support of 
the ‘aha’ experience has been criticised for lack of rigour and representativeness of 
problem solving as a limited number of problems were used to test the theory
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(Weisberg, 1986). The Gestalt Theory has been described as a general theory 
(Ohlsson, 1984a) and has been criticised for its vagueness, particularly for not 
answering what insight is and what processes underlie restructuring (Davidson, 2003). 
The subsequent sections will review representational change theories of insight 
problem solving and the processes proposed by such theories to overcome an impasse 
(Knoblich et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1984b, 1992).
2.3. Representational Change Theory (Ohlsson, 1992)
Ohlsson’s (1992) Representational Change Theory attempted to incorporate 
the constructs of ‘insight’ and ‘restructuring’ proposed by Gestalt Theory into an 
information processing theory of problem solving. Insight was conceptualised in 
terms of breaking out of an impasse. Hence, if there is no impasse in a problem, then 
that problem does not require insight. As in Gestalt Theory, Ohlsson also argued that 
the interpretation of a problem situation triggers a faulty initial representation that 
leads to an impasse. Further, an impasse is overcome or broken when the 
representation is changed i.e., it is reinterpreted, re-represented or is restructured 
(Ohlsson, 1984b). In this section Ohlsson’s explanation of the nature of insight is 
discussed first. Comparisons are made between Ohlsson’s approach and Gestalt 
Theory to explain why a solver experiences an impasse, how impasses are broken, and 
what happens after an impasse is broken. In particular, Ohlsson’s three mechanisms 
(elaboration, re-encoding, and constraint relaxation) by which an impasse may be 
broken to bring about representational change are discussed. It will be concluded that 
Ohlsson’s theory contradicts the suddenness of solution, as proposed by Gestalt 
Theory.
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According to Ohlsson, representational change can either result in partial or 
full insight. Partial insight entails breaking out of an impasse to enable (stepwise) 
problem solving to resume. For example, in the Anthony and Cleopatra problem 
solvers may correctly consider the names to not be associated to humans yet fail to 
realise that they refer to fish. In this case, partial insight is achieved as a result of 
restructuring although stepwise problem solving would not be feasible in such an ill- 
defined problem. Ohlsson contends that a series of partial insights may be needed 
before reaching the insightful solution. Contrary to the Gestalt view, Ohlsson suggests 
that restructuring can result in further impasses and that restructuring may not always 
lead to the solution. However, full insight entails breaking out of an impasse and 
‘seeing’ the complete solution. That is, once the solver sees the solution to a problem, 
that solution can be attained swiftly without further errors. Based on the distinction 
between partial and full-insight, Ohlsson claimed that what Gestalt psychologists 
referred to as the suddenness of solution that is accompanied by a ‘aha’ experience is 
essentially the achievement of full insight by a solver that may be the result of a series 
of partial insights.
Ohlsson (1992) argued that a problem solver encounters an impasse because 
their initial encoding of a problem (i.e., the initial representation) is based on their 
past knowledge and experiences, which do not activate the relevant operators to solve 
the problem. A similar explanation was provided by the Gestalt approach. However, 
Ohlsson claimed that a solver has the knowledge operators to solve a problem, which 
are retrieved from memory via an unconscious automatic process called ‘spreading 
activation’. To activate these operators, the solver must change their representation of 
the problem such that a new representation can serve as a new source of activation 
(Ohlsson, 1984b). Whereas Gestalt Theory did not specify what processes may
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underlie representational change, Ohlsson suggested three mechanisms. These were:
1) elaboration or addition of new information; 2) re-encoding, which entails focusing 
on correcting the faulty representation of a problem that is mistaken rather than 
incomplete by re-categorising or deleting some information; and 3) constraint 
relaxation, in which incorrect assumptions or constraints on the goal are altered. Each 
mechanism is examined below.
Elaboration entails adding new information, without deleting or revising 
existing information, by closely examining and noticing features o f a problem that 
were previously unnoticed. Alternatively, Ohlsson (1992) notes that new information 
can be added to a representation by recalling information from memory e.g., 
remembering that a metal lid on ajar will expand if placed in hot water. Ohlsson gave 
the example of Kaplan and Simon’s (1990) mutilated checkerboard problem to 
illustrate how the addition of information to a representation occurs via elaboration. In 
this problem, the board is initially covered by 32 dominoes which occupied two 
squares each. Two squares were removed from two opposite comers of the 
checkerboard and participants were asked to determine whether the remaining 62 
squares could be filled with 31 dominoes. Ohlsson argued that it is unlikely that 
solvers initially encode the colours of the squares as they do not recognise its 
relevance to the solution that 31 dominoes cannot cover the board. To attain the 
solution, the solver must recognise two features of the problem: that all squares on the 
diagonal line are the same colour and that each domino must cover one square of one 
colour and another square of another colour. Ohlsson notes that when these two 
features were noticed by the solvers, the solution was attained quickly. This 
observation was interpreted as evidence for elaboration of the problem that enabled
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the solver to acquire a new representation of the checkerboard in terms of it losing 
two white or black squares.
Another mechanism for representational change is re-encoding. Ohlsson 
(1992) contended that elaboration focuses on an initial representation of a problem 
that is incomplete whereas re-encoding focuses on an incorrect or mistaken 
representation. That is, the solver must abandon or reject some component of their 
current representation via re-encoding. Ohlsson gave the examples of Duncker’s 
(1945) candle problem and Maier’s (1931) two string problem to illustrate re­
encoding. In the former problem, a box must be re-encoded as a platform rather than a 
container to attain the solution. In the latter problem, the pliers must be used as a 
pendulum; therefore the solver must re-encode its function as a weight rather than a 
tool.
The final mechanism, constraint relaxation, focuses on the implicit constraints 
imposed by the solver that must be relaxed in order to overcome an impasse. Thus, 
constraint relaxation is argued to be different from elaboration and re-encoding 
because it changes the mental representation of the problem goal (solution) rather than 
the problem situation. For example, Ohlsson suggested that the nine-dot problem is 
less difficult once the solver relaxes the constraint that they can draw a line beyond 
the imaginary square formed by the nine dots. However, research by Weisberg and 
Alba (1981), discussed earlier, found that increasing a solver’s awareness of this 
constraint did not facilitate insight unless a solution-specific hint was also given.
More recently, MacGregor et al. (2001) also found that instruction to remove this self- 
imposed constraint did not always produce solution on the nine-dot problem. In fact, 
only 31% solved the problem. Indeed, Ohlsson acknowledged that the validity of the 
constraint relaxation analysis for the nine-dot problem is open to debate.
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Although Ohlsson (1992) provided examples of insight problems to illustrate 
how each mechanism may facilitate representational change, it is however unclear to 
what extent these mechanisms are distinct. Further, if  several impasses are 
encountered when attempting to solve a problem, then it follows that each impasse 
may be overcome by a different mechanism. For example, instead of elaborating on 
the colour of the squares on the mutilated checkerboard problem (Kaplan & Simon, 
1990), it is possible that the board is re-encoded such that pairs of squares are the 
same size as the dominoes being used to cover it. Alternatively, problem solvers may 
be constrained by assuming that the problem is not solvable and thus show fewer 
solution attempts. In the case of the nine-dot problem, elaboration may also help focus 
the problem solver to think beyond the boundaries of the nine dots. Fleck and 
Weisberg (2004) suggest that the candle problem may not be solved using re­
encoding, as proposed by Ohlsson. Instead, solution may be reached by elaborating 
the problem information and realising that a platform is required. This solution 
actually arose from several unsuccessful solution attempts in Fleck and Weisberg’s 
study.
Research has largely focussed on investigating Ohlsson’s (1992) constraint 
relaxation mechanism and support has been reported using a variety of insight 
problems including the six-coin (Chronicle, MacGregor, & Ormerod, 2004), 
matchstick arithmetic (Knoblich et al., 1991, 2001), the unlimited move car park 
game (Jones, 2003), and verbal insight problems (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000). 
Indeed, Ohlsson noted that most insight problems incur impasses because the solver 
imposes constraints that make a problem unsolvable. However, elaboration and re­
encoding have received little attention. A recent study by Ansburg and Dominowski 
(2000) suggests that these two mechanisms may not be distinct. They found that
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training geared towards elaboration problems i.e., problems requiring a change in 
representation through elaboration of information facilitated performance on both 
elaboration and constraint relaxation test problems. These results suggest that the 
same underlying processes may be involved in solving both elaboration and constraint 
relaxation type problems.
Representational Change Theory and Gestalt Theory also differ in terms of 
their explanation concerning what happens after an impasse is broken or after the 
‘aha* experience. Firstly, in contrast to Gestalt Theory, Ohlsson argued that 
representational change does not always lead to a better representation. Further, it 
does not guarantee solution attainment. Ohlsson argued that representational change 
merely facilitates an impasse to be broken to enable the solver to resume problem 
solving. Secondly, Gestalt psychologists contend that the insight solution appears 
suddenly into consciousness as a result of reorganising or restructuring the problem 
representation. Ohlsson hypothesised that this suddenness of solution is in fact an 
illusion due to the solver’s lack of introspective access to the cognitive processes that 
lead to the solution. Therefore, a solution to a problem is constructed at the moment of 
insight but due the capacity limits of human cognition, this construction is simple and 
of a short duration, which is why it is unnoticed by the solver. This hypothesis appears 
to be consistent with studies that have demonstrated solution attainment preceding 
several failed solution attempts (Durso et al., 1994; Weisberg & Alba, 1981).
In summary, Representational Change Theory provides a more detailed 
account of the Gestalt terms ‘insight’ and ‘restructuring’. Insight is explained in 
relation to impasses experienced during problem solving. Further, the theory specified 
three possible cognitive mechanisms (elaboration, re-encoding, and constraint 
relaxation) that may facilitate representational change although it was acknowledged
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that other mechanisms may exist. However, there is a lack of research that has 
attempted to investigate the elaboration and re-encoding mechanisms, although 
constraint relaxation has received greater support, thus suggesting that it plays an 
important role in problem solving. A criticism of the theory is that it is not always 
possible to predict when and how the representation of a problem will change during 
problem solving. The key difference between the Gestalt approach and Ohlsson’s 
theory is that the former contends that insight is attained following a sudden 
reorganisation of ones understanding of a problem whereas Ohlsson rejected this 
proposition. Ohlsson suggested that solvers have a lack of awareness of the cognitive 
processes that lead up to the solution, hence why the solution may appear to be 
sudden. Further, it was suggested that the insight solution may be reached after a 
series of partial insights that involve much information processing, which in turn may 
lead the solver closer to the solution. In other words, partial information is 
accumulated during problem solving which contributes to solution attainment.
2.4. Restructuring Change Theory (Knoblich et al., 1999)
Knoblich et al.’s (1999) Restructuring Change Theory is similar to Ohlsson’s 
(1992) Representational Change Theory in two ways. Firstly, both theories agree that 
insight problems trigger a faulty representation that leads the solver into an impasse. 
Secondly, both theories emphasise that impasses are resolved by altering the faulty 
representation via particular cognitive processes. Ohlsson (1992) proposed three 
processes underlying representational change (elaboration, re-encoding, and constraint 
relaxation), whereas Restructuring Change Theory advocates two processes, namely, 
constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition, where the former process is the same 
as that proposed by Ohlsson. Research by Knoblich and colleagues that tested the
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Restructuring Change Theory are discussed below. It is concluded that chunk 
decomposition is in scope to a particular type of insight problem whereas support for 
constraint relaxation extends to a variety of insight problems.
Knoblich et al. (1999) argued that chunk decomposition corresponds to an 
element in a problem representation that can be broken down further. For example, in 
matchstick arithmetic, the Roman Numerals VII can be decomposed into the chunks 
V and II whereas tight chunks such as X are less likely to be decomposed as two 
slanted sticks because they have no meaning within the problem context and thus are 
not chunks themselves. The second process, constraint relaxation, is not proposed to 
be either deliberate or voluntary. Knoblich et al. suggest that by relaxing the 
constraints in a problem the set of options available to a problem solver is expanded. 
Similarly, Ohlsson (1992) in his Representational Change Theory suggested that the 
relaxation of self-imposed constraints allows the activation of dormant operators. 
However, Knoblich et al. argued that the ease at which constraint relaxation occurs is 
dependent upon the scope of the constraint, which is determined by how much a 
problem representation is affected by relaxing that constraint. It was proposed that the 
wider the scope of a constraint, the lower the likelihood that the constraint will be 
relaxed.
Knoblich et al. (1999) provided support for their theory using matchstick 
arithmetic problems that were presented using Roman numerals. The goal was to 
move a single stick so that an initial false equation is transformed into a true equation. 
For example, moving from the false equation VI = VII + 1 to the true one VII = VI + I. 
Some problems (Type A) required changing the values (numbers) in the equation 
whereas others problems (Type B) required a change in representation of the equation 
by altering operators (i.e., +, -, and = signs). Knoblich et al. argued that our
43
experience of arithmetic is more towards changing values in an equation rather than 
changing operators, therefore this knowledge can inhibit problem solving. It was 
found that participants encountered difficulties in solving Type B problems, which 
was interpreted to suggest that solvers were unable to relax the constraints of 
arithmetic.
Knoblich et al. (2001) argued that the above experiment did not provide direct 
evidence for what was causing difficulties with Type B problems. Hence, they 
monitored eye movements whilst participants solved the matchstick problems used by 
Knoblich et al. (1999). They found that participants fixated on values rather than 
operators when attempting to solve both types of problems, which was interpreted to 
suggest that participants’ initial representation of the problems was based on the 
incorrect assumption that the values required change. Participants showed increased 
fixation for problems that required representational change, which was interpreted to 
suggest that an impasse was encountered. Those who were successful at solving Type 
B problems showed longer fixation on operators, presumably because they realised 
that a change in an operator was needed to reach the solution. Further, successful 
participants showed an ability to shift their attention to a part of a problem that they 
had previously neglected, which was argued to be the result of representational 
change. In conclusion, these results also suggest that the representation of a problem 
has a strong influence on problem solving.
In general, matchstick arithmetic problems are particularly suitable in 
illustrating support for the two mechanisms of representational change proposed by 
Knoblich et al. i.e., constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition. Constraint 
relaxation is indeed one process by which representational change takes place in a 
variety of insight problems including verbal insight problems (Ansburg &
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Dominowski, 2000; Wicker et al., 1978), yet the applicability of chunk decomposition 
does not extend as well to verbal problems as it is the semantic meaning of words in a 
problem that influences the mental representation. Therefore, decomposing the words 
to individual letters in such problems will not be useful.
In summary, Restructuring Change Theory is consistent with Gestalt Theory 
and Representational Change Theory in that all three approaches contend that insight 
is achieved once restructuring is facilitated by overcoming an impasse. However, 
Gestalt Theory did not specify any processes that may facilitate restructuring, whereas 
Representational Change Theory specified three mechanisms and Restructuring 
Change Theory specified two processes. In particular, Restructuring Change Theory 
drew our attention to an additional cognitive process i.e., chunk decomposition, which 
is more suited to explaining how insight problems such as matchstick arithmetic 
problems may be broken down into individual chunks to aid representational change.
2.5. Progress Monitoring Theory (MacGregor et al., 2001)
Progress Monitoring Theory provides an alternative view to the 
representational change accounts of insight problem solving by suggesting that an 
impasse results from the inappropriate application of heuristics rather than an 
inappropriate mental representation of the problem (MacGregor et al., 2001). This 
section begins with an overview of Progress Monitoring Theory which is followed by 
an evaluation of research that tested this theory (MacGregor et al., 2001; Ormerod et 
al., 2002). Next, research that attempted to test the predictions of both Progress 
Monitoring Theory and Representational Change theories are evaluated (Jones, 2003; 
Ollinger et al., 2006). It is argued that recent research suggests that an impasse results 
from an inappropriate problem representation rather than the inappropriate application
45
of heuristics. Moreover, representational change determines what heuristics are 
applied during insight problem solving. It will be concluded that the generality of this 
theory is limited to visuo-spatial insight problems.
Progress Monitoring Theory has some similarity to Newell and Simon’s 
(1972) Problem Space Theory, as both emphasise the role of heuristics in problem 
solving, although the latter is in scope to well-defined problems. This theory is based 
around the hill-climbing idea that problem solving proceeds with the solver seeking to 
minimise the distance between the current state and the goal or subgoal state. An 
impasse occurs when hill-climbing does not result in a solution, therefore alternative 
searches are explored to overcome this impasse. Two heuristics are central to Progress 
Monitoring Theory: maximisation and progress monitoring. The maximisation 
heuristic is similar to means-end analysis proposed by Problem Space Theory in that 
the solver works towards attaining the goal with each move. Progress monitoring is 
used by the solver to assess their rate of progress towards the goal. When the rate of 
progress is considered too slow to solve a problem within the maximum number of 
permissible moves, criterion failure occurs, which leads the solver to consider 
alternative searches that may lead to insight. However, solution is likely to be 
achieved earlier the sooner criterion failure is experienced. In contrast to 
Representational Change Theory, Progress Monitoring Theory contends that 
constraint relaxation is often necessary but not sufficient for achieving insight 
(MacGregor et al., 2001). That is, constraint relaxation will facilitate problem solving 
for those who experience criterion failure. The probability of experiencing an impasse 
in a problem is dependent on a person’s lookahead value i.e., the capacity of potential 
moves an individual can lookahead and remember. It was proposed that those with
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high lookahead will achieve insight quicker as they will realise sooner that the 
problem cannot be solved with traditional methods (MacGregor et al., 2001).
MacGregor et al. (2001) demonstrated support for their theory using the nine- 
dot problem, which is a visuo-spatial insight problem. Participants were given this 
problem but with a line already drawn. It was found that a line that extended 
horizontally across the top three dots and to a nondot point was less helpful in 
comparison to a diagonal line that went from the top left dot to the bottom right dot. 
According to Representational Change Theory, the former should have been 
beneficial as it removes the constraint that the lines are bound inside the square. 
However, those given the diagonal line demonstrated better performance, which 
MacGregor et al. argued forced participants to consider alternative solutions more 
quickly because drawing two additional lines whilst keeping inside the square would 
have resulted in three more dots being crossed out (Jones, 2003). However, this result 
is not surprising as earlier research has demonstrated that solution-specific hints 
facilitate performance on the nine-dot problem (e.g., Weisberg & Alba, 1981).
A later study by Ormerod et al. (2002) found similar results as MacGregor et 
al. (2001) using the eight-coin problem, which is also a visuo-spatial insight problem. 
Participants were presented with a configuration of eight coins and instructed to 
remove two coins, within a specified number of moves, so that each of the eight coins 
touched only three coins. The solution required the solver to represent the problem in 
three-dimensional terms such that the coins can be stacked on top of each other. 
Participants were given different versions of the problem that manipulated the number 
of moves available in which a coin can touch three other coins. It was found that in 
versions where there were no moves available, the problem was solved quicker than 
in versions where several moves were available. Ormerod et al. argued that, as in the
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case of the nine-dot experiment (MacGregor et al., 2001), the number of moves 
available determined how quickly alternative solutions were sought. These results 
support Ash and Wiley (2006) who suggested that insight problems involving many 
moves require the solver to search a larger problem space, whereas problems with a 
few or no moves require a shorter search, therefore the solver reaches an impasse and 
restructuring sooner.
Jones (2003) suggested that the problems in scope to Progress Monitoring 
Theory and Representational Change Theory differ in that the former cannot be 
applied to problems that can be solved in one move because it relies on the constant 
monitoring of progress during problem solving. Jones tested both theories using the 
car-park game, which is an unlimited move (visuo-spatial) insight problem. The game 
entails manoeuvring a taxi out of a car park but the way to the exit is obstructed by 
other cars. The goal is to determine how the cars can be moved out of the way to 
enable the taxi to leave the car park. This problem is considered difficult because 
solvers fail to realise that the taxi must be moved before an exit route can be created. 
In other words, the lack of awareness of this critical move places a constraint on the 
problem solution. Participants were given practice problems although none required 
them to move the taxi to create a path to the exit. The knowledge gained from the 
practice was manipulated such that it could be applied to the car-park problem. 
Representational Change Theory predicts that practice problems should lead 
participants to assume that the taxi does not need to be moved, which should hinder 
performance on the car-park problem. In contrast, Progress Monitoring theory 
predicts that the practice problems should have no effect as performance is based on 
reducing the difference between the initial state and goal state. The results provided 
greater support for Representational Change Theory as performance was higher when
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easy practice problems or a rotated version of the problem was given. Despite the 
different emphasis and scope of application of both theories, both advocate that 
insight problem solving involves some kind of restructuring of the initial faulty 
representation. A key difference between Progress Monitory Theory and 
Representational Change Theory is that the former accounts for the solution process 
until an impasse is reached and representational change is required, whereas the latter 
accounts for how an impasse is overcome to achieve insight (Jones, 2003).
Ollinger et al. (2006) investigated the relationship between heuristics and 
representational change in insight problem solving. In particular, they tested whether 
the main source of difficulty in insight problem solving arises from the use of 
inappropriate heuristics (MacGregor et al., 2001), or from self-imposed constraints on 
a given problem (Knoblich et al., 1999,2001; Ohlsson, 1992), or whether both 
sources of difficulty influence insight problem solving (Jones, 2003). Matchstick 
arithmetic problems used by Knoblich et al. (1999) were adapted to create two 
different types of problem that required solvers to make two moves to transform an 
incorrect statement into a correct one. One type of problem required a value 
(numbers) move and an operator (i.e., +, -, or = sign) move in order to reduce the 
distance to the goal. Another type of problem required a value and an operator move, 
which initially increased the distance to the goal, and the solution had a tautological 
structure. The latter type of problem is considered more difficult because the 
constraints that operators are constant and that an equation may have two operators 
have to be relaxed. The distance to a goal is defined as the numerical difference 
between the left and right side of the equation. For example, the following equation 
IV = IV + VI has a distance of four, which requires a value and an operator move. 
Hence, I from the VI must be moved before the V to make IV = IV + IV, thereby
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increasing the distance to six. Then the vertical stick from the + operator must be 
placed horizontally to make the + into a =. The solution (IV = IV = IV) has a 
tautological structure with a distance of zero.
dllinger et al. (2006) used these problems to test the assumptions of both 
Progress Monitoring Theory and Representational Change Theory. According to 
Progress Monitoring Theory, the maximization heuristic should be used to reduce the 
distance to make the left and right side of the equation more similar. Further, the 
progress monitoring heuristic is used to assess progress after every move to determine 
whether there is a consecutive move that would balance both sides of the equation.
The theory predicts that problems requiring moves to reduce the distance to the goal 
should be easier than problems that require moves to increase the distance to the goal, 
which has been previously demonstrated in well-defined problems such as the Hobbits 
and Ore problem (Thomas, 1974). Representational Change Theory predicts that 
problem difficulty in matchstick problems is determined by the degree to which 
constraint relaxation is required. Thus, problems requiring a value and an operator 
move to produce a tautological structure will be more difficult because of the greater 
nature of constraints involved.
The results by dllinger et al. (2006) indicated that the type of move required 
and whether a move increased or reduced the difference to the goal did not influence 
problem difficulty. Instead, problem difficultly was influenced by whether or not 
representational change was required. Hence, performance was poorer for equations 
requiring a solution with a tautological structure, which was likely to be due to the 
greater degree of representational change required by these problems. These findings 
were interpreted to suggest that solvers do not prefer an approach that reduces the 
distance to the goal and thus similar conclusions to Jones (2003) were drawn. That is,
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Progress Monitoring Theory explains problem solving before an impasse, in which 
inappropriate heuristics are applied to an inappropriate representation, and 
Representational Change Theory explains the impasse phase in which the 
representation is changed by applying more appropriate heuristics.
In summary, support for Progress Monitoring theory comes from visuo-spatial 
insight problems. To some degree, these problems can be broken down into states that 
are determined by a move made by the solver. In contrast, verbal insight problems 
cannot be conceptualised in terms of states, therefore the heuristics emphasised by 
Progress Monitoring Theory are not applicable to solving these problems. However, 
recent research suggests that representational change determines which heuristics are 
applied to overcome impasse in the types of insight problems in scope to Progress 
Monitoring Theory (Ollinger et al., 2006). Therefore, the importance of 
representational change in overcoming difficulties in insight problem solving was 
emphasised.
2.6. Summary
Insight problems are considered difficult because a problem solver’s past 
knowledge activates unhelpful information which consequently inhibits the 
knowledge that is required to solve a problem. A faulty problem representation is 
formed and solvers inevitably experience an impasse. The theoretical approaches to 
understanding insight problem solving discussed above differ mainly in terms of their 
focus on how insight, or solution, to a problem is achieved. Although Problem Space 
Theory is not in scope to insight problems, it is nonetheless useful in explaining how 
problem solving occurs within the problem space of a problem. The premise of 
Gestalt Theory is that the problem representation, i.e., how people perceive, interpret,
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or organise information influence solution generation. Insight problem solving is 
characterised by an initial period of no progress (i.e., impasse), followed by a sudden 
restructuring of the problem representation and the sudden appearance of the insight 
solution, although some research suggests that a solution is preceded by several failed 
solution attempts (Durso et al., 1994; Weisberg & Alba, 1981). However, this view 
did not explain how a problem is re-represented.
The representational change accounts also suggest that impasses occur due to 
an inappropriate problem representation that constrains the problem space (Knoblich 
et al., 2001; Ohlsson, 1992). However, unlike Gestalt Theory, Representational 
Change Theory and Restructuring Change Theory specify possible mechanisms 
underlying representational change, with constraint relaxation receiving much 
support. Further, Representational Change Theory contradicts the Gestalt view of the 
suddenness of solution and instead suggests that information gathered during failed 
solution attempts i.e., partial insights lead the solver to the insight solution. The 
solution appears to be sudden to the solver because they have a lack of awareness of 
the processes that lead up to the solution. The alternative viewpoint proposed by 
Progress Monitoring Theory is that impasses occur as a result of inappropriate 
application of heuristics within the problem solving process (MacGregor et al., 2001) 
rather than due to an inappropriate problem representation. However, research 
suggests that Progress Monitoring Theory is in scope to visuo-spatial insight problems 
only. Further, recent research suggests that representational change is the key factor 
that determines the appropriate application of heuristics on the representation 
(dllinger et al., 2006). In conclusion, it would seem that a faulty problem 
representation plays a critical role in explaining the difficulties experienced in solving 
insight problems. The next chapter, Chapter 3, provides a review of the different
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methodological approaches that have aimed to promote representational change to 
facilitate insight.
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CHAPTER 3 
Review of methods that facilitate insight problem solving
In this chapter, methods that facilitate insight problem solving are reviewed including 
the role of incubation (Sio & Ormerod, 2009; Wallas, 1926), hints (Kaplan & Simon, 
1990; Maier, 1931; Weisberg & Alba, 1981); and training (Ansburg & Dominowski, 
2000; Chrysikou, 2006; Dow & Mayer, 2004; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Wicker et 
al., 1978). It is argued that the positive effects of incubation are limited to a narrow 
range of problems whereas the hints approach is only effective when it is tailored to 
the solution of specific test problems. Therefore, training may offer the best approach 
for investigating the facilitation of a range of novel insight problems. Furthermore, the 
focus of training, as suggested by insight theories, should be on promoting 
representational change or restructuring to achieve solution.
3.1. Incubation
It has been documented that a flash of insight occurs when a problem is put 
aside and attention is temporarily shifted away from the problem (Wallas, 1926). 
Wallas (1926) labelled this temporary abstention from conscious problem solving as 
‘incubation’, where incubation is defined ‘as an increase in the probability of finding 
the solution to a problem after a pause’ (Schooler et al., 1993, p. 171). Thus, 
providing a break during insight problem solving allows for incubation to take place. 
This section will discuss the evidence in support of incubation and provide possible 
explanations for why incubation works.
A recent meta-analytic review of 117 empirical studies by Sio and Ormerod 
(2009) provides support for the existence of incubation effects in problem solving and
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suggests some potential moderators including whether the incubation period is filled 
or not, length of the preparation period, and the type of problem solved. Thus, greater 
performance was found when the incubation period was filled with intervening 
activities in contrast to working continuously on a problem or having a rest whilst 
solving the problem. Performance was also positively correlated with longer 
preparation periods. Finally, positive incubation effects were found more for creative 
writing problems (i.e., problems that have multiple solutions) than linguistic problems 
(i.e., those that require the solver to consider linguistic information in the problem 
e.g., riddles) and visual problems (i.e., those that require the solver to consider visuo- 
spatial information in the problem e.g., Duncker’s 1945 candle problem). These 
findings imply that incubation is less likely to be helpful in solving verbal insight 
problems, which are used by experiments reported in this thesis.
Three of the most prominent hypotheses proposed to explain the effects of 
incubation are spreading activation, selective forgetting, and problem restructuring 
hypotheses. The spreading activation hypothesis (Smith, 1995; Yaniv & Meyer, 1987) 
proposed that activation spreads to previously ignored items that are relevant to the 
solution. The selective forgetting hypothesis (Smith, 1995) proposed that time not 
spent on the problem weakens the activation of inappropriate information that 
distracts the solution path in the initial attempts at problem solving. Finally, the 
problem restructuring hypothesis proposed that a solver’s mental representation of a 
problem will be reorganised after several unsuccessful attempts. Hence restructuring 
may occur through adopting a new problem strategy (MacGregor et al., 2001) or by 
relaxing self-imposed constraints that inhibit problem solution (Knoblich et al., 1999; 
Ohlsson, 1992; Segal, 2004).
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Sio and Ormerod (2009) reported that support for the above hypotheses is 
specific to particular problem types. Hence, support for spreading activation comes 
from creative problems that have multiple solutions requiring a wide search of the 
solver’s knowledge, which is facilitated by an incubation period. If the solution to the 
problem lies within already activated knowledge that is represented incorrectly, then 
widening the search for new knowledge is unlikely to be helpful. Support for the 
restructuring hypotheses comes from linguistic (or verbal) and visual (or visuo- 
spatial) problems, which have one possible solution. Verbal problems illustrate 
restructuring resulting from the relaxation of inappropriate constraints (Ansburg & 
Dominowski, 2000), whereas visuo-spatial problems illustrate restructuring resulting 
from a strategic shift in the search process following an impasse (MacGregor et al., 
2001). Finally, support for the forgetting hypothesis is mixed.
To summarise, insight problems are difficult because inappropriate knowledge 
leads a solver to form an incorrect representation of a problem. Therefore, incubation 
provides time for the solver to forget such inappropriate knowledge and to view a 
problem from a fresh perspective upon returning to the problem. Positive effects of 
incubation have been linked to linguistic and visual problems although the 
phenomenon of incubation does not explain how the correct problem representation is 
identified. Moreover, research has demonstrated that insight still occurs even when no 
incubation period is provided (Dow & Mayer, 2004; Knoblich et al., 1999; Macgregor 
et al., 2001; Wicker et al., 1978). Thus, incubation may partly explain the process of 
insight on some occasions. In conclusion, the evidence in support of incubation 
effects is mixed (Dorfinan, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996; Sio & Ormerod, 2009), as it 
is never clear-cut whether the problem solver has actually stopped trying to solve a 
problem during the break. As suggested by Sio and Ormerod (2009), incubation is
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perhaps best understood through close examination of the problem to which it is 
applied and the conditions under which it is observed.
3.2. Hints approach
Another approach to facilitating insight problem solving is to provide the 
problem solver with a problem-specific hint. Research that has investigated the hints 
approach, which has mainly focussed on visuo-spatial insight problems, is reviewed 
below. It will be concluded that hints are only helpful when they are tailored 
specifically to the solution of the test problem.
Studies investigating the effects of hints can be traced back as early as Maier’s 
(1931) experiment of the two-string problem, in which the experimenter appeared to 
accidentally brush against a string hanging from a ceiling which prompted the solver 
to attain the solution that items can be used as weights to swing one rope closer to the 
other. The underlying mechanisms for how hints operate are explained by insight 
problem solving theories. According to Progress Monitoring theory (MacGregor et al., 
2001), hints expose the solver to problem-relevant information. Consequently, the 
solver is able to discover alternative moves when they experience criterion failure as a 
result of an impasse. In terms of Representational Change theory (Ohlsson, 1992), 
hints guide the solver to relax self-imposed constraints that otherwise block them 
from gaining insight into a problem.
The hints approach has predominantly been applied to facilitate performance 
on visuo-spatial problems (e.g., Burnham & Davis, 1969; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; 
Lung & Dominowski, 1985; Weisberg & Alba, 1981). For example, Kaplan and 
Simon (1990) tested the effectiveness of different types of hints to aid performance on 
the mutilated checkerboard problem. Verbal protocols were collected to examine
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changes in the problem space more thoroughly. They found that when participants 
were given a ‘parity* hint regarding what they might do to solve the problem, 
performance was greater than when given an ‘impossible’ hint i.e., what actions 
would be impossible in facilitating solution. These results were interpreted to suggest 
that ‘parity’ hints guided the solver to focus on finding an appropriate problem 
representation within the specific domain of the problem space, whereas the 
‘impossible’ hint directed the solver to generate other unhelpful representations of the 
problem. However, Kaplan and Simon’s observations do not indicate how 
participants’ identified the need for a new problem representation or what processes 
were involved in generating a new representation (Bohannon, 1994). Furthermore, it 
is not known whether such hints are generalisable to other insight problems (Cheung, 
Kong, Li, Wong, & McBride-Chang, 2005).
Several studies have developed hints to facilitate performance on the nine-dot 
problem, which is another visuo-spatial problem. Burnham and Davis (1969) gave 
participants an instruction to extend the line beyond the boundary of the nine-dot 
square. A training effect of 23% was found in the hint condition, whereas a later study 
by Lung and Dominowski (1985) found a 34% training effect. However, Weisberg 
and Alba (1981, Experiment 1) found 100% improvement when this hint was 
combined with a drawn line that was part of the solution to the problem. Weisberg 
and Alba’s result is not surprising as giving hints that are directly related to the 
problem solution narrow the problem space and provide a critical starting point for the 
solution process.
Few studies have investigated the effects of hints, sometimes referred to as 
strategic instructions, in solving verbal insight problems (e.g., Ansburg & 
Dominowski, 2000; Perfetto, Bransford, & Franks, 1983; Wicker et al., 1978). The
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hints utilised by these studies have differed in terms of their specificity. That is, some 
studies have provided general hints such as re-interpreting a problem several times to 
avoid making incorrect assumptions (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Wicker et al., 
1978), with training effects ranging between 48% (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000) 
and 63% (Wicker et al., 1978, Experiment 2). On the other hand, others have 
investigated whether giving hints that were directly related to problem solution 
improved performance on several verbal insight problems such as the following 
(Perfetto et al., 1983, p. 25):
‘A man living in a small town in the U.S. married twenty different women in 
the same town. All are still living and he has never divorced one of them. Yet, 
he has broken no law. Can you explain?’
Perfetto et al. (1983) presented participants with hints, referred to as ‘clues’ in their 
study, prior to problem solving. For example, the clue related to the above problem 
was ‘A minister marries several people each week’. The solution was that the man 
was a minister/priest. It was found that only the participants who were explicitly told 
that the clue would help them to solve the problems performed well (54%). It is 
surprising that the training effect was not much higher as the clue was directly linked 
to the problem solution. However, participants who were not prompted to use the 
clues performed as poorly (29%) as those who were not given any hints at all (19%). 
An important implication of these findings is that to be able to use new knowledge or 
problem-relevant hints, it is critical that participants are made aware of the relevance 
of this knowledge.
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In summary, research suggests that the hints approach facilitates positive 
transfer although the transfer effect is higher when the hint is directly linked to or 
gives a way a part of the solution to a problem. However, a general criticism of the 
hints approach is that, in providing a hint, the novelty of the problem is diminished 
whilst prompting the solution to the problem. Further, in order to be able to devise a 
useful hint, the solution to a problem must be known in advance. From an applied 
perspective, the generalisablity of solution-specific hints is likely to be limited, 
particularly given the variability among insight problems. In any case, everyday 
problems are not accompanied by explicit hints and research indicates that problem 
solvers habitually default to past knowledge and experiences to aid them in their 
problem solving (Knoblich et al., 1992; Ohlsson, 1992; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995).
3.3. Training
A number of experimental studies have demonstrated that insight can be 
facilitated through training (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Chrysikou, 2006; 
Cunningham & MacGregor, 2008; Lung & Dominowski, 1985; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 
2004; Weisberg & Alba, 1981; Wicker et al., 1978). The central aim of training is to 
facilitate transfer, in which previous learning is applied to solve a current task or 
problem. Positive transfer occurs when past experiences enable a person to solve a 
problem. In contrast, negative transfer occurs when past experiences inhibit problem 
solving (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Luchins, 1942). There are two types of training: specific 
training and generic training. The former is aimed at facilitating transfer to test 
problems that involve the application of the same rules or procedures as those 
inculcated during training whereas the latter aims to facilitate transfer to a wider range 
of problems. Much of the research on training in problem solving is specific in that
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positive transfer is facilitated to a similar problem soluble with the same process or 
heuristics that were learnt during training (e.g., Burnham & Davis, 1969; Chronicle et 
al., 2001; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Weisberg & Alba, 1981).
This section will first review research studies that have investigated specific 
training and transfer on insight problem solving to demonstrate that transfer effects 
are dependent on the degree of similarity between training and test problems. This is 
followed by a review of key generic training studies that have facilitated transfer to a 
range of different insight problems. It will be concluded that whilst specific training 
can be successful to some degree in facilitating positive transfer, the most important 
and difficult challenge is to develop more generic training that does not cue the 
specific answer to a problem and results in positive transfer to a variety of different 
problems.
3.3.1. Specific training and positive transfer
In the case of insight problem solving, the training literature highlights that 
transfer tends to be specific (e.g., Chronicle et al., 2001, Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004a; 
Weisberg & Alba, 1981) such that what is learnt during training can be directly 
applied to solve test problems that are similar to training problems. However, research 
has generally focussed on improving performance on visuo-spatial insight problems 
such as the four-dot problem (e.g., Weisberg & Alba, 1981, Experiment 4) and the 
nine-dot problem (e.g., Burnham & Davis, 1969; Chronicle et al., 2001, Experiment 3; 
Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004a; Weisberg & Alba, 1981, Experiment 2), with less 
attention paid to verbal insight problems. This section provides a review of specific 
training studies that have investigated visuo-spatial insight problems to conclude that 
the generality of the training is limited to a few specific problems.
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An example of specific training that aimed to facilitate transfer on the nine-dot 
problem is provided by Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004). The authors assert that insight 
problems are difficult to solve because the solver is hindered by multiple sources of 
difficulty posed by a problem. They speculated three sources of difficulty that need to 
be alleviated to improve performance on the nine-dot problem. These sources include 
difficulties in processing the problem information, the influence o f prior knowledge, 
and the way the problem is perceived by the solver. To overcome these difficulties, 
Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004, Experiment 3) trained participants in making non-dot 
turns i.e., making a turn where there is no dot, which is considered crucial to solving 
the nine-dot problem. The solution rate was raised from 7% to 40%, thus suggesting 
that other sources of difficulties excluding the ones identified by Kershaw and 
Ohlsson may operate in the nine-dot problem.
An earlier study by Weisberg and Alba (1981, Experiment 2) found training to 
go outside the pattern of dots for a four and ten dot problem raised the solution rate 
from 0% to 43% for the nine-dot problem. However, it is unlikely that training was 
maximised in the study by Weisberg and Alba as participants were not provided with 
feedback concerning their performance on the training problems, which may have 
limited improvement. Indeed, more recent research using verbal problems has found 
that solution feedback on practice problems can facilitate the solution of test problems 
(Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000, Experiment 4).
‘Shape training’ is another approach to specific training that has been utilised 
to facilitate transfer to visuo-spatial problems such as the four-dot problem (e.g., 
Weisberg & Alba, 1981, Experiment 4). In Weisberg and Alba’s (1981) study, the 
shape that was practised during training could be directly transposed to the solution of 
the four-dot test problem. It was found that shape training was successful when this
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shape was still relevant after one dot had been eliminated from the test problem. This 
highlights that the degree of specificity of the training with respect to the solution of a 
problem is very important in facilitating transfer. However, in addition to shape 
training in the Weisberg and Alba study, the practice problems allowed participants to 
join the dots together, thus facilitating outside dot turns on the four-dot problem. This 
may have contributed to the 91% solution rate that was found for the four-dot 
problem. It is not surprising that such problem-specific training is successful given 
that training is so closely oriented to the problem solution. However, this type of 
training is not 100% successful, which suggests that the context generated by the 
problem specification can still have strong inhibitory effects despite the fact that 
training is specifically tailored to the solution of that problem. Indeed, as discussed 
above, the transfer literature highlights that solvers need to be made aware of the 
relevance of their newly learnt skills to a problem in a new context in order for 
positive transfer to take place.
There is a lack of specific training studies that have investigated positive 
transfer using verbal insight problems. This is unsurprising as, unlike visuo-spatial 
insight problems, verbal insight problems do not have a clear goal state; therefore it is 
difficult to devise specific training for such problems. The closest to specific training 
for verbal insight problem solving is a study by Dow and Mayer (2004), which 
examined the effects of training in facilitating transfer to different categories of 
insight problems i.e., verbal, spatial, mathematical, or a combination of verbal and 
spatial problems. In Experiment 2 of their study, participants were trained on one or 
more of these types of problem and then tested on problems from both trained and 
untrained categories. Participants were trained in a three-step process for solving each 
type of problem. For example, training in verbal problems instructed participants to
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notice that “one of the words is a trick or play on words” (p. 394) and then 
demonstrated, using three training problems, how this could facilitate problem 
solution through a three step explanation process of defining key words in the 
problem, analysing the meaning of these words in the context of the problem, and 
concluding with the solution. Neither verbal nor mathematical training improved 
transfer to the same category of test problem and an improvement using this criterion 
was only found with visuo-spatial training. Another experiment included a control 
group that received no training and, again, verbal training was no better than visuo- 
spatial training or the control group at solving verbal problems. It is possible that the 
categories were too broad, which increased the variability in the nature of the problem 
constraints.
In summary, specific training studies on visuo-spatial problems have 
demonstrated weak transfer effects in spite of the strong correspondence between 
training and test problems, thus suggesting that there is still much room for 
improvement. It can be argued that by giving training on problems that are 
structurally similar to test problems, participants are given components of the solution 
(Chronicle et al., 2001), therefore a problem is no longer viewed as a novel problem 
by participants. Furthermore, perceptual problems, as proposed by Kershaw and 
Ohlsson (2004), are more likely to be associated with visuo-spatial problems whereas 
verbal insight problem solving is likely to be influenced by the problem solvers past 
conceptual knowledge and how the problem information is processed (Knoblich et al., 
1999; Ohlsson, 1992). From an applied perspective, such problem-specific training is 
not useful unless we have knowledge of both the insight problems and their solutions, 
which defeats the objective of facilitating transfer to novel, unseen problems. Indeed, 
in the training studies discussed above, both training and test problems were
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structurally and perceptually similar e.g., four-dot and nine-dot problems. Verbal 
insight problems, on the other hand, differ in terms of problem content, which 
suggests that training is needed that capitalises on any commonalities shared by such 
problems, which is explored in Experiments 1 to 3 reported in this thesis.
In conclusion, specific training studies encounter the same criticism as the 
hints approach in that training is likely to facilitate performance if it is linked to 
particular problem solutions. At a more general level, the success o f any training 
should be measured by its ability to facilitate positive transfer to a range of novel 
insight problems, which was the aim of generic training studies reviewed in the next 
section.
3.3.2. Generic training and positive transfer
The alternative to specific training is to devise generic training that facilitates 
transfer to not only the particular problem for which the training was designed but 
also to novel insight problems (e.g., Adeyemo, 2003; Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; 
Chrysikou, 2006; Wicker et al., 1978). However, a few generic training studies have 
attempted to investigate transfer to a range of insight problems, which are reviewed 
below to demonstrate that, although transfer effects tend to be modest, they highlight 
the importance of focusing solver’s attention on the incorrect representation of a 
problem (e.g., Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Chrysikou, 2006; Wicker et al., 1978). 
It is argued that the difficulty in devising generic training lies in the fact that the 
nature of the problem constraint or the stereotypical assumption associated with 
insight problems vary so much between problems.
One example of generic training is what Adeyemo (2003) labelled ‘definitions 
pre-training’, which entailed providing definitions of key terms that were required to
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solve test problems (Adeyemo, 2003; Mayer, Dyck, & Cook, 1984). Adeyemo (2003) 
trained children aged 12 and 13 in the use, meaning and definitions of key words such 
as ‘x-ray’, ‘tumour’, and ‘malignant* that are used in Duncker’s (1945) x-ray problem. 
Two other problems used in this study were Maier’s (1933) candle problem and Gick 
and Holyoak’s (1980) oil well problem. Participants then used these key words in 
sentences to demonstrate their understanding. Following this, participants either 
solved a problem that was considered near (oil well problem) or far (candle problem) 
from the experimental problem before attempting to solve Duncker’s (1945) radiation 
problem. Solution rate was increased from 15% to 37.5%. Adeyemo concluded that 
definitions pre-training improved problem solving performance on both near and far 
problems i.e., problems that were either specific or novel to training problems when 
compared to a control group that received no training. However, a criticism of such 
pre-training is that it may have either drawn attention to critical aspects of the 
problem or cued increased understanding of the context and the nature of the problem, 
thus enabling participants to reach the solution. Further, both the candle and oil well 
problems are actually structurally similar to the x-ray problem, which suggests that 
the approach to training was more specific than generic. Finally, it was not clear what 
aspect of the definition pre-training facilitated transfer.
The earliest attempt at some form of generic training for insight problem 
solving was reported in two experiments by Wicker et al. (1978). The effectiveness of 
training in two problem solving strategies was investigated: a problem reformulation 
strategy that encouraged problem solvers to keep changing their view of the problem 
to avoid making unnecessary assumptions and a visualisation strategy that instructed 
the problem solver to form a detailed visual representation of the problem.
Experiment 1 tested three training conditions: 1) a dual training condition that
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involved a combination of a reformulation and visualisation strategy; 2) a 
visualisation only strategy condition; and 3) a no strategy condition receiving only 
practice. Participants in the training conditions attempted eight training problems, that 
were defined as insight problems as each involved an assumption that had to be 
overcome, and solution feedback was provided for each. All conditions including a 
control condition were tested on 11 different test problems. A five point scoring 
scheme was devised for each attempted test solution although the criteria for this 
scheme were not made explicit by the authors. Results showed that performance was 
significantly better for the dual training condition (58%) than both the control (44%) 
and visualisation (26%) conditions. A second experiment was conducted in order to 
determine whether the problem reformulation strategy alone was responsible for 
improved performance in Experiment 1. Results confirmed that performance was best 
for the reformulation strategy (63%) in comparison to two control conditions although 
participants were given only three practice problems in Experiment 2 as opposed to 
eight in Experiment 1.
Although Wicker et al.’s (1978) study was the first to provide some form of 
generic training for insight problem solving, it is difficult to assess its value because a 
list of the training and test problems was not given, which make it difficult to gauge 
the transfer relationships between them for the different conditions. The experiments 
also incur other criticisms. Firstly, the reformulation strategy was not specified in 
detail. Secondly, participants did not receive practice in identifying and rejecting 
inappropriate assumptions, which is addressed by the training utilised in Experiments 
4 and 5 in this thesis. Finally, participants were not required to verbalise how they 
attempted to solve problems during the training and testing phases, and therefore there 
was no qualitative evidence concerning whether participants had actually applied the
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trained strategies. This criticism is also addressed by the collection and analysis of 
verbal protocols in this thesis.
Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) conducted a series of five experiments to 
investigate the effects of various forms of generic training in facilitating performance 
on novel verbal insight problems. In Experiment 1, training consisted of four 
components:- (i) reading strategic instructions that emphasised reading a problem 
carefully, interpreting it in alternative ways, and not getting stuck on the most obvious 
interpretation; (ii) practising 15 verbal problems and when unsuccessful re-reading the 
problem twice, paraphrasing the problem in writing and receiving a hint; (iii) 
explaining, if still unsuccessful, why the provided solution is correct; and (iv) 
comparing and identifying the procedural similarities between practice problems in an 
ongoing fashion. Solution rate on 15 test problems for the training and a control 
condition was 60% and 34%, respectively.
Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) conducted a further four experiments in an 
attempt to extricate the effect of the different components of training in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that the use of strategic instructions alone (component i 
above) resulted in a 48% training effect. Experiment 3 found that employing the same 
training as Experiment 1 with only three practice problems made little difference to 
the solution rate (57%). Experiment 4 compared the effect of strategic instruction and 
solution feedback with another condition that also received guided practice 
(component ii above). Solution rate for both trained conditions was better than a 
control condition although there was no difference between the two trained 
conditions, thus suggesting that the guided practice had no extra beneficial effect. 
Experiment 5 provided training that differed from that in Experiment 1 in two 
respects. Firstly, no practice problems were given although solution feedback was
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provided and, secondly, participants were encouraged to understand the similarities 
between problem solutions (component iv above) and to explicitly report a general 
strategy for solving such problems. Solution rate for the training condition was similar 
to that in Experiment 1, thus suggesting that attempted generation of practice 
solutions was not a necessary component of the training effect. Ansburg and 
Dominowski concluded that training should involve advance strategic instructions, 
practice with feedback on structurally similar problems and problem comparison to be 
most effective in promoting transfer.
A recent study by Cunningham and MacGregor (2008) attempted to replicate 
Ansburg and Dominowski’s (2000) finding. Training consisted of written instructions 
warning participants that the first or obvious interpretations can be mistaken and that 
alternative interpretations need to be sought to find solutions to insight problems. An 
explanation in how to apply the training was given using the nine-dot problem and 
practice given on three matchstick arithmetic problems (Knoblich et al., 1999). A 
wider range of test problems were employed that consisted of three spatial problems, 
six verbal problems and 21 rebus problems, which combine spatial and verbal 
elements as words or symbols are presented that represent a well-known phrase or 
saying (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008). Cunningham and MacGregor argued that 
spatial and verbal problems, in their original form, appear to be puzzle-like, and 
therefore may not be perceived as realistic which in turn may influence performance 
on such problems. Therefore, for each spatial and verbal problem, an analog version 
that had a more realistic cover was created. Half of the participants completed the 
original, puzzle-like versions of problems whereas the other half completed realistic 
versions of test problems. It was found that for spatial problems, training raised 
solution rate to 67% from 27% in the no training condition. However, training was not
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effective in raising solution rates on verbal problems or realistic spatial problems. A 
possible explanation for the lack of replication for Ansburg and Dominowski’s 
findings is likely to be due to differences in the training procedure. Cunningham and 
MacGregor’s training focussed on spatial problems whereas Ansburg and 
Dominowski trained and tested participants on verbal problems. Further, the spatial 
problems were presented verbally, which suggests that training did improve 
performance on verbal problems. However, as participants were not aware of the 
change in context from the training to test problems, it would explain why participants 
did not show transfer to verbal or rebus problems.
Chrysikou (2006) proposed an alternative approach to training, labelled ‘goal- 
derived categorisation training’, by attempting to break stereotypical assumptions 
concerning typical objects (e.g., shoe, fork) in facilitating performance on insight 
problems. In Experiment 1, participants were allocated to one of four training 
conditions. Two conditions involved participants completing either the Alternative 
Categories Task (ACT) or the Alternative Categories with Critical Items Task (ACT- 
C). These tasks required participants to list alternative categories to which common 
items may belong. However, ACT-C also included items that were important for the 
solution of test problems. There were also two control conditions; one involved the 
Embedded Figures Test in which participants had to find previously seen simple 
figures embedded in larger complex figures; the other comprised of a Word 
Association task. All participants completed seven test insight problems (i.e., two 
functional fixedness problems, four verbal insight problems, and one visuo-spatial 
insight problem). Although the training appears to be specific to functional fixedness 
problems, there was no significant difference in performance between the ACT and 
ACT-C conditions, thus suggesting that performance was unaffected by whether the
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training included the problem-specific object or not. A training effect of 57% was 
found in the ACT condition. Further, a second experiment replicated this finding 
although participants were not reminded to apply the training in solving test problems, 
as in Experiment 1. A possible explanation for this finding is that in breaking 
stereotypical categorisations of objects, participants were equipped with the general 
skill that the first interpretation is often incorrect and that alternative interpretations 
are required to solve an insight problem.
Both Wicker et al. (1978) and Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) demonstrated 
that generic training, which highlight the importance of interpreting a problem in 
alternative ways along with practice in doing this can improve performance on verbal 
insight problems. Further, Chrysikou (2006) demonstrated that training that focuses 
on breaking stereotypical categorisations of objects can facilitate solution on a range 
of insight problems including verbal problems. One commonality between these three 
studies is that solvers were made aware of the importance that the first interpretation 
is often incorrect and that the consideration of alternative interpretations is likely to 
lead to the problem solution. This is consistent with Gestalt Theory (e.g., Kohler, 
1924; Wertheimer, 1945) and theories of representational change (Knoblich et al., 
1999; Ohlsson, 1992) that advocate the importance of restructuring or representational 
change to overcome an impasse experienced during insight problem solving.
However, despite the positive effects of training, solution rates still need to be 
improved.
In summary, the results of the generic training studies reviewed above are 
notable as they demonstrate that a short training procedure can facilitate transfer to 
novel insight problems. Thus, it is possible to train general insightful skills in 
facilitating performance across a range of insight problems. However, they also
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highlight that further research on training is needed as transfer effects were not 100%. 
The generic studies discussed hitherto suggest that for generic training to be effective, 
problem solvers need to be given practice in identifying and correcting their faulty 
representations in order to overcome impasses during insight problem solving.
Further, the nature of assumptions associated with insight problems vary from one 
another, therefore a generic form of training is needed that addresses this issue. Both 
of the above points are investigated by Experiments 4 and 5 reported in this thesis.
3.4. Summary
Three methods that were discussed that facilitate insight included incubation, 
hints, and training. The evidence in support of incubation effects are mixed, whereas 
the hints approach is only effective when the hint is specifically tailored to the 
solution of the test problem. The final approach, training, has demonstrated that it is 
possible to promote positive transfer to insight problems that are either specific or 
novel to training problems. In particular, research on specific training suggests that 
the degree of specificity of the training is a critical factor in determining the rate of 
transfer to the insight test problem. However, limited research is available that 
demonstrates spontaneous transfer to a novel set of insight problems, although generic 
training is the way forward in facilitating transfer across a range of problems. It seems 
that there are two important prerequisites for inducing positive effects of training; 
highlighting the relevance of training to trainees along with practice in 
representational change (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000).
In conclusion, all three approaches demonstrate modest transfer effects, 
suggesting that no approach is completely successful and that there is room for 
improvement. However, of the three approaches, training requires further exploration
72
as it has been fruitful in facilitating transfer to either specific problems or a range of 
insight problems. The next four chapters in thesis report experiments that investigated 
transfer to verbal insight problems either through specific training (Chapters 4 and 5) 
or generic training (Chapters 6 and 7).
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CHAPTER 4 
Heuristic-based training for verbal insight problems
As discussed in Chapter 3, training is one of the main methods that have been 
investigated to improve the solution of insight problems (e.g., Ansburg & 
Dominowski, 2000; Burnham & Davis, 1969; Chronicle et al., 2001, Chrysikou, 2006; 
Dow & Mayer, 2004; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Weisberg & Alba, 1981; Wicker et 
al., 1978), along with incubation (e.g., Dorfman et al., 1996; Schooler et al., 1993; Sio 
& Ormerod, 2009), and providing the problem solver with a hint (e.g., Burnham & 
Davis, 1969; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Weisberg & Alba, 1981). However, much of the 
research on specific training has focussed on facilitating transfer to visuo-spatial 
insight problems although weak transfer effects have been reported. This chapter 
begins with a brief summary of this research, followed by a discussion of heuristic- 
based training as a form of specific training to promote transfer to verbal insight 
problems. Two experiments are reported that employed heuristic-based training as a 
possible methodology to promote transfer to specific categories of verbal insight 
problems.
4.1. Heuristic-based training and transfer to verbal insight problem solving
Much of the training research investigating specific training has focused on the 
nine-dot problem, which is a visuo-spatial insight problem (e.g., Burnham & Davis, 
1969; Chronicle et al., 2001, Experiment 3; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Weisberg & 
Alba, 1981, Experiment 2), with training effects ranging between 40% (Kershaw & 
Ohlsson, 2004, Experiment 3) and 43% (Weisberg & Alba, 1981, Experiment 2). 
When training entails practice in drawing non-dot turns, which is critical to solving
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this problem, performance is higher (Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Weisberg & Alba, 
1981,), which suggests that the degree of specificity of the training to test problems is 
crucial for positive transfer to occur. However, the training effects are modest, and 
suggest that other sources of difficulties may operate that affect performance on the 
nine-dot problem (Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004). Further, the context generated by this 
problem has a strong inhibitory effect, therefore despite the fact that training is 
designed to improve performance on a specific problem, the solution rate is far from 
100%. Finally, specific training reduces the novelty of the test problem by giving 
practice in problems that are structurally similar. From an applied perspective, the 
generality of these studies is limited to the test problem under study.
There is a lack of specific training studies designed to improve performance 
on verbal insight problems. This is most likely due to the fact that, unlike visuo- 
spatial problems, verbal insight problems do not have a clear goal state. Further, there 
is greater variability in the content and constraints associated with verbal problems. 
Therefore, the challenge is to devise and implement specific training that can facilitate 
transfer to verbal insight problems. One suggestion is to train solvers to use heuristics 
or rules of thumbs to solve insight problems that share certain characteristics. The 
remainder of this section provides a discussion of how heuristic-based training can be 
used to solve verbal insight problems.
Heuristic-based training is one type of training that has been used successfully 
in other problem solving domains, including industrial faultfinding (Shepherd, 
Marshall, Turner, & Duncan, 1977) and mathematics (Schoenfeld, 1979). General 
heuristics such as hill-climbing and means-end analysis have been successfully 
applied to solve well-defined, move problems (Chronicle et al., 2004; MacGregor et 
al., 2001; Newell & Simon, 1972; Ollinger et al., 2006; Ormerod et al., 2002). For
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example, Kaplan and Simon (1990) suggested that, in solving the mutilated 
checkerboard problem, a visuo-spatial insight problem, solvers applied heuristics to 
narrow the space of possible moves to achieve solution. However, such heuristics 
cannot be applied to solve verbal insight problems as their goal state is ill-defined. It 
is also important to note that most training studies provide training with only one test 
problem rather than looking at a wider range of problems, which limits the 
applicability of the training to other insight problems. Thus, general problem solving 
heuristics that might apply across a wider range of problems is lacking in the insight 
problem solving domain (Chronicle et al., 2004), and further research is needed in this 
area, which is explored by the two experiments reported in this chapter. Although 
heuristic training is also narrow in some sense, it nonetheless is better than some 
literature that has only looked at one test problem (e.g., Weisberg & Alba, 1981).
One of the difficulties faced in designing heuristic-based training for verbal 
insight problems is that the nature of the stereotypical assumptions or constraints 
associated with the problems are so idiosyncratic (cf. Isaak & Just, 1995), such that it 
is difficult to envisage how knowledge of any one of these could be used to facilitate 
the solution of other problems. One possibility is to develop an intermediate 
categorisation that identifies commonalities between particular types of insight 
problem and to design heuristic-based training based on these categories. This was the 
rationale for Experiments 1 and 2 reported in this chapter.
One study that attempted to categorise insight problems for the purpose of 
training is that by Dow and Mayer (2004; reviewed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1). Dow 
and Mayer categorised problems by their overall nature i.e., verbal, visuo-spatial, 
mathematical or a combination of these. They trained participants in solving one or 
more of these types of problems and performance was tested on the different problem
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categories. It was found training in verbal or mathematical problems did not improve 
performance on test problems of the same category. Only visuo-spatial training 
improved solution to the same category of test problems. In another experiment, no 
difference was found between verbal and visuo-spatial training in solving verbal 
problems when compared to a control group. It was possible that there was too much 
variability between the nature of the problem constraints and the categories were too 
broad which affected the results. Although it is useful to categorise problems for the 
purpose of training, it may be more beneficial to categorise problems in terms of 
constraints in order to narrow the categories and thus increase the rate of transfer 
Consequently, as part of the training, Experiment 1 in this chapter first 
identified commonalities in constraints between particular types of insight problem 
and heuristics were developed. Thus, participants were first made aware of problem 
constraints and then trained on two heuristics that involved identifying ambiguous 
words and ambiguous names within a problem that lead to solution. For example, 
‘guide* is an ambiguous word as it can refer to either a human/animal guide or a map. 
For ambiguous names, the names in the Anthony and Cleopatra refer to animals, not 
humans. The heuristic to consider names as ambiguous should discourage participants 
from making this assumption during testing. Experiment 2 aimed to improve solution 
of problems containing ambiguous words by adapting the training utilised in 
Experiment 2 and by using a new set of test problems. It was predicted that, in each 
experiment, positive transfer would be restricted to trained category of test problems 
as suggested by theoretical formulations of transfer (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Gick & 
Hollyoak, 1980; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901), and no transfer would take place on 
problems that were out of scope to the training. The think aloud methodology was 
utilised in both experiments.
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4.2. Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to design and implement specific training to 
facilitate transfer to verbal insight problems. Common problem constraints were 
identified and then simple heuristics were developed to examine the effects of 
heuristic training on verbal insight problems. The heuristics concerned searching for 
any ambiguous words or names in the problem statements and identifying their 
alternative interpretations. In addition, a third ‘out of scope’ category of verbal insight 
problem was used that could not be solved by either of these heuristics in order to 
shed light on the level of specificity associated with transfer of this training. It was 
predicted that positive transfer would be restricted to the two trained categories of 
verbal insight problems. Further, it was hoped that the verbal protocols might reveal 
whether solution attempts or the hypotheses generated by training and control (no 
training) participants were influenced by their problem representation. Thus, no 
training participants were more likely to generate hypotheses that were based on an 
inappropriate representation which they were unable to overcome spontaneously.
4.2.1. Method 
Participants
Forty-six psychology students from Cardiff University participated in this 
experiment as partial fulfilment of course requirements1. Ten participants were 
rejected as they were familiar with at least one of the test problems. The final sample 
comprised 36 participants and ages ranged between 18-27 years (M= 20.69, SD = 
2.16).
1 All materials were pilot tested using 10 participants, which revealed that four-minutes per problem 
were sufficient for participants to read and solve test problems. As no changes were required, datasets 
for these participants comprised part of the final sample.
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Materials
Training Programme
Training covered two categories of problem concerning either ambiguous 
words or ambiguous names and involved the following three stages:-
1. Solving problems that contained ambiguous words. This entailed:
a) awareness of ambiguous words in a problem and provision of a first 
heuristic.
b) practice in using this heuristic to solve a problem containing ambiguous 
words.
2. Solving problems that contained ambiguous names. This entailed:
a) awareness of the ambiguous nature of names in a problem and provision of 
a second heuristic.
b) practice in using this heuristic to solve a problem containing ambiguous 
names.
3. Practice solving problems containing either ambiguous words or names.
For awareness training in ambiguous words (Stage la), participants read an 
example of a problem that contained an ambiguous word and were given the heuristic 
‘If you cannot make sense of the problem then search for and identify any ambiguous 
word(s) and its alternative meaning(s)’:-
A woman shoots her husband. Then she holds him under water for over 5 
minutes. Finally, she hangs him. But 5 minutes later they both go out together 
and enjoy a wonderful dinner together. How can this be?
In this problem people might assume that the husband had been killed. Participants 
were told that ‘shoot’ was the ambiguous word and asked to think of alternative 
meanings for this word and to solve the problem. Participants then read that if ‘shoot’
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is thought of in the photography context, then it would be the case that the wife had 
shot a picture of husband, developed it under water, and then hung the photograph to 
dry. This interpretation would explain why the husband was alive.
Next, participants were required to practise using the heuristic to solve a 
problem containing an ambiguous word (Stage lb):-
A man walked into a bar, and before he could say a word, he was knocked 
unconscious. Why?
In this problem the word ‘bar’ is ambiguous. The man had walked into a metal bar 
rather than a drinking bar.
For awareness training in names associated with animals (Stage 2a), 
participants were told of the ambiguous nature of names, which do not always refer to 
humans, and then were given the heuristic ‘If you cannot make sense of the problem 
then search for a name and identify what animal could be involved’. Participants read 
the following problem:
Spike, an adult, brings the paper to Mr. Hopkins every day. Spike is never paid 
for this. Why does he do this?
The solution was that Spike was a dog taking the paper to his owner, Mr Hopkins.
Next, participants were required to practise using the heuristic to solve the 
following problem (Stage 2b):-
It was a Sunday morning and music was playing in the background. Charlie 
was sitting, minding his own business. However, when the music stopped, a 
shadow fell over Charlie which led to him being crushed to death. Why?
The solution was that Charlie was a small animal such as a bug that was crushed to 
death because someone sat on him.
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In the final part of the training participants were presented with two problems 
(Stage 3). Participants were required to apply the training to identify any words or 
names with alternative interpretations that the problems may contain and to think 
aloud whilst solving the problems. The problems were:
Problem 1
While on safari in the wild jungles of Africa, Professor Quantum woke one 
morning and felt something in the pocket of his shorts. It had a head and 
tail, but no legs. When Quantum got up he could feel it move inside his 
pocket. Quantum, however, showed little concern and went about his 
morning rituals. Why such a casual attitude toward the thing in his pocket?
Problem 2
Bobby had not taken anything and was feeling fine but he couldn’t help 
repeating everything Mr Jenkins said. Why is that?
Problem 1 contained the ambiguous words ‘head’ and ‘tail’, and thus referred to a 
coin, which is why Quantum was not concerned. Problem 2 contained two names but 
as Bobby was repeating what Mr Jenkins was saying, it suggests that Bobby was a 
parrot.
Test Problems
Nine test problems were used: six that were in scope to the training of which 
three problems contained ambiguous words (Married, Guide, and King & Queen) and 
three problems contained ambiguous names that were related to animals rather than 
humans (Anthony & Cleopatra, Mr Jones, and Jason). A further three problems were 
used where neither of the rules can be applied, and thus were out of scope to the 
training (Bombs Away, Rope, and Sons). The problems were taken from Sloane
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(1992), Ansburg and Dominowski (2000), and Dow and Mayer (2004) (see Appendix 
A).
Design
The independent variables were condition (training and no training) and 
problem category (ambiguous words, ambiguous names, and out of scope). 
Participants were randomly allocated to a condition and completed all problems from 
each category. Presentation of the test problems was randomised. The dependent 
variable was whether the problems were solved.
Procedure
Each participant was given an introduction to the experiment and then 
requested to ‘think aloud’ during each problem. To facilitate this, practice exercises 
were given involving different tasks and contexts as recommended by Ericsson and 
Simon (1980,1993). These involved solving a multiplication problem, calculating the 
number of windows in the participant’s house, and naming 20 animals.
After completing the think aloud training, participants in the control condition 
completed the test problems whereas participants in the training condition completed 
the training programme beforehand. Participants were given a four-minute time limit 
for each problem and if they were silent for a period of time, the experimenter again 
used two non-directive prompts (‘What are you thinking?’ and ‘Please keep talking’). 
Verbalisations were recorded continuously. After completing each test problem, 
participants were required to rate how familiar they were with that problem on a 5- 
point scale (1 = very unfamiliar, 5 = very familiar). Participants were not given 
solution feedback. Finally, participants were debriefed and asked not to reveal
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information about the experiment to others. The duration of the experiment was 
approximately one hour.
Qualitative categorisation and assessment o f reliability
Verbal protocols were analysed primarily for two reasons. Firstly, to verify 
that training influenced the types of hypotheses or solutions generated by participants 
and secondly, that training was responsible for the improvement in problem solving 
performance. The following two-stage procedure was developed to identify and 
categorise hypotheses and to assess inter-coder reliability.
1. Three coders (study researcher and two unrelated researchers) read the 
protocols and individually identified what they considered a 
hypothesis/solution for each of the test problems completed by participants. A 
hypothesis or solution was defined as ‘any verbalisation that attempts to 
answer the question posed in the problem statement’. Practice was given on a 
verbal protocol that was excluded from the final dataset to ensure coders had 
understood the task. Once all three coders had completed identifying the 
hypotheses, any discrepancies were discussed until a consensus was reached 
and a final list of agreed hypotheses was produced. A total of 787 hypotheses 
were initially identified between all three coders of which 750 or 95.3% were 
identified by all three coders, 14 or 1.78% were identified by two coders, 
whereas 23 or 2.92% were identified by one coder at the first stage of the 
categorisation process. After discussion, eight hypotheses were rejected 
making the final total 779.
83
2. The second stage involved the same three coders independently categorising 
the agreed 779 hypotheses into one of four categories: incorrect ambiguous 
word, incorrect ambiguous name, incorrect other, or correct. Incorrect 
ambiguous word hypotheses were so called because participants correctly 
identified the ambiguous word but incorrectly hypothesised its alternative 
meaning. For example, in the Guide problem, some participants correctly 
identified ‘guide’ as the ambiguous word but hypothesised that it referred to a 
‘goat’, ‘sheep’, or ‘dog’. Incorrect ambiguous name hypotheses were so called 
because participants correctly identified the ambiguous name but incorrectly 
identified which animal the name referred to. For example, in the Anthony and 
Cleopatra problem, participants incorrectly hypothesised that the names 
referred to ‘insects’, ‘dogs’, ‘cats’, ‘butterflies’, or ‘birds’ but not ‘fish’. 
Incorrect other hypotheses were those that could not be categorised using the 
other categories. Of the 779 hypotheses, it was found that 774 or 99% were 
categorised by all three coders using the same categories and the remaining 5 
or 1% were categorised by two coders only. The Perreault and Leigh (1989) 
reliability index was selected to calculate inter-coder reliability between pairs 
of coders as it accounts for differences in reliabilities due to the number of 
categories and also focuses the issue of reliability on the whole coding process 
(Kolbe & Burnett, 1991). The reliability indices across the 779 hypotheses for 
the three pairs of coders were 0.99 respectively, which is considered 
acceptably high as it exceeds 0.80 (Gremler, 2004; Krippendorf, 1980).
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4.2.2. Results and Discussion
Ten participants rated at least one of the test problems above three on the 
familiarity scale and therefore were rejected from the final sample, which comprised 
36 participants. An exploratory data analysis did not reveal any violations of 
homogeneity and normality of the data, therefore Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted. It was predicted that transfer would be specific and therefore positive 
transfer would be restricted to the two trained categories of verbal insight problem 
solving. As predicted, a 2 (condition: training and no training) x 3 (problem category: 
ambiguous words, ambiguous names, and out of scope) ANOVA revealed that more 
problems were solved in the training than in the no training (control) condition (F (1, 
34) = 13.11, MSE =11.34, p  < .01) although this effect interacted with problem 
category (F (2, 68) = 6.94, MSE = 3.90,/? < .01). Simple main effect analyses 
indicated that training was better than the control condition in the ambiguous words (p 
< .01) and ambiguous names categories (p < .01) but there was no difference in the 
out of scope category, as predicted. Solution rates are given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Effect of training on solution rates of problem categories (three problems in 
each category)
No Training 
(Control)
Training
Problem Category Mean SD Mean SD
Ambiguous Words 0.78 1.11 1.78 0.73
Ambiguous Names 0.11 0.32 1.17 1.15
Out of Scope 0.78 0.65 0.67 0.59
Figure 4.1 reports percentage solution rate between training conditions and 
problem category. For each category, the solution rate for the no training condition 
was taken as the baseline measure. It can be seen that within the ambiguous word 
category, training raised solution from 26% (no training) to 59% (training) whereas
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for the ambiguous name category, solution was raised from 4% (no training) to 39% 
(training). Thus, a facilitation of 33% was observed for the ambiguous word category 
whereas a facilitation of 35% was observed for the ambiguous name category.
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No Training (Control)
M Training
Ambiguous Words Ambiguous Out o f Scope
Names 
Problem category
Figure 4.1. Percentage solution rate by conditions and problem category
Analysis o f hypotheses generated
To further evaluate the effectiveness of training, verbal protocols were 
analysed to determine whether participants in the training condition had successfully 
identified the correct ambiguous word or name but failed to generate the correct 
alternative interpretation of that word or name. It was expected that training 
participants would generate a greater number of hypotheses that were associated with 
ambiguous words or names, but fewer (other) hypotheses that fell outside these two 
categories.
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Exploratory data analysis revealed that the data was positively skewed for 
ambiguous words and names in the no training condition, which could not be 
eradicated using log, square root or reciprocal transformations, therefore Mann- 
Whitney U tests were conducted (Table 4.2). As expected, training participants 
generated more ambiguous word (z = -3.53,p  < .01) and ambiguous name hypotheses 
(z = -4.63, p  < .001), although a no significant difference was found in the generation 
of incorrect other hypotheses (z = -1.17,/? > .05). These results further indicate that 
training was applied by participants as more hypotheses were generated that were 
associated with the trained problem solution categories.
Table 4.2. Incorrect hypotheses generated by condition (average rank)
Hypothesis Category
Condition
Ambiguous
Words
Ambiguous
Names Other
No Training
Mean Rank 12.72 11.11 20.56
Training
Mean Rank 24.28 28.89 16.44
A tentative observation that was made during inspection of verbal protocol 
data was that some training participants attempted to solve a problem by initially 
looking for a name followed by an ambiguous word although the order of training was 
first on ambiguous words and then ambiguous names. On some occasions participants 
alternated between both when they were unsure of the problem solution. Thus, a 
strategy by which to approach problem solving was adopted by some of the solvers 
which was not observed in the control condition. An example of how training 
encouraged reasoning to a successful solution in the Mr Jones problem was:
“Mr Jones, it doesn’t state that he is a person. So he could be some kind of 
animal. It’s kind of ambiguous about what the medical practitioners are.. .they
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might not be specialised in helping him with his leg. Although he broke his leg 
he could have died because of shock so although that’s not an injury, that is a 
result of the accident.. .It could be an animal that has been run over.. .So he 
died as a result of breaking his leg and he was attended to immediately.. .He 
could be some kind of cat or dog. That’s if he was run over or is an animal that 
can’t survive without his leg ... .Unless he was really small, an insect... He 
was attended to by medical practitioners so it’s more likely to be a bigger 
animal.. .He could be a horse because when horses break their leg they are 
often killed.”
On the whole, evidence from analysis of the verbal protocols indicated that training 
resulted in both qualitative and quantitative differences in the nature and number of 
hypotheses generated that were consistent with the nature of training. Thus, training 
encouraged participants to generate more solution related hypotheses concerning 
ambiguous words or names than no training participants.
In conclusion, training to be aware of and identifying ambiguous words and 
names improved the solution rates for novel exemplars of these problem categories. It 
is of interest that the transfer of training effect was quite specific and that positive 
transfer in terms of solution rate was observed only with respect to the trained 
problem categories, a finding consistent with theoretical predictions of transfer effects 
(e.g., Gick & Hollyoak, 1980; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). However, there was 
some evidence that this transfer effect was slightly better for the ambiguous names 
category. A reason for this may be that the problem space is greater when searching 
for ambiguous words rather than ambiguous names that can be linked with animals. 
Consequently, problem solvers may have found problems belonging to the ambiguous 
name category slightly easier. Also, the think aloud training required participants to
88
list 20 animal names which may have helped the participants in the training condition 
to solve the test problems containing ambiguous names. Another explanation is that it 
was possible that the results may have been confounded by the choice of three test 
problems (Guide, Married, and King and Queen) belonging to the ambiguous word 
category. That is, the words King and Queen within the King and Queen problem 
refer to a married couple which may have reinforced the problem constraint in the 
Married problem, and vice versa. The aim of Experiment 3 was to both replicate and 
increase performance on problems belonging to the ambiguous word category. The 
training in Experiment 2 was adapted to increase participants’ likelihood of correctly 
identifying and interpreting ambiguous words within a problem. Furthermore, to 
overcome the criticism of problem choice discussed above, the effects of training 
were investigated using a different selection of test problems.
4.3. Experiment 2
The training in Experiment 1 directed participants to identify the ambiguous 
meanings of words in verbal insight problems. A training score of 59% was found 
thus suggesting room for improvement. Experiment 2 aimed to both replicate this 
finding and to increase performance on problems with ambiguous words by using a 
new set of test problems to overcome the confounding issues concerning Experiment 
1, as discussed above. Unlike Experiment 1, the approach to training in Experiment 2 
focussed on one category of verbal insight problem solving i.e., ambiguous words, 
that could be solved by the use of a simple heuristic. Consequently, training was 
devised that covered awareness of this problem constraint coupled with practice at 
using the relevant heuristic to solve this type of problem. Thus, a problem containing 
an ambiguous word is one where the word can be interpreted in more than one way
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other than the most common interpretation e.g., guide can mean ‘map’ or a ‘person 
that directs*. The number of test problems in the ambiguous word category was 
increased from three, as used in Experiment 1, to four in Experiment 2. As in 
Experiment 1, a second out of scope category of verbal insight problems was also 
used that could not be solved by the heuristic. It was predicted that positive transfer 
would occur to test problems of the trained category.
An additional aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether problem length 
influenced performance on verbal insight problems. It is apparent that verbal insight 
problems tend to vary in terms of length, as illustrated throughout this thesis (cf. Isaak 
& just, 1995). Hence, it could be argued that when participants in Experiment 1 were 
presented with longer verbal insight problems, the search through the problem space 
to find a solution was increased, which consequently resulted in no solution. 
Surprisingly, past studies on insight problem solving have overlooked the possible 
effects of problem length on performance, therefore, in Experiment 2, original 
versions of verbal insight problems were deliberately lengthened by 12 significant 
words i.e., words with substantial meaning such as nouns and adjectives and not 
words like ‘the’ ‘and’ or ‘it’ and performance on original and lengthened versions was 
compared. It was ensured that sentences and words that were added had no relation to 
the ambiguous word in the test problem. It was predicted that performance would be 
poorer on lengthened problems as the search through the problem space to find the 
solution should take longer in contrast to original version of problems which are 
inherently shorter in length. Verbal protocols were collected, although not analysed, 
in order to keep the methodology as similar to the one employed in Experiment 1.
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4.3.1. Method 
Participants
Forty first year undergraduate psychology students from Cardiff University 
participated in this experiment as partial fulfilment of course requirements2. Ages 
ranged between 18 to 40 years (M= 20.13, SD = 3.88).
Materials
The no training (control) condition completed a Word Association task 
(Cohen, 1975) containing a list of 100 words that served as a filler task. A similar 
filler task has been used by Chrysikou and Weisberg (2004) and Chrysikou (2006), 
which had no adverse effect on problem solving performance. Unlike Chrysikou’s 
(2006) study in which participants read the words and wrote down their responses, the 
words were presented orally by the experimenter and participants were instructed to 
say out loud the first word that came to their mind. Participant’s responses were noted 
beside the respective word by the experimenter. The aim was to ensure that 
participants in the no training condition were thinking aloud as the same was required 
of participants who completed the training. Words that had associations with solutions 
to test problems were omitted and replaced with words from a version of the list by 
Winer (2002).
Training Programme
The training programme was similar to that used in Experiment 2 although the 
focus was only on training in solving verbal insight problems that contained
2 All materials were pilot tested using 10 participants, which revealed that four-minutes per problem 
were sufficient for participants to read and solve original and lengthened version of test problems. As 
no changes were required, datasets for these participants comprised part of the final sample.
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ambiguous words. The difference was that different training problems were used in 
Experiment 2 to allow for a larger set of test problems to be used. The full training 
programme can be found in Appendix C.
Test Problems
Seven test problems were used: four problems were in scope to the training 
(Coin, Guide, Island, and Shoot) of which only the Guide problem was the same as in 
Experiment 1. A further three problems where the rule cannot be applied, and thus out 
of scope to the training, were used (Captain, Twins, and Water Tower). Original 
versions of the seven test problem can be found in Appendix B.
Seven lengthened version of the original problems were created by adding 12 
significant words i.e. nouns and adjectives that elaborated the problem (see Appendix 
C). It was predicted that the addition of 12 words, that had no relation to the 
ambiguous word, would increase the search through the problem space for the 
solution.
Design
The independent variables were condition (training and no training), problem 
length (original and lengthened), and problem category (ambiguous words and out of 
scope), where the latter variable was repeated. Twenty participants were assigned to 
each condition of which 10 participants completed original version of the test 
problems and 10 completed lengthened version of the test problems. Thus four 
experimental groups were formed (trained participants who completed original 
problems, trained participants who completed lengthened problems, no training 
participants who completed original problems, and no training participants who
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completed lengthened problems). Presentation order of test problems was randomised. 
The dependent variable was whether the problems were solved.
Procedure
Participants read the introduction to the experiment and then were given 
practice in ‘thinking aloud’, as in Experiment 2. After completing the think aloud 
training, participants in the control condition completed the Word Association task 
whereas participants in the training condition completed the training programme. 
Participants then completed original versions or lengthened versions of test problems 
depending on which experimental group they were assigned to. Participants were 
given a four-minute time limit for each problem and if they were silent for a period of 
time, the experimenter again used two non-directive prompts (‘What are you 
thinking?’ and ‘Please keep talking’). Verbalisations were recorded continuously. 
After completing each test problem, participants were required to rate how familiar 
they were with that problem on a 5-point scale (1 = very unfamiliar, 5 = very 
familiar). Participants were not given solution feedback. Finally, participants were 
debriefed and asked not to reveal information about the experiment to others. The 
duration of the experiment was approximately one hour.
4.3.2. Results and Discussion
No participants rated the test problems above three on the 5-point familiarity 
rating scale, therefore data for all 40 participants were included in the analyses. An 
exploratory data analysis did not reveal any violations of homogeneity and normality 
of the data. It was predicted that positive transfer would be restricted to the trained 
category of verbal insight problem solving. Furthermore, solution rate for original
93
problems would be higher than on lengthened problems as the latter increases the 
search for solution.
A 2 (condition: training and no training) x 2 (problem category: ambiguous 
words and out of scope) x 2 (problem length: original and lengthened) ANOVA 
revealed no significant effect of problem length on performance (F (l, 36) = .89, MSE 
= .05 ,/? > .05) or a significant three-way interaction between condition, problem 
category and problem length, (F (l, 36) = .71, MSE = .05, p  > .05). The lack of a 
significant interaction suggests that training participants did not find original versions 
of test problems any easier to solve than lengthened problems with problem category 
having no effect on solution rate. One possible reason for these null results could be 
due to lack of power. The pilot test revealed that both lengthened and original 
versions of test problems could be solved within the four minute time limit, which 
provided an early indication that an effect of length may not be found, as confirmed 
by the above results. This oversight may also account for the no effect of length that 
was found in this experiment. Another explanation is that the problems actually 
needed to be lengthened by more than 20 words in order to observe an effect of 
length.
As no effect of length was found in the preceding analysis, the data was 
aggregated and a 2 (condition: training and no training) x 2 (problem category: 
ambiguous word and out of scope) ANOVA was conducted. As predicted, a 
significant effect of condition was found with more problems solved in the training 
(M= 2.85, SD = .99) than in the no training condition (M= 1.05, SD = .94), (F (1,38) 
= 33.25, MSE =1.82 ,p <  .001). Further, no significant effect of problem category (F 
(1, 38) = 2.89, MSE = . 19, p  > .05) or an interaction between condition and problem 
category (F (1, 38) = 3.07, MSE = .20 ,p >  .05) was found. Contrary to predictions,
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simple main effect analyses indicated that training improved performance on 
problems belonging to both the ambiguous word and out of scope categories.
Consequently, a 2 (condition: training and no training) x 7 (problems) was 
conducted to elucidate the effects of training on individual problems. Although the 
data are binary, ANOVA is applicable based on the assumptions of Greer and Dunlap 
(1997) that a repeated ANOVA on such data preserves the type 1 error rate and that 
power tends be unaffected. Further, other researchers have successfully analysed 
binary data using ANOVA (e.g., Knoblich et al., 1999; MacGregor et al., 2001; 
Ollinger et al., 2006; Ormerod et al., 2002). Solution rates are given in Table 4.3. As 
predicted, more problems were solved in the training than in the no training (control) 
condition (F (1, 38) = 46.77, MSE = 8.45,/? < .001) although this effect interacted 
with problem (F (6, 228) = 2.40, MSE = .39, p  < .05). Simple main effect analyses 
indicated that training was better than the control condition for all exemplars of the 
ambiguous words category. These were the Coin and Shoots problems (all ps < .05), 
and the Guide and Island problems (all ps < .001). Contrary to predictions, the Water 
Tower problem from the out of scope category also showed an effect of training (p < 
.05). The information in the Water Tower problem misleads the solver to think that 
the painter is painting the outside of the tower and but this interpretation does not 
explain why no one saw the painter. As training encouraged participants to consider 
alternative meanings of words, this may have directed participants to consider the 
alternative interpretations of the problem that the painter was painting the inside of the 
tower, which is the solution to the problem.
Table 4.3. Solution rates for test problems (as a proportion)
No Training 
(Control)
Training
Problem Category Mean SD Mean SD
Ambiguous Words
Coin 0.50 0.51 0.80 0.41
Guide 0.40 0.50 0.95 0.22
Island 0.05 0.22 0.65 0.49
Shoots 0.10 0.31 0.45 0.51
Overall Ambiguous Words Category 0.31 0.29 0.71 0.25
Out of Scope
Captain Scott 0.75 0.44 0.85 0.37
Twins 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.37
Water Tower 0.15 0.37 0.55 0.51
Overall Out o f  Scope Category 0.32 0.20 0.52 0.23
Table 4.3 illustrates a ceiling effect for the out of scope ‘Captain Scott’ problem in the 
no training condition, thus suggesting this problem was too easy. This finding may 
provide some explanation as to why a null effect of problem category was found 
earlier.
It was observed that training raised the solution rate from 26% (no training) to 
71% (training) within the ambiguous word category (Figure 4.2). Thus, a facilitation 
of 45% was observed for the trained category. However, a t-test was conducted on 
proportion solution data after checking assumptions of homogeneity and normality, 
which revealed that training in Experiment 2 did not significantly raise performance 
on ambiguous word problems (M= .71, SD = .25) when compared to performance in 
Experiment 1 (M  = .59, SD = .25), (t (36) = 1.50,/? = .07, 1-tailed).
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Figure 4.2. Percentage solution rate by conditions and problem category
In conclusion, training to be aware of and identifying ambiguous words 
improved the solution rates for novel exemplars of the ambiguous word category. 
However, the transfer of training effect was not categorically specific as transfer was 
also observed to one of the three out of scope problems. The data provided support, 
albeit not unequivocal, for heuristic-based training in promoting positive transfer to 
novel exemplars of the trained categories, and thus partially supported theoretical 
predictions of transfer effects (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Gick & Hollyoak, 1980; 
Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901).
4.4. G eneral D iscussion
The goal of this chapter was to investigate training to promote positive transfer 
on verbal insight problems through specific training. Two experiments were reported 
that investigated the effects of heuristic-based training on verbal insight problem 
solving. In both experiments, no training (control) participants found it difficult to 
solve test problems, thus supporting the assertion that presentation of a problem
% No Training (Control) 
■ Training
Out o f ScopeAmbiguous Words
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triggers irrelevant prior knowledge and incorrect assumptions block the solution path 
(Ohlsson, 1992). In other words, an incorrect initial representation of the problem 
resulted in low probability of success (Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al., 1999). Solution 
was likely to occur when the incorrect representation was identified and relaxed thus 
opening up the problem space.
The design of training in Experiments 1 and 2 was motivated by the need to 
ameliorate the inhibitory effects of ambiguous words in verbal insight problems that 
have a high probability of triggering a habitual conceptualisation leading to impasse. 
That is, training aimed to direct solvers to identify and consider the alternative 
meaning of ambiguous words in order to prevent the most common meaning of words 
from constraining problem solving and, consequently, solution attainment. However, 
the nature of the training varied slightly between Experiments 1 and 2 as training in 
the former focused on identifying ambiguous words and names within problem 
specifications whereas the latter focused on identifying ambiguous words only. The 
training was therefore specific in nature in that positive transfer was predicted to 
occur only to test problems belonging to trained categories. Indeed, the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 found that transfer was specific to the test problems such that a 
greater number of problems were solved that belonged to trained categories. However, 
in Experiment 1, participants found ambiguous name problems easier to solve. A 
reason for this may be that the problem space is greater when searching for 
ambiguous words rather than ambiguous names that can be linked with animals.
Positive transfer was also observed in Experiment 2, with participants solving 
71% of problems belonging to the ambiguous words category. However, the training 
effect was not specific as training improved performance on both the ambiguous word 
and out of scope categories. One possibility for this finding is that as training
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encouraged participants to consider alternative interpretations of words within the 
problem specification, this heuristic may have encouraged participants to consider 
alternative solutions for all problems. However, analysis by problems indicated that 
successful performance was observed for only one out of three out of scope problems.
Experiment 2 also found that the length of the verbal insight problem did not 
predict problem solubility. Thus, the insight problems were difficult regardless of 
their length and performance on original and lengthened versions of the test problems 
did not significantly differ, thus suggesting that lengthened problems did not increase 
the search through the problem space to attain the solution. On the other hand, it was 
possible that the original problems in this experiment needed to be lengthened by 
more than 12 words to observe an effect. This suggests that the manipulation of word 
length was not sensitive in this experiment, which should have been detected from the 
results of the pilot study but was overseen due to experimenter error.
The approach to training in Experiments 1 and 2 was specific to test problems 
as it identified categories of verbal insight problem that were solvable by the use of 
heuristics. The success of training in both experiments is consistent with the success 
of similar training, for example, in mathematical problem solving (Schoenfeld, 1979). 
However, although training equipped problem solvers with heuristics to solve both 
ambiguous word and ambiguous name problems in Experiment 1, solution rates for 
both were far from perfect even after training, being 59% and 39% respectively. One 
would expect that the search for an ambiguous word would involve a process of trial 
and error with each word in the problem statement until an alternative meaning is 
found. In contrast, an ambiguous name could easily be found and the search for an 
appropriate animal is dependent on the problem solver’s vocabulary. The solution rate 
for the ambiguous word problems in Experiment 2 was 71%, compared to 59% in
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Experiment 1, which was not statistically significant. It was possible that the training 
effects were partially dependent on the problems that were selected for testing. 
However, as training was not completely successful, it suggests room for 
improvement. Verbal protocols in Experiment 1 indicated that participants used the 
heuristics yet the modest solution rates suggest unexplained sources of difficulty. It 
can be speculated that a strong incorrect representation of the problem inhibited the 
identification of the ambiguous word or name, and its alternative meaning. This may 
have been further exacerbated due to uncertainty concerning which heuristic would 
lead to problem solution.
It is important to acknowledge limitations which may have affected the 
conclusions drawn from the experiments reported in this chapter. The choice of 
problems in Experiments 1 and 2 were limited due to lack of problems concerning the 
chosen heuristics. This meant that the same training and test problems could not be 
used although efforts were made to keep training as similar as possible. Furthermore, 
one of the practice problems (practice problem 1) in Experiment 1 unintentionally 
contained both an ambiguous word as well as a name, although the latter was not 
relevant to the training. This may have misled participants into thinking that the 
problems corresponding to the name category also contained ambiguous words. 
However, verbal protocol data suggests that participants attempted at first to generate 
solutions associated with names, and when they felt they had exhausted all 
possibilities they attempted to search for ambiguous words in a problem. This did not 
conform to the training sequence which addressed ambiguity of words before 
ambiguity of names. Further, is it not known whether the above strategy was adopted 
by some participants because they had a smaller problem space for names. Finally,
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another limitation concerns interpretation of the training effects. It remains to be 
determined over what periods of time such training effects would persist.
In conclusion, verbal insight problems are difficult to solve because they 
involve restructuring or reorganising one’s initial representation of the problem 
(Ohlsson, 1992). This poses a challenge not only to the problem solver as the shift in 
representation does not occur spontaneously but also to the design of training in terms 
of how restructuring can be facilitated to solve several problems that are novel to 
training problems. The two experiments reported in this chapter demonstrated how 
training can be successfully designed to make modest improvements on verbal insight 
problem solving. Experiments 1 and 2 concerned learning the heuristics for different 
types of constraint and training in categories of problems, which resulted in positive 
transfer to test problems that also belonged to the trained categories. Thus, the 
experimental results supported previous theoretical formulations of specific transfer 
(e.g., Gick & Hollyoak, 1980; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). The next chapter will 
explore specific training to facilitate transfer to another type of insight problem that 
require solvers to consider novel functions of objects to reach solution.
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CHAPTER 5
Specific training for functional fixedness verbal insight problems
Experiments 1 and 2, reported in Chapter 4, demonstrated that heuristic-based 
training can facilitate transfer to novel exemplars belonging to trained categories of 
verbal insight problems. However, as insight problems are not homogeneous (Bowden 
et al., 2005; Isaak & Just, 1995), such training is unlikely to be helpful in facilitating 
performance on insight problems which involve the use of objects in unfamiliar ways 
to attain solution. These are said to involve functional fixedness or functional fixity 
(e.g., Birch & Rabinowitz, 1951; Duncker, 1945; Maier, 1931). This chapter provides 
a brief discussion of research on functional fixedness to illustrate that in solving both 
functional fixedness problems and verbal insight problems, problem solvers encounter 
the same difficulties. That is, both types of problems trigger habitual 
conceptualisations that induce an incorrect representation and restructuring is required 
to solve such problems. A novel approach to specific training is proposed and tested 
in Experiment 3 that encourages divergent thinking to facilitate transfer to functional 
fixedness problems.
5.1. Divergent thinking and representational change in solving functional 
fixedness problems
Functional fixedness problems require an unfamiliar item/object to be used in 
a novel way to reach the solution (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Maier, 1931,1945). As past 
experiences can inhibit general problem solving (James, 1890; Reason, 1990), it is not 
surprising that in solving functional fixedness problems, our experiences and 
knowledge of objects can lead to encoding of objects in terms of their typical
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functional attributes (Keane, 1989), and an unwarranted impasse may result that can 
only be overcome through representational change (Ohlsson, 1992). This is consistent 
with what Reason (1990) proposed. That is, in cognitively underspecified situations 
solvers tend to default to high frequency responses. To overcome functional fixity, a 
specific form of representational change is required in that the solution generated 
must include a novel, unusual function for an object mentioned in the problem 
specification (Dunker, 1945; Maier, 1931). Therefore, similar difficulties are 
encountered in solving both verbal insight problems, studied in Chapter 4, and 
functional fixedness problems, as it is the unhelpful reliance on past habits which 
impedes performance on both types of problems. The remainder of this section 
provides a brief discussion of the evidence in support of functional fixity to 
demonstrate the importance of divergent thinking in overcoming functional fixity.
A number of experiments have attested to the existence of functional fixedness 
(Adamson, 1952; Birch & Rabinowitz, 1951; Duncker, 1945; Frank & Ramscar,
2003; Maier, 1931). For example, Maier (1931) found that participants were unable to 
generate a novel function for pliers in the two-string problem until the experimenter 
provided a hint. Duncker’s (1945) candle problem is perhaps more famously known 
for demonstrating functional fixedness. Participants were set the task of attaching a 
candle to a wall so that it can bum upright, with only some matches and a box of 
drawing pins. Duncker found that participants tried to attach the candle directly to the 
wall with the drawing pins, or to glue it to the wall by melting it. It was concluded 
that participants were ‘fixated’ on the box’s normal function of holding the drawing 
pins and could not reconceptualise it as a platform to solve the problem.
Adamson (1952) replicated experiments using functional fixedness problems 
conducted by Dunker (1945) due to limited original data. Participants in the
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experimental ‘pre-utilisation’ condition experienced initial functions for objects in the 
problems which were intended to inhibit problem solutions (i.e. boxes in the candle 
problem were presented with items in them so their function as a container was 
prevalent). Control participants were given the problems without any pre-utilization 
so no prior functions for items were displayed (i.e. boxes were presented empty to 
participants). The solution rate for the experimental condition was more than twice 
than that of the control condition. These findings provided further support for 
functional fixity and suggested that those who utilise an object for a particular 
function in the past will have greater difficulty solving problems that require a novel 
function for that object. That is, past experiences reinforce the typical function of an 
object which has a pervasive effect on problem solving.
Both Adamson (1952) and Duncker (1945) used the same situation for the pre­
utilisation and new task, therefore it was difficult to determine what aspect of the 
tasks was most difficult for participants. Furthermore, there was no control for the 
experience participants had with objects prior to the experiment (Mayer, 1992). To 
overcome these criticisms, Birch and Rabinowitz (1951) adapted Maier’s (1931) two- 
string problem. They presented two experimental conditions with different pre-tasks 
while a control condition received no pre-task. Findings demonstrated that the 
situational context influenced what function is generated for a given object. In 
particular, participants’ previous experience (gained during the pre-task) led them to 
use objects in a certain way and functional fixedness did not allow them to perceive 
the objects to be used for another purpose. Thus, the context of a problem can also 
have a strong inhibitory effect in solving functional fixedness problems, as a habitual 
response results in the formation of an incorrect representation which consequently 
prevents the solver from generating a novel or unusual function for an object.
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More recently, Frank and Ramscar (2003) found that performance on 
Duncker’s (1945) candle problem was dependent on participants’ lexical 
representation of the concept ‘box’ rather than the instructional manipulation i.e., 
when noun phrases such as ‘box of matches’ were underlined, or only when nouns 
such as ‘box’ were underlined, or when the same instructions used in the original 
experiment were employed. They suggested that overcoming functional fixity in the 
candle problem is dependent on having a flexible representation of the word ‘box’ in 
order to realise that the box can serve as a platform to attach the candle to the wall.
The above studies illustrate that functional fixity can prevent divergent, 
flexible thinking i.e., thinking that entails generating numerous solutions to a problem 
(e.g., different uses for a brick), which may be an underlying process in insight 
problem solving (DeYoung et al., 2008; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; 
Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). DeYoung et al. (2008) suggested that breaking frame 
(similar to breaking out of functional fixedness; Dunker, 1945) and divergent thinking 
were two broad cognitive abilities that both independently predicted insight. That is, 
breaking frame is necessary to avoid persevering with an incorrect problem 
representation, while divergent thinking is necessary to generate elements of a new 
representation. Further, flexibility also independently predicted insight, thus 
suggesting that the ability to switch between perspectives may be an important aspect 
of divergent thinking.
Chrysikou (2006) utilised training in functional fixedness problems but tested 
performance across a range of different test problems which included verbal insight, 
visuo-spatial and functional fixedness problems. Training entailed participants 
completing an Alternative Categories Task (ACT), which is a variation of the Unusual 
Uses Test (Christensen & Gilford, 1958). The task was presented in the form of a
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questionnaire and required participants to generate up to six common categories for 
12 items including a shoe and a fork. For example, it was stated that for ‘shoe’, the 
common category was ‘item used as a footwear’. The Alternative Categories with 
Critical Items Task (ACT-C) was similar to ACT but participants in this condition 
were also given items that were critical to solving the test problems e.g., ‘box’ which 
is of importance to solving Duncker’s (1945) Candle problem. Although the training 
appeared to be specific to solving functional fixedness problems, a training effect 
(57%) was found across all test problems even when the critical item was not included 
in the task. It appears that the training encouraged divergent thinking, which is 
particularly important in solving functional fixedness problems, although in this case 
it encouraged participants to assess alternative interpretations in triggering 
representational change, as suggested by the positive training effect.
The above studies support the Gestalt ( Kohler, 1924; Wertheimer, 1945) and 
representational change (Knoblich et al., 1992, 2001; Ohlsson, 1992) perspectives of 
insight problem solving as past experiences trigger stereotypical responses, which in 
this case is a typical function of an object, that impede problem solving. Perhaps more 
importantly, the results draw attention to the role of restructuring or representational 
change in overcoming functional fixity. In other words, a switch in representation is 
needed to access low probability hypotheses that tend to be overridden by default, 
high probability hypotheses that in most situations are correct (Patrick et al., 1999). 
For example, in Maier’s (1931) two-string problem, participants were unable to 
restructure their initial interpretation of the function of the pliers to serve as a 
pendulum weight without experimenter intervention (Adamson & Taylor, 1954). 
Similarly, solvers were unable to consider the box in the candle problem to serve as a 
platform to hold the candle (Dunker, 1945). It could be argued that that these
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problems were made more difficult because real objects were provided within the 
problem context. Consequently, this may have strengthened the habitual response 
concerning the typical function of a particular object, therefore making it harder for 
the solver to overcome functional fixity. On the whole, research indicates that training 
to overcome functional fixity needs to be devised that encourages divergent thinking 
such that participants generate several uses for familiar objects in the hope of 
facilitating restructuring. Hence, the common function for an object, that is usually 
unhelpful, is abandoned early on during problem solving.
5.2. Experiment 3
One suggestion for training to facilitate divergent thinking is to devise training 
that encourages solvers to systematically generate several functions for objects in 
functional fixedness problems. In other words, the training encouraged solvers to re- 
encode objects in terms of atypical functions (Ohlsson, 1992). As with the training in 
Experiments 1 and 2, the training in the present experiment also cued the type of 
problem with the difference being that a process was introduced which focussed 
participants on the functionality of objects that is relevant to solving functional 
fixedness problems. This approach to training has never been investigated before, 
particularly where the problems were presented verbally like the verbal insight 
problems in this thesis.
Consequently, training was designed that involved the following steps: 
participants’ were directed to select an object mentioned in the problem specification 
and to generate a function for that object. Next, participants were required to consider 
whether that function could be used to solve the problem. If not, then participants 
repeated the above process for that item until they were unable to produce anymore
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functions. Another item was selected and the above process was repeated as many 
times as necessary until a solution was generated. The above approach to training was 
simple as it critically cued the solver to systematically consider several functions for 
an object, therefore encouraging both divergent thinking as well as averting the solver 
from fixating on the typical function of an object in a functional fixedness problem.
The aim of experiment 3 was to test the efficacy o f this training by evaluating 
performance on two categories of insight problems: functional fixedness problems 
and verbal insight problems (that do not involve functional fixity) that were out of 
scope to training. However, unlike the original experiments that investigated 
functional fixity using real objects (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Maier, 1931), the functional 
fixedness problems in this experiment were presented verbally in order to keep in line 
with the out of scope, verbal insight problems. Further, by presenting functional 
fixedness problems verbally, it could be argued that the items were presented in a 
more neutral context than the original experiments, therefore weakening the effects of 
functional fixity. It was predicted that transfer would be restricted to the trained 
category of test problems as suggested by theoretical formulations (e.g., Anderson, 
1983; Gick & Hollyoak, 1980; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901), and no transfer 
would take place on problems that were out of scope to the training. The think aloud 
methodology was utilised in this experiment to keep in line with the methodology of 
Experiments 1 and 2.
5.2.1. Method 
Participants
Twenty-four first year undergraduate psychology students from Cardiff
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University participated in this experiment as partial fulfilment of course 
requirements3. Ages ranged between 18 to 21 years (M  = 19.13, SD = .90).
Materials
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the Word Association task (Cohen, 1975), which 
served as a filler task, was completed by no training (control) participants.
Training Programme
Training was designed to facilitate performance on verbal versions of 
functional fixedness insight problems and involved the following two stages:-
1. Introduction to training to consider alternative functions of objects. This entailed:
a) A short explanation of how the training works.
b) A worked example of how to use the training to solve a problem.
2. Practice in using the training to solve problems. This entailed:
a) Solving one problem with experimenter guidance and prompting.
b) Solving one problem under test conditions.
For Stage 1 a, a written explanation of how the training works was provided.
The aim of the training was to encourage participants to select items within a problem
statement and to systematically consider the uses and functions of each object. After
selecting and generating a function of an item, participants considered whether that
function served as a solution for the problem. If the solution could not be used,
participants were prompted to generate another function for the object and then to
consider the plausibility of that solution. This process was repeated until all possible
functions for an object was exhausted. Participants then selected another item and
3 All materials were pilot tested using 10 participants, which revealed that four-minutes per problem 
were sufficient for participants to read and solve test problems. As no changes were required, datasets 
for these participants comprised part of the final sample.
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repeated the above process. Hence, this interactive process of selecting an item, 
generating a function, and checking the plausibility of the function as a solution was 
repeated until a solution was generated that could be used to solve the problem.
In Stage lb, an example of how the training can be applied to solve the 
following problem was presented:-
Several wooden poles, clamps, and string have been made available. The task 
is to hang the string from the ceiling to the floor without defacing the ceiling.” 
(Based on Maier, 1945)
The item ‘clamps’ was selected first to illustrate the use of the training. Possible 
functions of the clamps include using them to hold the string, to connect the 
poles together, and to use the clamps to attach things in position. One solution 
was to clamp the string to the ceiling. However, this solution is not usable as, 
according to the problem statement, there is nothing to clamp the string to the 
ceiling. Next, possible functions of the wooden poles were considered including 
using it to hold the string or to fit the poles between the floor and the ceiling 
vertically. A solution was to tie the string to the top end of the wooden pole and 
to place it against the ceiling. However, this solution is also unusable as the 
string is hanging against the wooden pole and not against the ceiling. Next, 
alternative functions of the wooden poles and clamps in combination were 
considered. These include using the clamp to attach two poles together 
vertically, using the clamps to form a right angle with the poles, using the 
clamps to form an arch, and to use the wooden pole to hang the string from. A 
possible solution to solve the problem was to tie the string around a pole and to 
firmly fix the pole against the ceiling by forming an arch structure using the 
clamps with two other poles.
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Next, participants were required to practise using the training to solve the 
following problem (Stage 2a):-
A piece of white cardboard with four black squares fastened to it is to be hung 
from a ring fixed to the ceiling. On the table in the room are the following 
objects available: paper, a pen, a ruler and some paperclips. How could the 
cardboard squares be hung on the ring?
The solution was to bend one paper clip to form a hook from which to hang the large 
square.
In the final part of the training, participants were required to solve the 
following problem under test conditions (Stage 2b):-
Three cords are to be hung side by side from a wooden ledge. On the table in 
the room there is paper, pencils, tinfoil, two short screw-hooks and a hand 
powered screwdriver. How could the three cords be hung up?
The solution was to screw the two screw-hooks using the hand powered screwdriver 
and then to hang the chords on the hooks.
Test Problems
Six test problems were used: three functional fixedness verbal insight 
problems and three out of scope verbal insight problems (see Appendix E for original 
and altered problems). The functional fixedness problems were: the Two-String 
problem (Maier, 1931), the Candle problem (Chrysikou, 2006; Duncker, 1945) and 
the Hatrack problem (Maier, 1945). As past research has presented these problems in 
both pictorial and verbal format, changes were made for the purpose of this 
experiment and problems were presented verbally to match the presentation of the out
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of scope problems. Some names for items in the problems were exchanged for more 
common terms to increase comprehension.
The three out of scope verbal insight problems were: the Charlie problem 
(Chrysikou, 2006; Weisberg, 1995), the Fake Coin problem (Chrysikou, 2006; 
Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000) and the Prisoner and Rope problem (Chrysikou, 2006; 
Isaak & Just, 1995).
Design
The independent variables were condition (training and no training) and 
problem category (functional fixedness verbal insight problems and out of scope 
verbal insight problems). Participants were randomly allocated to a condition and 
completed all problems from each category. Presentation of the test problems was 
randomised. The dependent variable was whether the problems were solved.
Procedure
Participants read the introduction to the experiment and then were given
practice in ‘thinking aloud’, as in Experiments 2 and 3. After completing the think
aloud training, participants in the control condition completed the Word Association
task before completing test problems. Participants in the training condition completed
the training programme beforehand. Participants were given a six-minute time limit4
for each problem and if they were silent for a period of time, the experimenter again
used two non-directive prompts. Verbalisations were recorded continuously. After
completing each test problem, participants were required to rate how familiar they
were with that problem on a 5-point scale. Participants were not given solution
4 Chrysikou (2006) allocated eight minutes for each problem, whereas Experiments 2 and 3 gave a four 
minute time limit; therefore the mean time of six minutes was used as a limit in this Experiment, which 
the pilot study revealed was sufficient for problem solving.
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feedback. Finally, participants were debriefed and asked not to reveal information 
about the experiment to others. The duration of the experiment was approximately one 
hour.
5.2.2. Results and Discussion
No participants rated the test problems above three on the 5-point familiarity 
rating scale, therefore data for all 24 participants were included in the analyses. An 
exploratory data analysis did not reveal any violations of homogeneity and normality 
of the data, therefore ANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis. It was predicted 
that transfer would be specific and therefore positive transfer would be restricted to 
the trained category of functional fixedness verbal insight problems.
A 2 (condition: training and no training) x 2 (problem category: functional 
fixedness and out of scope) ANOVA revealed that more problems were solved in the 
training than in the no training (control) condition, (F (1, 22) = 7.62, MSE = 3.00, p  < 
.05) although this effect interacted with problem category, (F (1, 22) = 6.60, MSE =
3.00,/? < .05). Simple main effect analyses indicated that training was better than the 
control condition in the functional fixedness problem category (p < .01) and that there 
was no difference in the out of scope, non-functional fixedness category, as predicted. 
In fact, it was observed that performance on the latter category was the same in both 
the control and training conditions. Solution rates are given in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1. Effect of training on solution rate of problem categories (three problems in 
each category)
Condition
No Training (control) Training
Problem Category Mean SD Mean SD
Functional Fixedness 0.17 0.39 1.17 0.84
Verbal Insight 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.65
Figure 5.1 reports percentage solution rate between conditions and problem 
category. Solution rate for the no training condition was taken as a baseline measure.
It can be seen that training raised the solution rate from 6% (no training) to 39% 
(training) for functional fixedness problems whereas the solution rate remained at 
22% in both the no training and training conditions for the out o f scope, verbal insight 
problems. Thus, a facilitation of 33% was observed for the trained category.
I  20 4
m
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Problem category
Figure 5.1. Percentage solution rate by conditions and problem category
Verbal protocols were not formally analysed as the primary aim of Experiment 
3 was to design and test training to facilitate performance on functional fixedness
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problems. However, a tentative observation that was made from inspection of the 
verbal protocols was that participants in the training condition indeed deliberated on 
different uses for objects in the functional fixedness problems, which enabled them to 
continue thinking of solutions after reaching an impasse as the problem space was 
broadened. Below is an excerpt that is representative of how training encouraged 
reasoning to a successful solution in the Two-String problem:
“The task is to reach one string while holding the other. So lets assume 
you’re standing directly underneath the piece of string and you put your 
hand on it and you cant reach the other one in a stretch.. .um, if you put 
the chair in between the two pieces of string in a central point, from the 
middle you would be able to reach one and then the other because the
lengths of string would meet in the middle I assume Or use the
drawing pins to pin the string in the chair and hold one there and then 
walk across to the other string and then you could have both strings in
the middle and could tie them together Or what could you do with
paper? Make a paper aeroplane, tie to the end of it and throw one of the 
strings across. Unless you put the drawing pin through the front of it to 
make it heavier. Unless you use the pliers to break off a chair leg and 
that way you could hook one piece of string and tie it to the other one or 
use it to reach longer. Trying to think of something you could do with 
the jar. Unless you could use the jar as a weight and tie the string to the 
jar and then swing it, but then it would swing back. But it would be 
easier. So you could swing it to the centre.”
The participant initially fixated their focus on the chair before considering several 
different ways of using it to reach the string. After referring to the training, they
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changed their representation and considered alternative functions for other items in 
the problem such as the paper which lead them to the correct solution. There is a 
comparable difference in the structure of how this participant solved the problem in 
comparison to the excerpt below of a participant in the control condition:
“It says it’s impossible to reach them but it doesn’t say if that is not 
using anything. Um, you could stand, you could maybe, I don’t know, 
stand on the chair and try and reach it. Or move one string and pin it so 
that it is easier to get to and then stand on the chair and get it from where 
you pinned it so it’s nearer and then hold on to it. I don’t know. I don’t 
know how to use the pliers, paper or the jar but yeah, I would do 
something like that.”
This example is representative of how participants in the control condition 
exhausted ideas quickly. They were more likely than the training condition to 
accept the first solution they generated i.e., fixating on the typical function of an 
object such as using the chair to reach the string, which was often incorrect. 
Furthermore, when they reached an impasse, they were more likely to give up 
problem solving. This supports Reason (1990) in that control participants were 
likely to default to high-frequency responses that were incorrect in solving 
functional fixedness problems.
In conclusion, training in systematically considering alternative functions of 
objects as possible solutions to functional fixedness verbal problems improved 
solution rates on novel exemplars of this problem category. As predicted, positive 
transfer on functional fixedness problems was observed. Indeed, training encouraged 
the specific process of generating alternative functions for objects in the problems, 
which supports Keane (1989) who suggested that a problem solver needs to think
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beyond previously encoded functional attributes of objects to overcome an impasse. 
However, although a positive training effect was observed, it is not clear whether it 
was the content or the process of training that resulted in improved performance on 
functional fixedness verbal insight problems.
5.3. General Discussion
The goal of this chapter was to investigate specific training to promote 
positive transfer on functional fixedness verbal insight problems. For this purpose, 
Experiment 3 utilised training that cued the functionality of items in a problem 
statement. In other words, the approach to training explicitly drew solvers’ attention 
to the function of items that is critical to the problem solution. Hence, divergent 
thinking was encouraged as the solver was required to generate an exhaustive list of 
possible functions for individual items. It was expected that solvers in the no training 
(control) condition would initially interpret items in terms of their common functions 
that would trigger an incorrect representation of the problem, which would inhibit 
problem solving. Training was based on the notion that the solver could be trained to 
systematically consider the different functions of objects and to check the plausibility 
of each function as a solution to the problem. This process of considering different 
functions of objects should shift the faulty representation and cue re-encoding, as 
suggested by Ohlsson (1992) and this, in turn, should facilitate solution to problems 
belonging to that problem category.
The results suggest that training indeed facilitated performance to novel 
exemplars of the trained category as solution rate was raised from 6% (no training) to 
39% for functional fixedness problems. However, this is a modest training effect, and 
suggests that other sources of difficulty may impede performance. As predicted,
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transfer did not occur to non-functional fixedness problems i.e., verbal insight 
problems that were out of scope to the training. One possible reason is that the 
training directed the problem solver’s attention to objects in a problem and generating 
object-related solutions which was not applicable to solving the out of scope 
problems.
There are some unresolved issues concerning the present experiment. Firstly, 
it is unknown whether the training would be as beneficial if original versions of the 
functional fixedness problems were used. However, it could be argued that by 
presenting functional fixedness problems verbally, the problems were made a little 
easier in contrast to the original versions of the problems (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Maier, 
1931). This is because the original problems presented objects that were highly 
associated with the context in which they were presented in whereas in this 
experiment, the objects were presented in an abstract form within the problem 
specification, thus the assumption concerning the function of an object may have been 
less difficult to overcome. Of course, this requires further investigation. Secondly, it 
remains to be determined over what periods of time such training effects would 
persist. Thirdly, it is not clear from these results whether it was the process or the 
content of the training that led to increased solution rate on problems for the trained 
category. However, despite the aforementioned issues, it is important to note that this 
experiment was the first attempt at assessing problem solving of functional fixedness 
verbal insight problems where past research presented these problems in both pictorial 
and verbal format (Dunker, 1945; Maier, 1931, 1945).
In conclusion, the results demonstrated that it is possible to facilitate transfer 
to functional fixedness problems, which are considered a different class of problems 
compared to verbal insight problems. Both functional fixedness and verbal insight
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problems are generally difficult to solve because of their apparent familiarity with 
past problems, which results in problem solving being based on a stereotypical 
response or assumption that is incorrect. Therefore, solution attainment for such 
problems is critically dependent on the problem solver abandoning their assumptions 
and considering a novel way of viewing the problem. The present results are 
promising and provide modest support for previous theories of transfer (e.g., 
Anderson, 1983; Gick & Hollyoak, 1980; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). However 
the challenge remains to devise generic training that promotes positive transfer to 
novel exemplars of verbal insight problems. This is addressed in Chapters 6 and 7.
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CHAPTER 6
Inconsistency checking as a form of generic training for verbal insight problems
Chapters 4 and 5 reported experiments that utilised specific training to promote 
transfer on insight problems that were exemplars of the trained categories. Thus, 
Experiments 1 and 2 (reported in Chapter 4) provided training in heuristics that were 
applicable to solving verbal insight problems that either contained ambiguous words 
or ambiguous names. Further, the training in Experiment 3 (reported in Chapter 5) 
was also specific in that positive transfer was facilitated to a category of problems 
involving functional fixity. Thus, the training in these experiments aimed to improve 
performance on categories of verbal insight problems. Therefore, a major challenge is 
to devise a more generic form of training that facilitates positive transfer to not only to 
the problem for which it was designed but also to a range of novel verbal insight 
problems. In other words, training should be applicable to solving any verbal insight 
problem irrespective of the implicit constraint that is associated with it.
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the research that has investigated 
generic training (reviewed in detail in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2) to facilitate 
performance on a range of insight problems. A new form of generic training is 
introduced in Experiment 4 which aimed to guide problem solvers in recognising and 
reinterpreting their implicit assumptions that form part of a faulty representation 
which, in turn, impedes verbal insight problem solving.
6.1. Inconsistency checking as a mechanism for representational change
The aim of generic training is to improve performance across a range of 
insight problems that were associated with different constraints. This section provides
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a summary of the findings of key generic training studies on insight problem solving 
(e.g., Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Chrysikou, 2006; Wicker et al., 1978), which 
highlight that the nature of the assumptions or constraints associated with insight 
problems vary so much that it is difficult to design generic training for verbal insight 
problem solving. In addition, past generic studies suggest that solvers must overcome 
such assumptions to attain insight without specifying how this can be achieved.
As reviewed earlier in Chapter 3 (.section 3.3.2), the earliest study cited that 
attempted some form of generic training for verbal insight problem solving was by 
Wicker et al. (1978). Two experiments were conducted which revealed that training in 
a reformulation strategy that encouraged problem solvers to keep changing their view 
of the problem to avoid making unnecessary assumptions was sufficient in raising the 
solution rate to 68% (Experiment 2) when compared to a visualisation condition that 
required participants to form a detailed visual representation of the problem. Training 
entailed practice with solution feedback on eight problems in Experiment 1 and three 
problems in Experiment 2. Although the results are promising, the study incurred 
methodological criticisms. That is, the reformulation strategy was not specified in 
detail and participants were not given practice in identifying and rejecting incorrect 
assumptions. Further, a list of the training and test problems was not provided which 
makes it difficult to assess the transfer relationship between the conditions. Finally, 
verbal protocols were not collected, therefore it was now known to what extent 
training was applied during problem solving. The above criticisms are addressed in 
the experiment reported in this chapter.
Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) employed a similar approach to generic 
training as Wicker et al. (1978) to facilitate performance on novel verbal insight 
problems. They found that strategic instructions in reading a problem carefully and
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interpreting it in alternative ways resulted in a training effect of 48% (Experiment 2).
It was also found that the number of practice problems attempted during training had 
little effect on test performance (Experiment 3). It was concluded that highlighting the 
relevance of training to problem solvers along with practice during the training phase 
was critical in observing a training effect (Experiment 4). As with the findings of 
Wicker et al, the above results also draw attention to the importance of considering 
alternative interpretations of a problem in facilitating representational change.
The approach to training by Chrysikou (2006) appeared to be specific to 
functional fixedness problems as it provided practice in generating alternative uses for 
items. However, training was successful in facilitating performance across a range of 
different types of insight problem, including verbal problems, and a facilitation effect 
of approximately 60% was reported. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
training provided participants with a general skill to avoid relying on their first 
interpretation which is often incorrect and that considering alternative solutions was 
likely to lead to the correct solution to a problem.
In summary, the training employed by Wicker et al. (1978), Ansburg and 
Dominowski (2000), and Chrysikou (2006) encouraged solvers to consider alternative 
interpretations. In particular, the training by Wicker et al. and Ansburg and 
Dominowski made solvers aware that the first interpretation is often incorrect and to 
consider alternative interpretations, thereby helping solvers to identify and correct 
their faulty representations. Indeed, Gestalt theory (e.g., Kohler, 1924; Wertheimer, 
1945) and theories of representational change (Knoblich et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1992) 
propose that insight problems are difficult because the problem specification triggers a 
faulty representation which leads to an impasse. The faulty representation needs to be 
abandoned through representational change that enables the solver to overcome the
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impasse, which consequently allows the solver to resume problem solving (Ohlsson, 
1992).
A possible reason why the training effects reported by the above generic 
studies were not closer to 100% is that the issue of the different assumptions or 
constraints associated with verbal insight problems was not addressed. That is, the 
idiosyncratic nature of the stereotypical assumptions that are triggered by verbal 
insight problems have largely been ignored by past training studies in this area.
Hence, the training in this experiment adopted a generic approach similar to that of 
Wicker et al. (1978) and Ansburg and Dominowski (2000) rather than the more 
specific training tailored to the solution of specific categories of insight problems that 
was investigated in Experiments 1 to 3. Further, unlike past training generic studies 
that were summarised earlier, the present experiment specified a mechanism for 
overcoming implicit assumptions in verbal insight problem solving.
An important prerequisite for any such generic training is to first draw the 
trainee’s attention to nature of the difficulties (Campione & Ambruster, 1985) 
associated with insight problems before providing the trainee with a solution strategy 
that can be applied to solve such problems. With regards to verbal insight problems, 
firstly, a problem solver must be made aware that such problems induce a 
stereotypical assumption that is often mistaken or incorrect. Secondly, training must 
provide a mechanism that allows the solver to identify the nature of these incorrect 
assumptions during problem solving. A suggestion for a possible mechanism is to 
focus participants’ on identifying inconsistencies between their hypotheses or 
interpretations of a problem and the problem specification, as a means of assessing the 
plausibility of their hypotheses. Indeed, hypothesis generation is an important part of 
problem solving as it entails generating possible solutions that are consistent with the
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problem statement (Patrick et al., 1999). This idea of inconsistency checking during 
problem solving is certainly not novel. In fact, inconsistency checking has been found 
to be a central process in hypothesis generation as it can occur spontaneously even if 
participants have not been asked explicitly to consider the plausibility of their 
hypotheses (Fisher, Gettys, Manning, Mehle, & Baca, 1983).
The mechanism of inconsistency checking used in the present experiment 
derives from a study by Patrick et al. (1999) in which nuclear power plant operators 
were trained to shift incorrect representations when trying to diagnose unusual faults 
by identifying the inconsistency between the actual symptoms and those associated 
with their incorrect hypothesised fault. This served as a cue to the problem solver to 
abandon their high frequency default representation and to extend their stereotypical 
single fault hypothesis into a more unusual multiple one. Patrick et al. suggested that 
such cognitive training that provided practice in resolving inconsistencies between a 
hypothesis and available symptoms should be generalisable to laboratory problem 
tasks.
It was expected that the identification of inconsistencies between a person’s 
representation of a verbal insight problem and the problem specification should cue 
representational change, which in turn should make solution attainment easier, 
particularly if the inconsistency concerned the hypothesised constraint associated with 
a particular problem. For example, the Anthony and Cleopatra and Coming Home 
problems (see Appendix F) evoke initial representations that inappropriately include 
humans and night-time, respectively. By training people to make a careful comparison 
between the problem specification and their representation of the problem this should 
result in the identification of the stereotypical assumption that has been associated 
with their representation. Thus, by attempting to make a solver’s representation of a
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problem more explicit by comparing their interpretation of a problem with the 
problem statement, they are forced to question themselves, which has been found to 
be useful in other problem solving contexts such as design problem solving (e.g., 
Wetzstein & Hacker, 2004). However, for this method to be effective, it is important 
that solvers are given practice in doing this which is coupled with solution feedback 
(e.g., Anderson, 1983; Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981).
6.2. Experiment 4
The aim of Experiment 4 was to facilitate performance across a variety of 
verbal insight problems. The training was geared towards overcoming incorrect 
assumptions associated with verbal insight problems that lead the solver to form a 
faulty problem representation. In particular, participants were trained in recognising 
potential inconsistencies between their interpretations of a problem and the problem 
specification, in the hope of cueing representational change to facilitate solution. It 
was predicted that positive transfer would occur across all verbal insight test 
problems. Concurrent verbal protocols were collected to glean evidence of the nature 
of the hypotheses generated by participants. In addition verbal protocols might also 
reveal whether training was having the intended effect on the search for the solution.
6.2.1. Method 
Participants
Twenty-four non-psychology students from Cardiff University took part in this 
study and were awarded payment for their participation5. Ages ranged from 18-23 
years (M= 20.50 SD = 1.38).
5 All materials were pilot tested using four participants, which revealed that no changes were required. 
Therefore, datasets for these participants comprised part of the final sample.
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Materials
Training programme
There were two main objectives of the training programme:-
1. To make participants’ aware that an incorrect interpretation (or representation) of 
a problem may block the solution.
2. To provide practice at identifying inconsistencies between the problem statement 
and their interpretation of it.
For the awareness training, participants read through two examples of how this 
blocking effect might operate. For example:
Why are 1988 pennies worth more than 1983 pennies? (Sloane, 1992, p. 28)
In this problem people might assume that the numbers refer to years, which would 
then block the correct interpretation that the numbers refer to quantities of pennies. 
Therefore, 1998 pennies would be worth £19.88, which is more than £19.83.
The second part of the training involved four stages that focused on 
overcoming such blocking effects by providing increasingly independent practice. In 
the first stage, participants were presented with two different problems, each having 
two written interpretations that were inconsistent with the problem specification. 
Participants were required to identify these inconsistencies and, if they failed to do so, 
were prompted by the experimenter. An example of one problem was:
Archie and Ben were professional golfers and keen rivals. One day during a 
game, they had each scored 30 when Ben hit a bad shot. Archie immediately 
added 10 to his own score. Archie then hit a good shot and he had won the 
game. Why? (Sloane, 1992, p. 21)
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Possible interpretation: ‘Two friends were playing golf, they were both on 30
points, then one reached 40 points and won’.
The interpretation is inconsistent with the problem specification because it does not 
state that Archie and Ben were friends, nor that they were playing golf. The solution 
was that they were playing tennis.
The second stage of training required participants to read a similar problem to 
the above, to write down their own interpretation, and then to attempt identifying any 
inconsistencies between their interpretation and the problem specification. After this 
participants attempted to solve the problem. The experimenter prompted participants 
who were unable to complete any aspects of this. In the third stage of this training, 
participants were required to solve a standard problem without writing their own 
interpretation but being prompted, if necessary, by the experimenter. In the final 
stage, participants attempted to solve a problem without the experimenter prompting 
although solution feedback was given at the end.
Test problems
All participants attempted to solve four test problems (Anthony & Cleopatra, 
Bombs Away, Coming Home, and Unseen Walker) which were taken from Sloane 
(1992, see Appendix F). Each test problem was selected because it was hypothesised 
to involve a constraint that could block solution attainment.
Design
The independent variable was condition (training and no training). Participants 
were randomly allocated to a condition and completed all test problems. Presentation
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of the test problems was counterbalanced using a four by four balanced Latin square. 
The dependent variable was whether the problems were solved.
Procedure
Participants read the introduction to the experiment and then were given 
practice in ‘thinking aloud’, as in previous experiments. After completing the think 
aloud training, participants in the no training (control) condition completed the test 
problems whereas participants in the training condition completed the training 
programme followed by the test problems whilst thinking aloud. Participants were 
given a five-minute time limit for each problem and if  they were silent for a period of 
time, the experimenter again used two non-directive prompts. Verbalisations were 
recorded continuously. After completing each test problem, participants were required 
to rate how familiar they were with that problem on a 5-point scale (1 = very 
unfamiliar, 5 = very familiar). Participants were not given solution feedback. Finally, 
participants were debriefed and asked not to reveal information about the experiment 
to others. The duration of the experiment was approximately 40 minutes.
Qualitative categorisation and assessment o f reliability
Verbal protocols were analysed to gather evidence that the inconsistency 
checking training procedure was responsible for any improvement in solution rates 
and also to identify the nature of the hypotheses generated between the training and 
no training conditions. A rigorous three-stage procedure was developed to identify 
and categorise hypotheses and to assess inter-coder reliability. The three stages were 
as follows:
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1. Three coders (experimenter and two unrelated researchers) read the protocols 
and individually identified what they considered to be hypotheses/solutions for 
each of the four test problems completed by participants. A hypothesis or 
solution was defined as ‘any verbalisation that attempts to answer the question 
posed in the problem statement’. Practice was given on a verbal protocol that 
was excluded from the final dataset to ensure that coders understood the task. 
Once all three coders had identified potential hypotheses, disagreements were 
discussed until a consensus was reached and a final list of agreed hypotheses 
was produced. A total of 382 hypotheses were initially identified by all three 
coders. Of these 382 hypotheses, 312 or 81.7% were identified by all three 
coders, 45 or 11.8% were identified by two coders, and 25 or 6.5% were 
identified by one coder. After discussion, 20 hypotheses were rejected, making 
the final total 362.
2. The second stage examined verbal protocols to determine whether participants 
engaged in training related behaviours. Firstly, two coders (the experimenter 
and a different coder to those in the previous stages) used the following 
criteria to identify any segment in the protocols that demonstrated that:
a) a participant re-read or paraphrased some part or the whole of the problem 
statement.
b) a participant explicitly questioned something within the problem statement.
c) a participant self-questioned their hypotheses i.e., self-reflection.
A total of 394 segments across the verbal protocols were initially identified of 
which 42 or 11% were identified by one coder and 352 or 89% was identified 
by both coders. After discussion, 12 segments were rejected, making the final
129
total 382. Next, the coders categorised the 382 segments into one of the above 
three types of training related behaviours. The Perrault and Leigh (1989) 
reliability index was 0.92 between the two raters, which was acceptably high 
(Gremler, 2004; Krippendorf, 1980).
3. The final stage involved the same coders, as in stage 1, who independently 
categorised the agreed 362 hypotheses into one of three categories: 
inconsistent, incorrect other, or correct. Inconsistent hypotheses were so called 
because they contradicted some information given in the problem statement. 
Thus, for example, in ‘Bombs Away’ the hypothesis that ‘the release 
mechanism failed’ is inconsistent because it was contradicted by the problem 
statement that ‘the plane was in perfect condition and everything on it worked 
properly’. Incorrect other hypotheses were so called as they did not contradict 
any information in the problem specification but nonetheless were wrong. For 
example, in ‘Anthony and Cleopatra’, an incorrect other hypothesis was that 
death was due to natural causes. Correct hypotheses referred to the solution of 
the problem. Of the 362 hypotheses, it was found that 334 or 92.3% were 
categorised by all three coders using the same categories and the remaining 28 
or 7.7% were categorised by two coders. The Perreault and Leigh (1989) 
reliability indices for the three pairs of coders were 0.95, 0.97, and 0.97, 
respectively, which were acceptably high (Gremler, 2004; Krippendorf, 1980).
6,2.2, Results and Discussion
No participants were familiar with test problems; therefore the final sample
comprised 24 participants. An exploratory data analysis did not reveal any violations
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of homogeneity and normality of the data, therefore a t-test was conducted, which 
revealed that more problems were solved in the training (M  = 1.58, SD = 1.00) than in 
the no training condition (M = .83, SD = 1.03), t (22) = 1.81,/? < .05 (1-tailed). Hence, 
training almost doubled the solution rate from the baseline o f 21% (no training) to 
40% in the training condition, thus illustrating a facilitation of 19% (see Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1. Percentage solution rate by condition
In order to confirm that the above transfer effect was as a result o f the training 
procedures, the verbal protocols were analysed firstly to identify whether participants 
in the training condition engaged in training related behaviours and secondly, to 
determine if there were differences in the types of hypotheses generated by 
participants between the two conditions.
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Analysis o f  verbal protocols
It was expected that participants in the training condition were more likely to 
refer to the problem specification and/or to question some of part of the specification 
as a result of training. Another possible consequence of training is that it may have 
prompted participants to engage in more reflective thinking i.e., self-reflection that 
entailed questioning their hypotheses.
A t-test revealed that trained participants were more likely to refer to the 
problem statement by either re-reading or paraphrasing some parts or the whole of 
problem statement during problem solving (t (22) = 2.56,/? = .009,1-tailed, Table 
6.1). A logarithmic function eradicated the problems of skewness on data assessing 
whether participants directly questioned the content within the problem statement. 
Hence a t-test was conducted on the transformed data, which also revealed that trained 
participants were more likely to verbally question information in the problem 
statement (t (22) = 2.50,/? = .01, 1-tailed) during problem solving (Table 6.1). It can 
be seen that there are large differences in the means (Table 6.1.) between the two 
conditions for the first two training related behaviours, which provides support for the 
use of the training procedure by trained participants. Table 6.2 provides examples of 
questions participants in the training condition verbalised during problem solving for 
each of the four test problems.
Finally, due to violations of skewness on self-reflection data which could not 
be eradicated with a logarithmic transformation, a Mann-Whitney U test was 
conducted which revealed no differences between conditions (z = 3.98,/? = .75) in the 
engagement of self-reflection during problem solving(Table 6.1). The mean rank was 
12.04 for no training condition and 12.96 for training condition. This suggests that 
there were no differences between conditions in participants explicitly questioning
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their hypotheses during problem solving. In fact, the results indicate that very few 
hypotheses were generated that illustrated self-reflection. Examples of hypotheses that 
suggested trained participants had engaged in self-reflection for the Anthony and 
Cleopatra include ‘we assume that it is the famous Anthony and Cleopatra as they are 
in Egypt but they could be any old Anthony and Cleopatra’ and ‘we assume that the 
Anthony and Cleopatra relate to the death that happened thousand of years ago but 
may be I shouldn’t have assumed that’. This null finding is not surprising as self­
reflection is a metacognitive activity which was not covered by the training in this 
experiment.
Table 6.1. Types of training related behaviours during problem solving
Types of training related behaviour
No Training 
(Control) 
M SD
Training 
M SD
1. Re-read or paraphrased some part or whole of the 
problem statement
7.75 5.82 15.67 8.98
2. Directly questioned something within the problem 
statement
1.83 1.95 5.83 6.79
3. Self-reflection on hypotheses 0.33 0.65 0.42 0.67
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Table 6.2. Examples of questions verbalised by trained participants that were related
to the problem statement
Test Problem Examples of questions asked by participants
Anthony & Cleopatra 1. How else could they [Anthony and Cleopatra] die?
2. What was in the bowl?
3. Did they [Anthony and Cleopatra] die in the villa?
Coming Home 1. Why is there a car that doesn’t have its headlights on racing 
down the road?
2. It doesn’t say he has been drinking alcohol?
3. How did the driver of the car manage to see him?
Unseen Walker 1. Why is he walking several miles on a busy Friday afternoon?
2. Is he walking on the pavement?
3. Why didn’t anyone see him?
Bombs Away 1. It doesn’t say that it [the plane] was flying?
2. Where did the [the bombs] fall from?
3. Did it [the problem statement] say they [the plane] were 
carrying bombs?
The above findings demonstrate that what was learnt during training was indeed 
applied during problem solving as participants engaged in the types of behaviours that 
they were trained to carry out.
Next, verbal protocols were analysed to determine whether there were 
differences between conditions in the types of hypotheses participants had generated 
during problem solving. It was expected that participants in the control condition were 
more likely to generate hypotheses that contradicted some information available in the 
problem statement. Further, as a result of training, participants in the training 
condition were more likely to avoid or repress a hypothesis that was inconsistent with 
the problem statement and thus were less likely to generate inconsistent hypotheses 
but were more likely to generate ‘other’ hypotheses that were neither inconsistent nor 
correct. Due to violations of skewness on the number of inconsistent hypotheses 
generated in the no training condition, a logarithmic function was conducted which 
served to eradicate this problem. Contrary to predictions, a t-test revealed no
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significant difference between the no training (M= 2.75, SD = 2.09) and training (M = 
3.33, SD = 1.67) conditions in the generation of inconsistent hypotheses, (t (22) = 
1.212,/? = .119,1-tailed). Further, no significant difference was found between the no 
training (M = 11.92, SD = 3.77) and training (M  = 9.75, SD = 4.12) conditions in the 
generation o f ‘incorrect other’ hypotheses, (t (22) = 1.344,/? = .096, 1-tailed).
Possible reasons for the above null findings include that although the coding was 
highly reliable, the verbalisations did not fully reveal participants’ thoughts during 
problem solving. Alternatively, the results may have been due to lack of power.
Differences in the approach to problem solving
Verbal protocols illustrated differences in the approach to problem solving 
between conditions. The following excerpt is representative of the difficulties 
participants in the no training had in solving the Coming Home problem in which the 
problem statement triggered the incorrect assumption that it is night-time, thus 
preventing the solver to realise that the driver was able to see the man because it was 
day-time.
“In this question, we know that the man had quite a few drinks and was on his 
way home.. .1 assume that the driver might have some instinct that made him 
aware there might be a person on the road. Especially if the driver is a very 
careful person and at the time he was driving on the road, it was so dark, most 
probably he was not speeding as well. When it came to getting near to the man 
who was drunk, I think the driver must have sensed a feeling of human trace 
on the road.. .It made him stop immediately when there was danger....And 
because it was all in the dark and because the man was drunk, he might be 
walking from one end to the other, and somehow he got to see the movement,
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shadow. I would think that that would make the driver of the car aware that 
there might be an animal or a car and it makes him alert...He might have good 
eyesight as well so that makes things easier for him rather than a person with 
blurred vision. Or just simply having the music loud.. .would contribute to him 
being able to see the drinking man.”
This excerpt is very different to the following excerpt from the training condition 
which demonstrates how the inconsistency checking mechanism was applied to attain 
solution in the Unseen Walker problem:
“No moon light but there could have been, there’s possibility of
starlight But there could have been another source of illumination such as
a house or there was starlight. Or there could have been some other method of 
seeing him such as a .. .some cars have got infrared filters in the windscreens 
but I think that’s quite unlikely. It says he’s been out drinking but it doesn’t
imply alcohol He was walking down the middle of a deserted country
road.. .which makes me think of narrow and windy so .. .If it was windy, the 
driver might not have seen him until the last minute because of a bend rather 
than because of everything being black.. .It doesn’t say it’s night-time though. 
So I think he’s walking in the middle of the day and there was a bend and 
whoever was dressed in black, the driver saw him anyway.”
The participant initially made the incorrect assumption that it was night-time and thus 
hypothesised alternative light sources that could explain how the driver saw the man. 
Then it was correctly identified that although the man had been drinking, he may not 
have been drinking alcohol which is often associated with night-time. The solution 
was attained shortly afterwards.
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In conclusion, the results of the present experiment suggest that this form of 
generic training can be successful in raising people’s awareness of stereotypical 
assumptions that hinder verbal insight problem solving, and that providing appropriate 
practice at identifying these wrong assumptions through an inconsistency checking 
mechanism can facilitate solutions to novel problems.
6.3. Conclusions
The approach to training in Experiment 4 was generic in that it was designed 
to facilitate performance on any verbal insight problem in spite of the type of 
assumption or constraint associated with that problem. Hence, the aim was to mitigate 
the difficulties encountered in solving any verbal insight problem by helping solvers 
to identify the assumption or constraint that blocks the solution path. It is of 
importance to note that the generic training in this Experiment 4 was different to the 
training of Wicker et al. (1978) and Chrysikou (2006). Both Wicker et al.’s 
reformulation strategy and Chrysikou’s goal-derived categorisation training 
emphasised that the solver must overcome assumptions to attain solution although 
how this can be achieved was unspecified. This criticism was addressed by the 
training in Experiment 4 in which an explicit cognitively related process was provided 
that attempted to identify problem constraints. It was expected that the solver would 
initially generate an incorrect representation of a problem that was based on a 
stereotypical assumption that was triggered by the problem specification. Further, this 
incorrect representation would contain unhelpful additional information that was not 
detailed in the problem specification. Training was based on the idea that the solver 
could be trained to recognise this additional information by explicitly comparing their
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interpretations with the problem specification, which would, in turn, facilitate 
recognition of the problem constraint or assumption and consequently the solution.
This training was clearly successful and this was substantiated by analysis of 
the verbal protocol analyses. This found that the participants in the training condition 
referred more frequently back to the problem statement and also explicitly questioned 
some information in the problem statement during problem solving. Therefore it is 
reasonable to conclude that the training effect was due to this trained procedure, 
which was termed inconsistency checking. It was unsurprising that there was no 
evidence of more reflective thinking in the trained condition as the training did not 
directly address this.
However the solution score was only at 40% even in the trained condition and 
so training clearly still needs to be improved. Indeed there was no significant 
difference between the training and control conditions in the generation of hypotheses 
that were inconsistent with the problem statement. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that the cognitive process of inconsistency checking was difficult for 
solvers to perform because it requires assessment of their representation of a problem, 
which may have increased cognitive load and demands on working memory. 
Therefore, a replication of this experiment would benefit an extra condition in which 
an external memory aid, such as a pen and paper to write down interpretations during 
problem solving, is utilised which may further make a person’s representation more 
explicit and increase recognition of a discrepancy.
Generally the verbal protocol data provided some indirect support for 
Representational Change theories (Knoblich et al., 1999, 2001; Ohlsson, 1992) that 
suggest that a faulty representation blocks the solution path. Indeed, the test problems 
evoked an implicit constraint that affected hypothesis generation. In other words, once
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the stereotypical assumption was triggered, it had a strong and pervasive effect during 
problem solving, particularly in the no training condition.
In conclusion, the results demonstrated that it is possible to facilitate 
performance on novel verbal insight problems through generic training, as reported by 
previous studies (e.g., Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Chrysikou, 2006; Wicker et al., 
1978). The inconsistency checking mechanism embedded within problem solving 
aimed to identify faulty representations, and therefore served as a novel method for 
demonstrating restructuring within verbal insight problem solving. However, the 
results provided modest support for previous theoretical formulations of transfer (e.g., 
Anderson, 1983; Gick & Hollyoak, 1980; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). A 
suggestion to improve the training effect is to further break down the use of the 
inconsistency checking mechanism by directing participants to scrutinise 
interpretations of different parts of the problem statement, thus increasing the 
likelihood of identifying a faulty representation during verbal insight problem solving. 
Thus, an iterative approach to problem solving, which is similar to that used to solve 
functional fixedness problems in Experiment 3, is explored in Experiment 5, reported 
in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
Enhanced training in inconsistency checking for verbal insight problems
The generic training employed in Experiment 4, in the preceding chapter, introduced 
an inconsistency checking mechanism as a way of operationalising restructuring in 
verbal insight problem solving. A training score of 40% was reported. The aim of the 
present experiment was to raise this effect by implementing an adapted version of the 
inconsistency checking training that was utilised in Experiment 4. In addition, an 
additional training condition was employed to determine whether instructing 
participants to explain and justify their solutions induced reflective thinking that 
served to improve performance.
7.1. An iterative process of inconsistency checking
The training in inconsistency checking was adapted for the present experiment 
in order to improve performance on verbal insight problems by encouraging 
participants to adopt a more systematic approach to using the mechanism to help them 
identify and correct the faulty representation to attain insight. The training in 
Experiment 5 was designed to encourage participants to systematically select different 
parts of a problem and to identify any inconsistencies between their interpretations 
concerning that part of the problem and the problem specification. In addition, once 
participants had generated an interpretation that was consistent with the problem 
specification, they were required to consider whether it could be used to solve the 
problem. Thus, an iterative process was introduced that explicitly encouraged 
participants to be more exhaustive in examining the problem specification and their 
interpretations thereby increasing the chance of identifying their incorrect
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representation. This iterative approach to assessing the problem statement is similar to 
the training method that was implemented in Experiment 3, reported in Chapter 5, 
which was successful in facilitating performance on functional fixedness verbal 
insight problems for which the solution required an object to be used in a novel way. 
That is, participants were trained to solve functional fixedness problems by iteratively 
selecting an object mentioned in the problem specification, to consider all possible 
functions for that object and to systematically consider the plausibility of each 
function for an object as a possible solution to a problem.
Another issue that was addressed in the present experiment concerned the 
number of test problems used. It has been mentioned throughout this thesis that one of 
the problems for designing training for insight problem solving is that there is much 
variability between problems in terms of their associated assumption or constraint. 
Hence, the number of test problems was raised from four to seven in Experiment 5 in 
an attempt to better gauge the efficacy of inconsistency checking as method for 
inducing representational change.
7.2. Reflective verbalisations during problem solving
An alternative approach to the concurrent verbalisations used in this thesis, 
after Ericsson and Simon (1993) is ‘reflective verbalisation’, which requires a 
problem solver to critically evaluate their thinking by explaining themselves, and thus 
can give rise to reflection. Reflection of the solution searching process encourages 
relevant metacognitive activity and thus directs the problem solver to focus on aspects 
of the problem that are critical to solution attainment (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; 
Dominowski, 1990). For the purpose of training, it has been reported that asking 
participants to explain their thinking is in fact beneficial to problem solving (Ahlum-
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Heath & DiVesta, 1986; Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1987; Wetzstein & Hacker, 2004; 
Winckelmann & Hacker, 2010). This section briefly discusses research that has 
successfully induced reflective thinking, particularly during analytical problem 
solving, and then makes suggestions for how reflection can be trained and 
investigated with respect to verbal insight problem solving.
Wetzstein and Hacker (2004) cited a case study which compared verbal 
protocols of two participants who were instructed to think aloud. It was observed that 
one participant frequently asked questions, stated hypotheses and conclusions, and 
attempted to explain, evaluate and justify their behaviour whereas the other 
participant tended to be descriptive in their verbalisations. The former participant 
demonstrated greater problem solving performance. This suggested that the mere act 
of self question-answering dialogues or discussions during problem solving appears to 
encourage a solver to reflect on their thinking which can have positive benefits.
Support for verbalisations that encourage reflection has been reported for the 
well-defined Tower of Hanoi task (Ahlum-Heath & DiVesta, 1986). Ahlum-Heath 
and DiVesta found that when naive problem solvers were required to state and justify 
each move they made before it was made during practice on two, three, four and five 
disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi problem, performance was consequently 
improved on the test problem involving six disks. It was also found that participants 
who were given practice without having to justify their moves were more likely to 
make excess moves than those in the justification condition. These results were 
interpreted to suggest that instructing solvers to state and justify their moves 
encouraged solvers to consider each move separately, to evaluate alternative moves 
for a given problem state and to reject moves that were unfavourable. Thus, the
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process explicitly encouraged solvers to employ means-end analysis to explicate 
moves to reach the goal state.
Support for the positive effects of reflective verbalisations has also been 
reported for search tasks (Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1987) and design tasks 
(Wetzstein & Hacker, 2004; Winckelmann & Hacker, 2010) which are complex and 
ill-defined. For example, Berry and Broadbent (1984) investigated three different 
methods for improving search performance on a diagnostic task. It was reported that 
a) verbal instruction on procedures and b) giving participants instructions to so say 
aloud their reasons for their actions were both ineffective in changing performance. 
However, when verbal instructions were combined with asking participants to justify 
their actions aloud, performance was improved. It was also reported that positive 
effects for the latter method were not only observed on the specific task that was 
trained, but also on a different task that required the same procedures. Thus, positive 
transfer was observed to a different context. This finding suggests that simply 
instructing participants to justify (or explain) their thinking during problem solving is 
sufficient to encourage reflection, which in turn, aids performance.
More recently, Winckelmann and Hacker (2010) demonstrated that question- 
based reflection improved the quality of design solutions in students and experts. In 
designing an artefact, the experimenter asked questions that encouraged participants 
to explain, justify and to evaluate their finished design. That is, the questions aimed to 
stimulate reflection on the solutions generated that participants could subsequently 
modify or revise. Examples of questions included “How does the proposed solution 
fulfil the required functions?’ and ‘Which alternative solutions for the functions may 
exist?’. All groups (experts versus novices) demonstrated an improvement on 
solutions when compared to a control. Moreover, of the experts, those with less
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experience showed better performance in comparison to those with higher experience, 
thus supporting the beneficial effects of reflective verbalisations.
The above research indicates that reflection during problem solving has been 
induced via two different methods. That is, by asking participants to explain their 
thinking which may also result in the participant engaging in self question-answer 
dialogues, or by allowing participants to ask the experimenter questions during 
problem solving. A more notable observation is that research investigating the effects 
of reflective verbalisations has focussed on non-insight problems which, unlike 
insight problems, do not require restructuring to reach solution (Ohlsson, 1992; 
Sternberg & Davidson, 1995; Weisberg, 1995). In other words, solution attainment for 
such problems is not dependent on the abandonment of an initial misrepresentation of 
the problem. Ormerod and Ball (2007) recently noted that studies that measure 
cognitive activity through the collection of verbal protocols often make no attempt to 
engage participants in reflecting about their performance. The qualitative analyses in 
Experiment 4 revealed that participants in the training condition were more likely to 
explicitly question information in the problem statements during problem solving 
although no evidence was found for a greater engagement in reflective thinking in the 
training condition. Therefore, an additional aim of Experiment 5 was to asses whether 
instructing participants to explain and justify their thinking during practice promotes 
reflective thinking, which in turn facilitates performance on verbal insight problems. 
No research has investigated this approach using verbal insight problems.
7.3. Experiment 5
The present experiment comprised of two training conditions (Enhanced 
Inconsistency Checking and Explanation and Justification conditions) and two control
144
conditions (Practice and No Training conditions, see Table 7.1) The Enhanced 
Inconsistency Checking training condition completed training in inconsistency 
checking on three practice problems that encouraged a systematic approach to 
identifying inconsistencies between interpretations of different parts of a problem and 
the problem specification. The Explanation and Justification condition also completed 
the same three practice problems as the first training condition. The difference 
between the two training conditions was that in the latter condition participants were 
required to explain and justify their thinking during practice whereas the former 
required participants to verbalise their thinking only. Solution feedback was provided 
during practice for both conditions.
The inclusion of the first control condition was based on research evidence 
suggesting that training incorporating practice coupled with feedback facilitates 
learning (Anderson, 1983), which is an important determinant of positive transfer not 
only in insight problem solving (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000) but also in other 
domains including improving and maintaining performance on vehicle-related jobs 
(Komaki, Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980), training of sprinters (Howell, 1956), and 
performance on perceptual tasks (Ludwig & Pieper, 1998). Thus, participants in the 
Practice condition also completed three practice problems and solution feedback was 
provided. Finally, participants in the No Training condition completed the same test 
problems as all the other conditions but did not receive practice beforehand. Table 7.1 
provides a table o f the design for Experiment 5 summarising the four conditions.
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Table 7.1. Table of design for Experiment 5
Condition Training/Practice Phase Testing Phase
No Training (Control) No training or practice given. Completed seven 
test problems
Practice Completed three practice problems and 
solution feedback was provided.
Completed seven 
test problems
Explanation & 
Justification
1. Completed three practice problems and 
solution feedback was provided.
2. Instructed to explain and justify thoughts 
during the training.
Completed seven 
test problems
Enhanced 
Inconsistency 
Checking Training
1. Completed inconsistency checking 
training on three practice problems and 
solution feedback was provided.
2. Instructed to verbalise thoughts during 
the training
Completed seven 
test problems
It was predicted that the Enhanced Inconsistency Checking Training would 
facilitate the greatest performance followed by the Explanation and Justification 
condition, then the Practice condition with the No Training condition last. This is 
because the Enhanced Inconsistency Checking training introduced an exhaustive 
search process in considering discrepancies between several interpretations and the 
problem specification, thereby increasing the likelihood of recognising and changing 
the faulty representation that is associated with a given problem. The next best 
performance should be observed for the Explanation and Justification condition as it 
encourages participants to explicitly examine their thoughts, thereby indirectly 
encouraging careful scrutiny of solutions, which in turn may draw participants’ 
attention to the faulty problem representation. It was expected that performance 
should be significantly higher for the former condition because training is explicitly 
geared towards helping participants identify the misrepresentation of a problem unlike 
the latter condition. Thirdly, solution rate should be higher for the Practice condition 
than the No Training condition because practice with solution feedback on problems
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similar to test problems should facilitate performance (Anderson, 1983) in comparison 
to no practice as is the case in the No Training condition.
7.3.1. Method 
Participants
Forty-eight psychology students from Cardiff University took part in this 
study and were awarded payment for their participation6. Ages ranged between 18 to 
35 years (M= 19.27, SD = 2.46).
Materials
Training Programme
The Enhanced Inconsistency Checking training programme was similar to that 
used in Experiment 4 (see Appendix G). The differences were that participants were 
instructed to select a part of a problem and to identify any inconsistencies between 
their interpretations and the problem specification. Further, when they had generated a 
consistent interpretation, they were required to consider the plausibility that their 
interpretation could lead to a possible solution to a problem. This iterative process 
was repeated until the solution was attained. An explanation in how to use the training 
was illustrated using the Sid Shady problem and then guided practice was given on 
the Barney Dribble problem followed by practice under test conditions on the Coffee 
problem (see Appendix H).
Explanation and Justification
Participants in this condition were required to explain and justify their
6 All materials were pilot tested using 16 participants, which revealed that four-minutes per problem 
were sufficient for participants to read test problems and to problem solve. As no changes were 
required, datasets for these participants comprised part of the final sample.
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solutions during completion of practice problems. The practice problems (Sid Shady, 
Barney Dribble, Coffee problem) were the same as those used for the above condition.
Practice and No Training
Participants in the Practice condition completed the three practice problems as 
both of the above conditions before the completion of test problems whereas the No 
Training condition completed test problems without receiving any practice.
Test Problems
Seven test problems were selected from Ansburg and Dominowski (2000). These 
were: Pear tree, Dr Apple, Train, Directory, Antique coin, Professor Bumble and 
Light (see Appendix H).
Design
The independent variable was condition with four levels (Enhanced 
Inconsistency Checking Training, Explanation and Justification, Practice and No 
Training). Participants were randomly allocated to a condition and completed all 
seven test problems that were randomly presented. The dependent variable was 
whether the problems were solved.
Procedure
Participants read the introduction to the experiment and then were given 
practice in ‘thinking aloud’, as in previous experiments. After completing the think 
aloud training, participants in the No Training (control) condition completed the test 
problems. Participants in the Practice and Explanation and Justification conditions
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first completed practice problems except those in the latter condition were required to 
explain and justify their solutions during the practice phase. Participants in the 
enhanced training condition completed the training programme prior to completing 
test problems. Participants were given a four-minute time limit for each problem and 
if they were silent for a period of time, the experimenter again used two non-directive 
prompts (‘What are you thinking?’ and ‘Please keep talking’). Verbalisations were 
recorded continuously. After completing each test problem, participants rated their 
familiarity with the problem on a 5-point scale (1 = very unfamiliar, 5 = very 
familiar). Participants were not given solution feedback. Finally, participants were 
debriefed and asked not to reveal information about the experiment to others. The 
duration of the experiment was approximately one hour.
Qualitative categorisation and assessment o f  reliability
As in Experiment 4, verbal protocols were analysed to gather evidence that the 
inconsistency checking training procedure was responsible for any improvement in 
solution rates and also to identify the nature of the hypotheses generated between the 
conditions. A similar procedure to the one adopted in Experiment 4 was employed in 
coding verbal protocols. The results of the coding are reported below.
1. Three coders (experimenter and two unrelated researchers) read the protocols
and individually identified each hypothesis/solution for each test problem. A 
total of 816 hypotheses were initially identified by all three coders. Of these 
816 hypotheses, 786 or 96.3% were identified by all three coders, 6 or 0.7% 
were identified by two coders, and 24 or 2.9% were identified by one coder. 
After discussion, 27 hypotheses were rejected, making the final total 789.
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2. The second stage involved the same coders independently categorising the 
agreed 789 hypotheses into one of three categories (inconsistent, incorrect 
other, or correct), as was the case in Experiment 4. Thus, inconsistent 
hypotheses were those that contradicted some information given in the 
problem statement. Incorrect other hypotheses were those that did not 
contradict any information in the problem specification but nonetheless were 
wrong. Correct hypotheses referred to the solution of the problem. Of the 789 
hypotheses, it was found that 786 or 99.6% were categorised by all three 
coders using the same categories, 2 or 0.3% were categorised by two coders, 
whereas 1 or 0.1% were categorised by only one coder The Perreault and 
Leigh (1989) reliability indices for all three pairs o f coders were 0.99 
respectively, which were acceptably high (Gremler, 2004; Krippendorf, 1980).
7.3.2. Results and Discussion
It was predicted that transfer would be positive and that the Enhanced 
Inconsistency Checking training condition would facilitate the highest solution rate 
because the approach was much more systematic as well as exhaustive in comparison 
to the inconsistency checking training in Experiment 4. The next best performance 
should be observed for the Explanation and Justification, Practice and No Training 
conditions, respectively.
An exploratory data analysis did not reveal any violations of homogeneity and 
normality of the data, and therefore a one-way ANVOA was conducted on total 
frequency of solution, which revealed significant differences between the conditions, 
(F ( l, 44) = .61, MSE = .04,p  < .001). Bonferroni adjustment for multiple 
comparisons revealed that the Enhanced Inconsistency Checking Training condition
150
performed significantly better than the No Training (control) (p < 0.001) and Practice 
(p < 0.01) conditions (Table 7.2). Thus, practice with solution feedback is not 
sufficient in facilitating representational change as participants require training in how 
to identify the incorrect representation. The results also revealed that the Explanation 
and Justification condition also performed significantly better than the No Training 
(control) condition (p < 0.01), thus suggesting that encouraging participants to reflect 
on their thinking during problem solving facilitated performance on verbal insight 
problems. Counter to predictions, there was no difference between the Enhanced 
Inconsistency Checking and Explanation and Justification conditions. This null 
finding may possibly be due to lack of power.
Table 7.2. Solution rates across conditions (out o f seven problems)
Condition Mean SD
No Training (Control) 2.08 1.68
Practice 2.75 1.14
Explanation & Justification 4.08 1.51
Enhanced Inconsistency Checking Training 4.75 1.14
Figure 7.1 provides the percentage solution rate among the training conditions. 
The solution rate for the No Training condition was 30%, which served as a baseline 
measure. It can be seen that the Enhanced Inconsistency Checking Training raised 
solution to 68% (i.e., 38% facilitation), whereas the Explanation and Justification 
condition raised solution to 58% (i.e., 28% facilitation). Further, a t-test was 
conducted on proportion solution data after checking assumptions of homogeneity and 
normality, which revealed that performance in the Enhanced Inconsistency Checking 
condition (M= .68, SD = .16) was significantly better than performance in the 
inconsistency checking training in Experiment 4 (M=  .40, SD = .25), (t (22) = 3.23, p  
< .01, 1-tailed). This further validates that introducing an iterative process of
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inconsistency checking in the present experiment was indeed beneficial. In other 
words, unlike Experiment 4, participants in Experiment 5 were more exhaustive in 
searching for and in identifying inconsistencies between their interpretations and the 
problem statement, which in turn increased the likelihood of recognising an incorrect 
representation, which is critical to achieving insight.
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Figure 7.1. Percentage solution rate by condition
Analysis o f  inconsistency identification
As in Experiment 4, it was expected that the enhanced training in 
inconsistency checking would reduce the number o f inconsistent hypotheses 
generated by encouraging participants to check the consistency between their 
representation/interpretation of the problem and the information within the problem 
specification. Thus, as a result of training, participants may avoid or repress 
inconsistent hypotheses that contradicted some information in the problem
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specification) and instead generate more incorrect other hypotheses which are neither 
inconsistent nor incorrect. An exploratory data analysis did not reveal violations of 
homogeneity and normality on the inconsistent hypotheses data, therefore a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted, which revealed no difference between conditions in the 
generation of inconsistent hypotheses, (F  (3, 47) = .94, MSE = 2.72, p  > .05, Table 
7.3). The data on ‘incorrect other* hypotheses was skewed across the practice and 
explanation conditions, which a logarithmic function eradicated and a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted which also revealed no significant difference between 
conditions, (F (3, 47) = .65, MSE = .03,/? > .05, Table 7.3).
Table 7.3. Types of hypotheses generated between conditions (across seven problems)
Types o f hypotheses 
Inconsistent Incorrect Other
Condition M SD M SD
No Training 3.00 1.48 10.00 4.75
Practice 3.67 1.50 5.96 6.20
Explanation and Justification 2.75 2.05 11.00 5.03
Enhanced Inconsistency Checking 2.58 1.73 8.75 4.83
Differences between conditions in the approach to problem solving
The verbal protocols provided additional evidence that enhanced training in 
inconsistency checking was applied during problem solving. Comments such as ‘It 
doesn’t say in the problem.. .so it’s not consistent’ and ‘now I’ll go through the 
problem again’ suggested that participants’ were checking for inconsistencies between 
their interpretations and the problem statement. For example, the following excerpt 
demonstrates how a trained participant iteratively used the inconsistency mechanism 
to reach the solution for the Light problem in which participants needed to overcome 
the assumption that it was not night-time.
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“Um turned off the light in his bedroom and managed to get into bed
before the room was dark. I'm not really sure if  the room is his bedroom, so he
could possibly be getting into bed in another room If the bed is ten feet
from the light switch..............I'm not ever so sure that's got anything to do with
it at the minute. A young boy turned off the light in his bedroom and managed
to get into bed before the room was dark..............possibly there was a light
source elsewhere, outside Got into bed before it was dark The light
may have possibly had a setting on it that stayed on for a few seconds
after The bed is ten feet from the light switch. I'm not sure what or how
that ten feet will be— maybe he could turn it off from there I'm not sure, whilst 
he's in bed.. .Is it really consistent with the problem? It is possible that the 
light has some sort of setting if it is the main light. I'm assuming that it was the
main one.. ..Maybe he went oh no there were no other
contraptions so that the possibility of turning it off from the bed
probably isn’t consistent with the problem Turned off the light in his
bedroom. At the moment I'm thinking a solution.. .probably something to
do with the light having a setting.........If the bed is ten feet, it’s quite far I
think isn’t it from the light switch.. .and he used no w ire.. ..So a young boy, he
turned off the light in his bedroom before the unless the bed’s in
another room but then.... he managed to get into bed before the room was
dark possibly we shouldn’t assume that it’s the night time possible
solution yeah it might be that. He may have turned off the light in his bedroom 
and it wouldn’t have made any difference if  it was daytime outside and 
therefore he managed to get into bed before the room was dark. That's possibly 
consistent with the problem so if there was no wires, strings or contraptions
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and he can’t reach the light switch That may be a young boy turned off the
light in his bedroom and managed to get into bed before the room was dark.. .1 
think the answer is that the boy did turn off the light in his bedroom and got 
into bed before the room was dark after it was still sort of daytime and there 
was light coming possibly from a window.”
Below is an excerpt which demonstrates how a participant in the Explanation and 
Justification condition reached the solution for the Light problem.
“Well he wouldn’t have been able to reach the light from his bed so he would 
have had to have got out of bed to turn it off and he didn’t have any 
contraptions. He'd have more than likely had to turn the light off
himself. but he turned the light off and would still be able to get back into
bed before the room was dark. Um so but he didn’t use any wires or
strings or other contraptions So he would probably have had to physically
turn the light off. but if he turned the light off then you would have thought
that the room would go into instant darkness unless it was a dimming light
bulb... .But i f  i t ’s not night time then it will be light outside so even when he 
switches the light o ff the light from the window would come into the room so 
he'd still be able to see in which case he would be able to find his way back to
bed as it wouldn ’t be dark. in which case he doesn’t have to use any wires,
or strings or other contraptions because he could have actually physically 
walk to the light switch to turn it o ff and walk back and be able to see where 
he was going because o f the light shining in through the window.”
It can be seen that the participant spent quite some time explaining what they were 
thinking and justifying their solutions, in particular, towards the end when they had 
reached the correct solution to the problem.
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In conclusion, the results of Experiment 5 provide further support for generic 
training in raising people’s awareness of stereotypical assumptions that hinder verbal 
insight problem solving. In particular, the results support those reported in Experiment 
4 and suggest that providing people with detailed practice in identifying their 
assumptions and incorrect interpretations in a systematic manner through an 
inconsistency checking mechanism is successful in producing a strong training effect. 
In addition, a novel finding was that asking participants to explain and justify their 
solutions had a positive effect on problem solving performance.
7.4. General Discussion
The aim of Experiment 5 was to adapt the inconsistency checking training that 
was employed in Experiment 4 in the hope of raising performance on verbal insight 
problems. It was expected that an iterative approach to inconsistency checking 
training that encouraged participants to be more systematic in comparing their 
interpretations concerning different parts of a problem with the problem specification 
would increase the likelihood of recognising the faulty representation for a given 
problem. It was found that the Enhanced Inconsistency Checking training raised the 
solution rate from 40% (Experiment 4) to 68% (Experiment 5), thus illustrating a 
facilitation of 28%. This result lends greater support for inconsistency checking as a 
mechanism for inducing representational change in verbal insight problem solving. It 
is also possible that this result was due to reflective thinking that was indirectly 
promoted by the trained mechanism. Indeed the analyses of the training related 
behaviours in Experiment 4 suggested that participants did engage in some form of 
reflective thinking by verbalising explicit questions that concerned the information in 
the problem specification.
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As was the case in Experiment 4, analysis of the frequency with which 
inconsistent hypotheses were generated by participants in Experiment 5 did not reveal 
a difference due to training. One possible explanation for the null results is that it was 
possible that although the coding of the verbal protocols was highly reliable, the 
verbalisations may not have fully revealed these cognitive related activities.
It was unclear from the results in Experiment 4 whether the training effect was 
due a) to inconsistency checking alone; b) the reflective thinking induced by the 
mechanism as evidenced by the questions verbalised by participants; or c) due to a 
combination of both inconsistency checking and reflective thinking. Research has 
demonstrated that reflective verbalisations encourage problem solvers to critically 
evaluate their solutions, which in turn direct the solver to important aspects of a 
problem that are critical to solution (Ahlum-Heath & DiVesta, 1986; Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984, 1987; Wetzstein & Hacker, 2004; Winckelmann & Hacker, 2010).
In particular, instructing participants to explain or justify their solutions has been 
demonstrated to aid problem solving in search tasks (Berry & Broadbent, 1984,1987) 
and design tasks (Wetzstein & Hacker, 2004; Winckelmann & Hacker, 2010) 
although no research has been conducted using verbal insight problems. Therefore, an 
additional condition was employed in the present Experiment in which participants 
were instructed to explain and justify their thoughts during training. The results 
revealed a 58% training score for this condition, thus a facilitation of 28% was 
observed when compared to the No Training condition. This suggests that the practice 
in explaining and justifying solutions without training in how to overcome incorrect 
representations appeared to improve performance on verbal insight problems, which is 
consistent with research that demonstrate the benefits of using reflective, 
verbalisations (Ahlum-Heath & DiVesta, 1986; Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1987;
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Wetzstein & Hacker, 2004; Winckelmann & Hacker, 2010). A possible explanation 
for this finding is that by asking participants to explain their responses indirectly 
promoted inconsistency checking, thereby increasing the likelihood of drawing 
participants* attention to information that they may not have noticed initially that is 
critical to identifying faulty representations.
A significant difference in performance was expected between the Enhanced 
Inconsistency Checking and Explanation and Justification conditions but this was not 
the case. It could be argued that, at a more general level, that both conditions give rise 
to some reflective thinking that drew participants’ attention to critical information 
related to an incorrect representation. However, the key difference between the two 
conditions was that in the former a detailed mechanism was specified that could 
essentially be used to overcome a range of incorrect assumptions or representations.
In contrast the Explanation and Justification condition did not specify particular 
mechanisms but this nevertheless had a training effect. Further research is needed to 
determine how these general instructions to explain and justify any proposed solution 
facilitated verbal insight problem solving.
Although not directly comparable, the training score of 68% is in line with the 
generic studies of Wicker et al. (1978) and Ansburg and Dominowski (2000), who 
reported effects of 63% and 60% respectively. Indeed, inconsistency checking 
encouraged solvers to assess their interpretations of a problem in identifying their 
faulty representations, which was also the aim of the studies mentioned above 
although it was not explicitly stated as such. The difference between the present 
training and those employed by Wicker et al. and Ansburg and Dominowski is that the 
former encouraged participants to systematically examine the problem statement in 
greater depth by comparing interpretations concerning different parts of the problem
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with the problem statement such that the likelihood of identifying a faulty 
representation was increased. In addition, participants were asked to explicitly 
consider the plausibility of their hypotheses in solving the problem. These steps broke 
down the problem solving process, thus providing participants with greater guidance 
in reaching the solution.
The results also provide indirect support for theories of insight problem 
solving which stipulate that an incorrect representation triggered by an insight 
problem inhibit problem solving, and that solution is likely to be attained once the 
problem is re-represented (e.g., Ohlsson 1992; Knoblich et al., 1999, 2001). Indeed, 
participants in the No training and Practice conditions found this difficult to achieve. 
However, as training did not raise the solution rate to 100%, it is clear that other 
sources of difficulty were present that were not overcome through training. This again 
highlights the powerful inhibitory effect of a familiar but incorrect representation on 
problem solving and the future need to investigate how training can be further 
improved.
I .
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CHAPTER 8 
A measure of constraint activation in verbal insight problem solving
Past studies have tended to focus on the processes underlying insight problem solving 
and, at present, there is no means of identifying whether or not a person is constrained 
in their representation of the problem other than by asking them to solve the problem. 
Thus, representational change is inferred if a person is able to solve a problem. In 
contrast, lack of representational change is inferred when a person is unable to solve a 
problem. This is particularly problematic as there are large individual differences both 
within and between problems which make it difficult to not only predict whether a 
person could solve a particular problem but also whether or not a particular training 
manipulation is effective without testing a person with the actual problem. Therefore, 
a mechanism is needed that is capable of measuring constraint activation without 
requiring a person to attempt a problem to determine whether their representation is 
constrained. This chapter begins with a discussion of the issues concerning the 
measurement of representational change. It then introduces an experiment that aimed 
to test a novel method of predicting the degree of constraint activation with a given 
verbal insight problem.
8.1. Representational change during insight problem solving
Ash, Cushen, and Wiley (2009) identified three issues or difficulties facing the 
empirical investigation of restructuring or representational change during insight 
problem solving. The first issue concerned the difficulty of selecting problems to test 
theories of representational change. A variety of problems have been classed as 
insight problems including matchstick arithmetic problems, rebus problems, and word
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riddles, which make it difficult to identify what is common between these problems. 
The second issue concerns the lack of appropriate controls or comparison conditions. 
Often successful performance on a target problem is compared with those who were 
unsuccessful. However, this type of comparison provides no evidence for 
representational change during the solution attempt. Further, studies that include a 
comparison condition tend to vary the difficulty of the baseline problem. Thus, 
differences in the solution rate between the target and control problems may arise due 
to problem difficulty rather than the need for representational change. The third issue 
concerns lack o f differentiation between spontaneous restructuring versus the addition 
of new information in facilitating restructuring. Ash et al. defined spontaneous 
restructuring as changes in the representation due to the assimilation of new 
information, acquisition of new skills or because environmental events cued different 
memory traces. It was argued that some studies failed to differentiate between 
successful solvers and unsuccessful solvers who were given solution feedback. Thus, 
solution feedback may help unsuccessful solvers to comprehend the steps required to 
solve a problem and therefore their experiences are likely to be different to those who 
independently reached the solution.
The criticisms outlined by Ash et al. (2009) were taken into consideration in 
designing a method that could indicate whether a problem solver’s representation of 
an insight problem was constrained. Thus, only verbal insight problems were selected 
for testing in both the present and previous experiments reported in this thesis to 
overcome the issue of variability between the types problems studied. However, 
verbal insight problems also vary in terms of their associated constraints and their 
influence on problem solving, which the current experiment aims to shed some light 
on. In order to address the second issue of lack of appropriate control noted by Ash et
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al., some of the experiments in this thesis included verbal protocol analysis, which 
revealed differences in problem representations between trained and control 
participants. Finally, the issue of solution feedback influencing performance was 
addressed by not providing participants with solution feedback when they solved test 
problems.
8.2. The Lexical Decision Task (Mayer & Schvaneveldt, 1971)
Verbal insight problems are deemed difficult to solve because they 
deliberately mislead readers to make inferences from particular words or themes 
within the problem (Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004). A 
robust technique for studying the activation of semantic associations to a given word, 
referred to as a ‘prime’, is Meyer and Schvaneveldt’s (1971) Lexical Decision Task 
(LDT) (e.g., Neely, 1991; Shelton & Martin, 1992; Hermans, Houwler, & Eelen,
2001; Perea & Rosa, 2002). Experiment 6 aimed to test whether the LDT could be 
used to identify whether a person’ representation of an insight problem is constrained. 
Typically, participants are presented with several strings of letters and asked to 
classify whether each is a ‘word’ or a ‘nonword’. Before performing the actual LDT, 
participants are ’primed1 with a certain stimulus. A consistent finding is that 
participants are faster to respond to a target word i.e., a semantic associate to the 
primed word, when they are first shown a semantically related prime. Hence, 
participants are faster to classify ‘nurse’ as a word when it is preceded by ‘doctor’ 
than when it is preceded by ‘butter’. The semantic priming effect demonstrated by 
LDTs suggest that if a problem solver is constrained after reading a verbal insight 
problem, then they are likely to respond faster to a target word that is semantically
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representative of the problem constraint. An example of a verbal insight problem to 
illustrate this point is the Unseen Walker problem:
‘A man walked home after having been out drinking. He walked down the 
middle of a deserted country road. There were no streetlights to illuminate the 
road and there was no moonlight. He was dressed all in black. Suddenly a car 
that did not have its headlights on came racing down the road. At the last 
moment, the driver of the car saw the man and swerved to avoid him. How did 
he manage to see him?’
When attempting to solve this problem, it is often incorrectly inferred that it is night­
time when in fact it is day-time, hence why the driver was able to see the man. It 
follows then that priming resulting from reading the problem will result in the 
problem solver being constrained and thus more likely to respond faster to the target 
word ‘night’, which is representative of the problem constraint or inference that is 
likely to be drawn when this problem is encountered for the first time.
Yaniv and Meyer (1987) found that participants were unable to retrieve 
answers to factual questions, yet they were quick to respond to the answers in a 
subsequent LDT, thus suggesting that inaccessible stored information primes the later 
recognition of the information. This suggests that if a problem solvers’ representation 
of a problem is constrained, then they are likely to respond faster to a word that is 
semantically representative of this representation.
To summarise, it is proposed that the LDT can offer a novel way of 
empirically measuring constraint activation to a fine-grain level through variations in 
reaction time to a target word after reading a verbal insight problem. First, it was 
predicted that a priming group required to read a verbal insight problem will exhibit a 
faster reaction time when subsequently tested with a target word (that is associated
163
with an incorrect representation of that problem) on a LDT in comparison to a group 
that is required to read a neutral passage of text. Thus, a faster response to the target 
word would represent increased constraint activation with respect to the insight 
problem. Second, participants who were identified as being constrained as a result of 
the LDT are unlikely to be able to solve the problem afterwards.
8.3. Pilot study
As verbal insight problems differ in terms of their associated constraints (Isaak 
& Just, 1995), it was important to first identify a selection of verbal insight problems 
and a potential target word that was perceived representative of the constraint 
associated with each problem. If participants in the pilot study associated the selected 
target word strongly with the problem, then it could be considered as a strong 
semantic representative o f the problem constraint, which could subsequently be used 
in the LDT to measure the degree of constraint activation for a given problem.
8.3.1. Method 
Participants
Forty-four undergraduate students from Cardiff University participated on a 
voluntarily basis. Ages ranged between 19 to 48 years (M  -  24, SD = 5.70).
Materials and Design
Seven verbal insight problems were selected and randomly presented (see 
Appendix I). Using a semantic differential scale scored 1 (weak) to 7 (strong), 
participants rated the extent to which they associated each problem with each of two 
words that were selected by the experimenter: a target word that represented the
164
problem constraint and a non-target word that was related to the problem solution. For 
example, after reading the Unseen Walker problem participants were asked to rate the 
extent to which they associated the problem with the words ‘night’ (the target word) 
and ‘day’ (the non-target word). For each problem, the two words were rated one after 
the other and presentation was counterbalanced. For the Unseen Walker problem, if a 
participant was constrained and an inappropriate representation was generated, then 
‘night’ would be associated strongly and ‘day’ weakly. Conversely, if participants 
were not constrained i.e., they did not incorrectly infer that it was night-time, they 
were more likely to strongly associate ‘day’ than ‘night’ with the problem.
Procedure
Each participant was presented with the seven problems in a booklet, where 
one page was used per problem. Instructions on how to rate the problems, using the 
semantic differential scale described in the preceding section, was provided at the start 
of the booklet, which took approximately 10 minutes to complete. Participants were 
debriefed at the end of the study.
8.3.2. Results
Table 8.1 reports the means and SDs for the target and non-target words for all 
seven problems. The average rating for the two words for each problem was assessed 
and when a score of five or above was given to the target word it was considered a 
strong association and thus a strong representative of the problem constraint. Target 
words for five out of the seven problems had an average rating of five or above and t- 
tests revealed significant differences in rating between target and non-target words for 
each problem (all ps < .05). Therefore, when the target word was associated strongly
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with the problem, the non-target word was given a low rating. The Jumped and Tan 
problems were not used for further experimentation in this experiment.
Table 8.1. Mean rating and SD for target and non-target words for each problem
Word
Problem Target Non-Target
Unseen Walker Night Day
Mean 6.14 1.91
SD 0.97 1.25
Murder Men Women
Mean 6.19 1.86
SD 1.28 1.06
Professor Bumble Driving Walking
Mean 5.91 1.91
SD 1.38 1.17
Shot Killed Photographed
Mean 5.63 2.12
SD 1.59 1.55
Guide Person Maps
Mean 5.02 2.67
SD 1.93 2.03
Jumped Outside Inside
Mean 4.21 2.65
SD 1.96 1.93
Tan Naked Clothed
Mean 4.23 3.12
SD 2.05 1.78
8.3.3. Discussion
The assumption behind the pilot study was that participants would associate 
each problem with a target word selected by the experimenter to be representative of 
the problem constraint. In contrast, it was expected that participants would associate 
the non-target word, which is required for the solution of problems, less strongly to 
the problem. As predicted, participants associated the problems strongly with the 
target words which suggested that the incorrect stereotypical inferences were drawn. 
That is, the target words selected for five out of the seven verbal insight problems
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were representative of the problem constraint and thus appropriate for use in the 
experiment (see Appendix J).
8.4. Experiment 6
The pilot study identified five verbal insight problems and target words 
suitable for assessing constraint activation for each problem. Using these problems 
and target words, Experiment 6 aimed to utilise the LDT in a novel way to determine 
constraint activation for a given problem.
The experiment was conducted in three stages for each insight problem. In the 
first stage, participants in the priming condition read a verbal insight problem whereas 
those in the no priming condition read a neutral passage o f text. In the second and 
third stages, participants in both conditions followed the same procedure. Thus, in the 
second stage, participants completed the LDT corresponding to the verbal insight 
problem presented to participants’ in stage one of the priming condition and in the 
final stage, participants were given the problem to solve. Two predictions were made. 
Firstly, if a participant’s representation of a problem is constrained, they were more 
likely to make an incorrect inference after reading the problem (in the priming 
condition) and thus respond faster to the target word in the LDT. After completing the 
LDT, participants were asked to solve the problem. Secondly, if  reading the verbal 
insight problem triggers constraint activation, then participant’s performance on the 
problem is likely to be impaired resulting in no solution. This would suggest that 
reaction data for target words could provide a means of predicting solution or not in 
advance of asking a participant to solve a verbal insight problem.
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8.4.1. Method
Participants
Fifty-six first year undergraduate psychology students from Cardiff University 
participated in this experiment as partial fulfilment of course requirements7. Ages 
ranged between 18 to 25 years { M -  18.71, SD = 1.23).
Apparatus and Stimuli
Verbal insight problems, a passage o f neutral text (for control participants), 
and the LDTs were presented on a computer screen. Reaction time (in 
milliseconds/ms) to target words was measured and verbalisations recorded via a 
microphone.
Prior to completing the corresponding LDT for each of the five insight 
problems identified by the pilot study for experimentation, each problem was 
displayed on the screen for either 50 s (seconds: Unseen Walker, Murder and Shot 
problems) or 30 s (Professor Bumble and Guide problems). Thus, the presentation 
times for problems were adjusted to minimise the amount of extra time participants 
had to re-read shorter problems. Participants in the no-priming condition were 
presented with a neutral passage of text instead of the verbal insight problem for the 
same length of time before the LDT. These passages were matched on number of 
words with the corresponding verbal insight problem and the content was unrelated to 
the target word or verbal insight problem (see Appendix K).
Five experimental LDTs and one practice LDT were used. The stimuli used 
for each experimental LDT consisted of six words (i.e., five words and the target 
word) and six non-words. All words were matched as much as possible to the target
7 All materials were pilot tested using 20 participants. As no changes were required, datasets for these 
participants comprised the final sample.
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word on mean reaction time and length in letters according to the English Lexicon 
Project (ELP: Balota et al., 2002), which is a database of behavioural and descriptive 
characteristics of over 40 thousand words and nonwords. Nonwords were also 
selected from Balota et al. in order to match their characteristics to the words as much 
as possible. However, as reaction times for nonwords are generally higher than that of 
words (Balota et al., 2002), nonwords were matched only on length in letters with the 
words. All LDT sets are provided in Appendix L.
The presentation of the target word was randomised from fourth to ninth 
position in the LDT to reduce the likelihood of participants anticipating the position of 
the target word.
Test Problems
Five verbal insight problems were used: the Unseen Walker problem, the 
Murder problem, the Professor Bumble problem, the Shot problem, and the Guide 
problem (see Appendix K).
Design
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two conditions: no-priming 
(control) or priming (experimental) condition. The five verbal insight problems/five 
passage of texts and corresponding LDTs that included the target word associated 
with the problem constraint were randomly presented. Table 8.2 outlines the design 
followed for presentation of the first verbal insight problem, which was repeated for 
the remaining four test problems. The dependent variables were participants’ reaction 
time (in milliseconds) to target words and whether they correctly solved the 
subsequent problem.
169
Table 8.2. Table of design for Experiment 6
Priming Condition
Stage one Stage Two Stage Three
Read verbal insight 
problem one
Completed LDT that 
included the target word 
that is representative o f the 
problem constraint for 
verbal insight problem 
one.
Given verbal insight 
problem one to solve.
No Priming condition
Stage one Stage Two Stage Three
Read neutral passage of 
text that is equivalent in 
length to verbal insight 
problem one.
Completed LDT that 
included the target word 
that is representative of the 
problem constraint for 
verbal insight problem 
one.
Given verbal insight 
problem one to solve.
Procedure
Participants completed the experiment individually in a quiet room.
Participants read the introduction to the experiment and then were given practice in 
‘thinking aloud’, as in previous experiments. Participants then completed a practice 
LDT. Participants’ were seated approximately 50cm from the computer screen. All 
LDTs commenced with the presentation of the fixation marker, +, at the centre of the 
screen that remained visible for .25 s. Then the first word/nonword in the LDT 
appeared and remained on the screen until the participant responded by either pressing 
the A key for ‘word’ or the L key for ‘nonword’.
After completing the practice LDT, participants in the priming condition read 
the first verbal insight problem whereas participants in the no-priming condition were 
presented with a neutral passage of text. Once the problem or passage of text 
disappeared off the screen, participants completed the corresponding LDT which 
included the target word. Immediately upon completion of the LDT, the verbal insight
170
I :
problem was presented for four minutes and participants’ in both conditions were 
required to think aloud during problem solving. Thus, participants in the priming 
condition were presented with the same verbal insight problem before and after the 
LDT whereas participants in the no-priming condition viewed the verbal insight 
problem once i.e., after completing the LDT. Verbalisations were recorded 
continuously. If participants were silent for a period of time, the experimenter used 
two non-directive prompts: ‘What are you thinking?’ and ‘Please keep talking’. After 
completing the problem, participants rated the familiarity on a scale ranging from 1 
(very unfamiliar) to 5 (very familiar) in order to ensure participants were not familiar 
with the problems. Participants were not given solution feedback. The above 
procedure was repeated for the remaining four test problems. Finally, participants 
were debriefed and asked not to reveal information about the experiment to others. 
The duration of the experiment was approximately 45 minutes.
8.4.2. Results and Discussion
No participants were familiar with the test problems; therefore data for all 56 
participants were included in the analyses. Due to violations of skewness on total 
number of problems solved and all reaction time data, all variables were transformed 
using a logarithmic function that served to eliminate these problems and analyses 
were performed on transformed data.
It was hypothesised that participants in the priming condition were likely to be 
constrained after reading a verbal insight problem. Hence, participants’ who were 
constrained were 1) more likely to display a faster reaction time to the target word in 
the LDT, and 2) remain constrained by failing to correctly solve the problem after 
completing the LDT.
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To test prediction one, a t-test was conducted between conditions on average 
reaction time for the target word across five problems, which revealed that 
participants in the priming condition (M = 621.50, SD = 101.09) were faster to 
respond to the target word than participants in the no priming condition (M  = 679.14, 
SD -  134.95), (t (54) = 1.83,/? = .04,1-tailed). This indicates that participants who 
had read the verbal insight problem prior to completing the LDT were more likely to 
respond faster to the target word associated with that problem, thus illustrating that 
participants representation of the problem was constrained which consequently 
resulted in a faster response to the target word that was representative of the problem 
constraint.
The second prediction of Experiment 6 was that a faster reaction to target 
words would suggest constraint activation, and that this would be further corroborated 
when participants demonstrated an inability to solve the problem after completing the 
LDT. To test this prediction, a Pearson's correlation was conducted between average 
reaction time for the target word across five problems and the total number of 
problems solved out of five. The results revealed a weak, negative correlation 
between average reaction time data and solution frequency data, (r (56) = -.23,/? =
.05,1-tailed). This suggests that a faster reaction to the target word was indeed 
associated with a non-solution result.
Although the above finding provides support for constraint activation, it was 
possible that participants were simply faster to react to the target word as a result of 
demand characteristics. To test this prediction, a difference was first calculated 
between the baseline reaction times available for the (non-target) words and the 
average reaction time for the target word, and a Pearson's correlation was conducted 
between this difference and the total number of problems solved out of five. The
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correlation was not significant (r (56) = -.14 ,p >  .05, 2-tailed), and thus is not in 
accordance with the previous finding. This suggests that the LDT was not predictive 
of constraint activation in verbal insight problem solving in the present experiment.
8.5. General Discussion
The LDT was employed as a technique for measuring the activation of an 
incorrect or faulty representation for individual verbal insight problems that was 
subsequently likely to constrain problem solving performance. It was hypothesised 
that reaction time data could be used to infer constraint activation and consequently, 
the likelihood of reaching the solution to a problem. Hitherto, it is the first time an 
established method such as the LDT has been utilised in this way to try and measure 
constraint activation in verbal insight problem solving. The results indicated that 
participants who had read a verbal insight problem were subsequently faster to 
respond to a target word, which was considered semantically representative of 
problem constraint, in a LDT. Furthermore, reaction time to target words was 
predictive of whether a participant was able to solve the problem after completing the 
LDT. However, this latter finding was not supported when reaction times for non­
target words were taken into consideration. Therefore, it was possible that demand 
characteristics encouraged participants’ to respond quickly to target words rather than 
it being the influence of constraint activation per se.
Nevertheless, this study was the first attempt at measuring constraint 
activation in verbal insight problem solving. The LDT was utilised in a novel way to 
demonstrate that if a problem solver’s holds the incorrect representation of a problem, 
then they are likely to respond faster to a word that is representative of the problem 
constraint, and subsequently performance on the problem is likely to be impaired. It is
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unknown from these results what constitutes a fast reaction time which is indicative of 
constraint activation as further research is required using a larger set of insight 
problems.
This study however is not without limitations. To standardise the features of 
the target word and ‘words’ in the LDT, the lexical features that were considered were 
length in letters and average reaction time. Another lexical feature that may have 
contributed to the variability in reaction time data was word frequency i.e., how 
common a target word is. Research by Balota and Chumbley (1984) found that word 
frequency was highly related to lexical decisions. That is, high-frequency or common 
words were recognised more quickly than low-frequency words and this aspect was 
not controlled in the present study.
Another factor that may have reduced the effects o f priming is that once 
participants in the priming condition had learnt that they were required to solve the 
problem after completing the LDT, it was possible that they had rehearsed the 
problem solution during completion of the LDT. Thus, participants in the priming 
condition may have focussed on generating possible solutions to the problem whilst 
completing the LDT, which subsequently affected reaction time to the target word.
In summary, the LDT was a successful method to some extent in predicting 
constraint activation for a given verbal insight problem. However, further research is 
required to determine whether the LDT may serve as an accurate measure of 
constraint activation in verbal insight problem solving. The advantage of this method 
is that it provides the possibility of predicting whether a problem solver is likely to be 
constrained in terms of representation without an explicit attempt being made at 
solving the problem. This information might be useful in reducing the likelihood of
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employing problems that produce floor or ceiling effects, which is problematic across 
training studies.
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CHAPTER 9
General Discussion
The primary aim of this thesis was to design and implement training to overcome 
implicit assumptions in solving verbal insight problems. This chapter begins with an 
overview of the experimental findings and their contribution to the field of problem 
solving. This is followed by discussion of the limitations of the research and 
recommendations are made for future work.
9.1. Overview of experimental findings
The first four experimental chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4 to 7) tested 
novel training programmes that were designed to improve verbal insight problem 
solving. The approach to training was either specific or generic. Thus, specific 
training aimed to effect change for a particular category of insight problems which 
shared common features, whereas the aim of generic training was to facilitate 
performance on any verbal insight problem in spite of the constraint associated with 
it. Chapter 8, the final experimental chapter, reported an experiment that was different 
in that it aimed to measure whether a person’s representation was constrained prior to 
asking them to solve a problem. The experimental findings are discussed below with 
reference to past research on insight problem solving.
Specific training studies on insight problem solving have tended to focus on 
one test problem thereby limiting the generalisability of training (e.g. Burnham & 
Davis, 1969; Chronicle et al., 2001; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; Weisberg & Alba, 
1981). This limitation was addressed by the specific training programmes tested in 
this thesis as a wider range of verbal insight problems was tested by categorising
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problems that were solvable through the application of simple heuristics. Experiment 
1 (reported in Chapter 4) trained participants in using heuristics to solve two 
categories of verbal insight problems: those that contained an ambiguous word or an 
ambiguous name in the problem specification. For the ambiguous word category, 
training raised the solution rate from 26% (no training condition) to 59%, whereas for 
the ambiguous names category, the solution was raised from 4% (no training 
condition) to 39%. As the results may have been influenced by the choice of test 
problems for the ambiguous word category, Experiment 2 further tested the heuristic- 
based training for problems with ambiguous words only. An additional aim of the 
experiment was to test whether problem length was a determinant of problem success. 
That is, whether longer problems increased the search for the solution through the 
problem space, thus resulting in poorer performance. No effect of problem length was 
found although training raised solution from 26% (no training condition) to 71%, thus 
performance was improved substantially. In general, Experiments 1 and 2 
demonstrated positive transfer for trained categories, which was consistent with the 
success of similar training (e.g., Schoenfeld, 1979).
Experiment 3 was slightly different in that training aimed to improve 
performance on functional fixedness insight problems that were presented verbally, 
unlike past research which has presented such problems both pictorially and verbally 
(Adamson, 1952; Birch & Rabinowitz, 1951; Duncker, 1945; Frank & Ramscar,
2003; Maier, 1931). Success on both functional fixedness problems and verbal insight 
problems is dependent on overcoming an unhelpful stereotypical response. In the case 
of the former, a typical function for an object is triggered that prevents the generation 
of an unusual function that is required for solution. The approach to training in 
Experiment 3 was novel in that it encouraged participants to think divergently and yet
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systematically by considering several functions for objects mentioned in the problem 
statement thereby increasing the probability of solution attainment. Indeed, the results 
provided evidence of positive transfer to test problems that were exemplars of the 
functional fixity problem category only, as training raised performance from 6% (no 
training condition) to 39%.
Collectively the results of Experiments 1 to 3 provide modest support for 
theories of transfer (Anderson, 1983; Gick & Hollyoak, 1980; Thorndike & 
Woodworth, 1901). Further, although training successfully improved performance on 
the trained categories of problems, it can nevertheless be argued that the focus of 
training was narrow. Therefore the challenge was to design training that facilitated 
solutions on any verbal insight problem irrespective o f the assumption or constraint 
associated with it. This was the aim of the two generic training experiments reported 
later in this thesis, which aimed to address the variability in constraints that is found 
among verbal insight problems.
As was the case in the generic training studies o f Wicker et al. (1978) and 
Ansburg and Dominowski (2000), the generic training in Experiments 4 and 5 in this 
thesis also aimed to firstly increase participants’ awareness of the possibility of 
incorrect assumptions associated with insight problems. Indeed, past research has 
highlighted the importance of drawing trainee’s attention to the nature of the 
difficulties associated with problems before providing a strategy to overcome such 
difficulties (Campione & Ambruster, 1985). The key difference was however that the 
training in Experiments 4 and 5 went further to specify and give practice in using a 
cognitive process to help participants identify and correct their incorrect assumptions, 
which has never been attempted by past training research in this area.
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The first experiment, Experiment 4 (reported in Chapter <5), introduced 
training in using the inconsistency checking mechanism, which in theory could be 
applied to solve any verbal insight problem. This mechanism attempted to induce 
participants to scrutinise their interpretations and assumptions by comparing them 
with the problem specification in the hope of facilitating recognition and restructuring 
of an inappropriate representation. As practice with feedback is a prerequisite for 
promoting positive transfer for many tasks (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Ansburg & 
Dominowski, 2000; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981), participants were provided with 
practice in using this mechanism to try and identify their incorrect representations. 
Further, training and test problems shared similarities to promote positive transfer 
(Anderson, 1983; Gick & Hollyoak, 1980; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901) as verbal 
insight problems were used that all involved only one constraint that needed to be 
overcome through restructuring. Experiment 4 revealed that training raised 
performance by 19% from the no training condition (21%) to 40%. Further, verbal 
protocol analyses suggested that what was learnt during training was indeed applied 
during problem solving.
The aim of Experiment 5 was to raise the training score of 40% by introducing 
an iterative approach to using inconsistency checking in the hope of improving the 
likelihood of participants recognising their faulty representation. Hence, participants 
were trained to systematically identify discrepancies between interpretations of 
different parts of a problem and the problem specification. Indeed, a similar approach 
to problem solving was successful in overcoming functional fixity in the specific 
training tested in Experiment 3 in this thesis. An additional condition was employed 
in which participants were instructed to explain and justify their solutions during 
practice to facilitate reflective thinking as research on search and design tasks has
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demonstrated the positive benefits of such instructions (Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 
1987; Wetzstein & Hacker, 2004; Winckelmann & Hacker, 2010). The results 
revealed greater support for inconsistency checking as a training score of 68% was 
found, hence a significant improvement from the training score of 40% reported in 
Experiment 4. Further, instruction to explain and justify solutions during practice 
resulted in a 58% training score. The difference in performance between these two 
conditions was not significant although the former had specified a mechanism for 
identifying the incorrect representation unlike the latter. Further research is needed to 
determine why instruction to justify solutions had such a positive effect on problem 
solving. The results also demonstrated that practice with feedback, which is important 
for facilitating positive transfer (Anderson, 1983; Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000; 
Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981), was not sufficient to improve solution rate without the 
provision of training that gives explicit practice in how to solve such problems. 
Collectively, the findings of Experiments 4 and 5 suggest that it is possible to 
facilitate positive transfer to a range of verbal insight problems that require some 
implicit assumption to be overcome.
The final experimental chapter (reported in Chapter 8) was different to the 
above training experiments. At present it is not possible to identify which verbal 
insight problems induce a powerful incorrect representation without testing a 
participant on the problem. Therefore, Experiment 6 introduced the Lexical Decision 
Task (LDT; Hermans et al., 2001; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1991; Perea 
& Rosa, 2002; Shelton & Martin, 1992) as a novel method for identifying when 
participants were constrained by an incorrect problem representation prior to asking 
the participant to solve the problem. The results indicated an overall effect of priming. 
That is, when compared to participants who read a neutral piece of text, participants
180
who had read a verbal insight problem prior to completing the LDT were faster to 
respond to the target word (that was semantically representative of the problem 
constraint or assumption). Although the results suggested that a faster reaction time 
was associated with weaker solution rates when participants were asked to solve the 
problem immediately upon completion of the LDT, further analyses indicated that this 
finding may have been due to demand characteristics. Nevertheless, the results of 
Experiment 6 have important implications for training research as it suggests that the 
LDT may be used as a means of predicting solution or no solution in advance of 
problem solving. Further research is therefore required to validate use of the LDT as a 
predictive technique.
9.2. Some implications
Consistent with past research on insight problem solving, performance data for 
no training participants across the training experiments in this thesis demonstrated that 
insight problems are generally difficult. Different approaches to training were 
designed that were informed by theories of insight problem solving and transfer, 
which produced problem solving success. The results make two broad contributions 
which are discussed below.
The research in this thesis did not set out to explicitly test any specific theory 
of insight problem solving that was reviewed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, the findings 
lend indirect support for Representational Change Theories of insight (e.g., Knoblich 
et al., 1999, 2001; Ohlsson, 1992) that argue insight problem solving is constrained by 
an incorrect representation of the problem. Indeed, verbal protocol data suggested that 
participants’ solutions to problems were in line with their incorrect interpretation of 
the problem. Researchers such as Jones (2003) and Ollinger et al. (2006) tested both
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Representational Change Theory and the Progress Monitoring Theory (MacGregor et 
al., 2001), which the present research did not set out to test. However, it was unlikely 
that participants used a lookahead heuristic, as advocated by the Progress Monitoring 
Theory, as this heuristic is particularly suited to solving move problems. The aim of 
the training programmes was to facilitate representational change and performance 
data provided indirect support for this.
The current thesis also makes practical contributions to the study of verbal 
insight problem solving by providing examples o f training that successfully facilitated 
performance. When faced with a problem situation it is common practice for the 
problem solver to default to habitual conceptualisations, which, in most 
circumstances, is helpful in reaching the solution. However, such habitual 
conceptualisation can be unhelpful in unusual problem situations, and in some cases, 
detrimental as illustrated by the David-Besse (1985) and Three Mile Island (1979) 
incidents. The present research demonstrated how training can be designed to 
overcome these habitual conceptualisations. That is, solvers must first be made aware 
of how past habits impede problem solving before guided practice is given in 
overcoming these unhelpful responses using deviant scenarios. Further, practice in 
overcoming these unhelpful responses can take place either through specific 
mechanisms (Experiments 1 to 3) or through a generic mechanism such as 
inconsistency checking (Experiments 4 and 5). Of course, the benefits of such training 
are greater when it is useful in a variety of different problem situations where a novel 
interpretation of a problem is critical to solution. Indeed, results of the latter training 
studies (Experiments 4 and 5) in this thesis provided support for the cognitive process 
of inconsistency checking, which has been successfully utilised to break habitual
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barriers in reasoning about unusual faults within the nuclear industry (Patrick et al., 
1999).
9.3. Limitations
Ash et al. (2009) recently challenged whether restructuring plays any role in 
problem solving. It cannot be concluded with 100% certainty that representational 
change occurred as a result of training in the present experiments although verbal 
protocols provide some indirect evidence of this and performance data was indicative 
of a change in representation leading to the correct solution. Further, verbal protocols 
not only gave some clues as to the nature of the cognitive processes during problem 
solving but also could be used to ascertain whether the training was used by 
participants during problem solving. Although past research suggests that the think 
aloud procedure does not overshadow thought processes when the guidelines set by 
Ericsson and Simon (1993) are followed (Chrysikou, 2006; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; 
Gilhooly, Fioratou, & Henretty, 2010), it cannot be ascertained whether this was true 
in the present experiments as a silent control condition was not included. Despite 
much justification for the utility of verbal protocols, it is important to note that they 
may not be as veridical as we might hope them to be.
Another limitation is that it is difficult to disentangle the different aspects of 
training that resulted in improved performance in Experiments 1 to 5. Thus the effect 
of the subject matter of the training (e.g., heuristics) cannot be separated from the 
processes involved e.g., practice.
A major problem concerns the variability of the constraints associated with the 
problems and their variation in difficulty. Although the aim of the experiments was to 
establish overall training effects, this variability no doubt affected performance on
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individual problems where some problem constraints may have been easier to 
overcome than others. To some extent this problem variability will also contribute to 
the different levels of performance across the training studies and training effects do 
depend to some extent on the nature of the problems used.
Finally, a possible limitation that may explain some of the null effects 
concerns the issue of lack of power due to small sample sizes. Further, it must be 
noted that whilst steps were taken to minimise participants’ familiarity with test 
problems through the collection of familiarity ratings, there was still the possibility 
that some participants were able to solve test problems based on past experience.
9.4. Recommendations for future research
According to the Cognitive Load Theory (Sweller, 1998; Sweller, Van 
Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998), working memory is very limited when handling new 
information. Hence, when the processing of information requires the solver to 
organise, contrast or compare, the solver is only able to consider two or three items 
simultaneously. Further, new information is lost within 15 to 30 seconds if it is not 
rehearsed (Artino, 2008). This suggests that the requirements of training may have 
resulted in intrinsic cognitive load i.e., the mental work load required for problem 
solving, therefore impinging on working memory. In fact, cognitive overload may 
have been an issue across all five training experiments reported in this thesis. For 
example, participants may have found it difficult to monitor which heuristics they had 
applied in attempting to solve test problems or which words they had assessed in 
identifying the ambiguous words in Experiments 1 and 2. Also, in Experiment 3, 
participants were encouraged to produce an exhaustive list of functions for items in a 
problem which may have impinged on working memory as it required participants to
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remember all the functions they had considered. Perhaps the demands on working 
memory were greatest in Experiments 4 and 5. That is, inconsistency checking 
required by the training may have been difficult for participants to perform because of 
the need to attempt to examine one’s own representation of the problem and then to 
compare it with the problem specification.
One suggestion for reducing cognitive load is through the use of an external 
memory aid (e.g., pen and paper). Research evidence indicates that it is necessary to 
provide an external memory aid for problem solving to facilitate the selection of an 
appropriate solution path (Cary & Carlson, 1999). In addition, it has been suggested 
that people are likely to use an external memory aid (e.g., to make notes) when they 
believe the benefits of using it outweigh the costs of not doing so (Cary & Carlson, 
2001). Rigney (1978) also suggested that tasks such as note taking act as an ‘orienting 
task’ as it ‘orients’ the trainee to develop appropriate learning strategies. Future 
research needs to ensure that training does not fail due to inappropriate memory 
demands, and therefore should include a condition in which a memory aid could be 
used in order to reduce and evaluate the effect of such cognitive workload. Further, in 
relation to the generic training studies, asking participants to make notes during 
problem solving may facilitate a more precise and detailed comparison between the 
external written representation and the problem specification.
One of the difficulties experienced in design training for verbal insight 
problem solving was the limited choice of problems. Cunningham and MacGregor 
(2006) proposed rebus puzzles as candidates for insight problem solving which 
require further investigation. A rebus combines verbal and visual clues to create a 
familiar phrase (e.g., you just me = ‘just between you and me’). It is argued that 
rebus problems require restructuring because past experiences of reading result in the
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solver focusing on syntax rather than the semantic meaning. The solution to a rebus 
puzzle ignores grammar and instead the spatial relationships of components in a 
problem must be given a verbal interpretation. Furthermore, our past experiences of 
reading ignore print characteristics such as bold letters or capital letters whereas such 
characteristics are important to the solution o f rebus problems (e.g. PUNISHMENT = 
‘capital punishment’). The advantage for using rebus problems is that the level of 
difficulty can be manipulated (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2008) in terms of the 
number of implicit assumptions involved. Many studies have attempted to control for 
problem difficulty by comparing performance on ‘insight’ problems with ‘non insight 
problems that were matched on overall solution rates (e.g., Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; 
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Lavric et al., 2000; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Schooler et 
al., 1993). However, rebus problems are similar to verbal insight problems because 
past experiences trigger an incorrect cognitive representation and restructuring of the 
representation is required for solutions. To further shed light on the role of 
representational change in insight problem solving, future research could adapt the 
training designs tested herein using rebus problems that involve one implicit 
assumption, as did the verbal insight problems employed in this research.
Finally, it is unknown to what extent the training effects are durable as 
participants were tested immediately after completion of the training programmes.
The success of training will be better determined if future research tested participants 
after a longer duration elapsed between time of training and time of testing.
9.5. Conclusions
The challenges that verbal insight problem solving pose to the training 
designer is that such problems do not have a clear state and that the overall nature of
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the constraints associated with these problems vary greatly, which may explain why 
there is a paucity of training research in this area. The experiments reported in this 
thesis provide convincing evidence that habitual responses triggered by verbal insight 
problems are possible to overcome through training that induces a shift in 
representation. The implication of these results is that domains which require problem 
solvers to interpret situations in an unusual way would benefit from training similar to 
that developed in this thesis, to help avoid the constraints imposed by problem 
solvers’ past experiences. In particular, a psychological shift in representation can be 
induced by developing awareness of incorrect representations which is coupled with 
practice in identifying and correcting these faulty representations. In conclusion, the 
current thesis made some important advances in research in this area.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Test problems - Experiment 1
Category: Ambiguous words 
Problem A: MARRIED
A man who lived in a small town in the United States married 20 different women of 
the same town. All are still living and he never divorced any of them. In this town 
polygamy is unlawful; yet he has broken no law. How is this possible?
Hypothesised constraint: The man married each woman himself.
Solution: The man is a vicar/priest who married couples together.
Problem B: GUIDE
A mountain climber in the Himalayas took along with him two mountain guides.
After a few hours, one of the guides fell into a deep crevasse. The climber and the 
other guide continued the climb and did not raise the alarm. Why?
Hypothesised constraint: The guide was human like the mountain climber.
Solution: The guide is inanimate such as a book or map.
Problem C: KING & QUEEN
Two sisters along with a large group of people watched as the queen attacked the 
king. No one said anything. Why?
Hypothesised constraint: The King and Queen were royalties.
Solution: The King and Queen were chess pieces and the game had reached checkmate.
Category: Ambiguous names associated with animals 
Problem D: ANTHONY & CLEOPATRA
Anthony and Cleopatra are lying dead on the floor in an Egyptian villa. Nearby is a 
broken bowl. There are no marks on their bodies and they were not poisoned. Not a 
person was in the villa when they died. How did they die? (Sloane, 1992, p. 13) 
Hypothesised constraint: Anthony and Cleopatra were human.
Solution: Anthony and Cleopatra were goldfish. They died when their bowl was knocked over 
by a clumsy guard dog.
Problem E: MR JONES
Mr Jones broke his leg on Saturday afternoon. He was immediately attended to by 
expert medical practitioners, and suffered no other injury. Sadly, he died later that day 
as a result. Why?
Hypothesised constraint: Mr Jones was human.
Solution: Mr Jones was a race horse who had to be put down after breaking his leg.
Problem F: JASON
Jason is lying dead. He has a piece of metal across his back and some food in front of 
him.
Hypothesised constraint: Jason was human.
Solution: Jason was a mouse that got caught in a mouse trap when attempting to eat the 
cheese in the trap.
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Category: Out o f Scope 
Problem G: BOMBS AWAY
One night during the Second World War, an allied bomber was on a mission over 
Germany. The plane was in perfect condition and everything on it worked properly. 
When it had reached its target, the pilot ordered the bomb doors to be opened. They 
opened. He then ordered the bombs to be released. They were released. But the 
bombs did not fall from the plane. Why should this be so? (Sloane, 1992, p. 8) 
Hypothesised constraint: The plane was flying the right way up.
Solution: The plane was flying upside-down.
Problem H: ROPE
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found in his cell a rope that 
was half long enough to permit him to reach the ground safely. He divided the rope in 
half, tied the two parts together, and escaped. How could he have done this? 
Hypothesised constraint: The rope was cut width ways therefore it remained the same length. 
Solution: The rope was unravelled and two pieces were tied together.
Problem I: SONS
A woman had two sons who were bom on the same hour of the same day of the same 
year. But they were not twins, and they were not adopted. How could this be so? 
Hypothesised constraint: The sons were twins.
Solution: The sons were two of a set of triplets.
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Appendix B
Experiment 2 -  Training Programme
The training programme was similar to that used in Experiment 2 that covered training in a 
category of problem concerning ambiguous words and involved the following two stages:-
1. Solving problems that contained ambiguous words. This entailed:
a) awareness of ambiguous words in a problem and provision of the first heuristic.
b) practice in using this heuristic to solve a problem containing ambiguous words.
2. Practice solving problems containing ambiguous words.
For awareness training in ambiguous words (Stage la), participants read an example of a 
problem that contained an ambiguous word and were given the heuristic ‘If you cannot make 
sense of the problem then search for and identify any ambiguous word(s) and its alternative 
meaning(s)’:-
A man is found dead in the arctic with a pack on his back. How did he die?
In this problem people might assume that the pack refers to a back pack. Participants were 
told that ‘pack’ was the ambiguous word and asked to think of alternative meanings for this 
word and to solve the problem. Participants then read that if the word ‘pack’ was thought of 
as a group of animals, then it would be the case that there was a pack of wolves on the man’s 
back that were eating him. This interpretation would explain how the man died.
Next, participants were required to practise using the heuristic to solve a problem containing 
ambiguous words (Stage lb):-
A man walked into a bar, and before he could say a word, he was knocked 
unconscious. Why?
In this problem the word ‘bar’ is ambiguous in meaning. The man had walked into a metal bar 
rather than a drinking bar.
In the final part of the training participants were presented with two problems (Stage 
2). Participants were required to apply the training they had received to identify any words 
that were ambiguous and to think aloud whilst solving the problems. The problems were: 
Problem 1
Two sisters along with a large group of people watched as the queen attacked the 
king. No one said anything. Why?
Problem 2
One morning a woman's earring fell into a cup that was filled with coffee, yet her 
earring did not get wet. How could this be?
Problem 1 contained the ambiguous words ‘queen’ and ‘king’, and thus referred to chess 
pieces, hence why the sisters and the group of people said nothing. Problem 2 contained the 
ambiguous word ‘coffee’ which refers to coffee granules rather than liquid coffee, hence why 
the earrings did not get wet.
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Appendix C
Experiment 2 - Test Problems (Original version)
Category: Ambiguous words 
Problem A: GUIDE
A mountain climber in the Himalayas took along with him two mountain guides. 
After a few hours, one of the guides fell into a deep crevasse. The climber and the 
other guide continued the climb and did not raise the alarm. Why?
Hypothesised constraint: The guide was human like the mountain climber.
Solution: The guide is inanimate such as a book or a map.
Problem B: SHOOT
A woman shoots her husband. Then she holds him under water for over 5 minutes. 
Finally, she hangs him. But 5 minutes later they both go out together and enjoy a 
wonderful dinner together. How can this be?
Hypothesised constraint: Shoot means kill him.
Solution: She took a photograph of him and developed it.
Problem C: COIN
While on safari in the wild jungles of Africa, Professor White woke one morning and 
felt something in the back pocket of her shorts. It had a head and a tail but no legs. 
When White got up she could feel it move inside her pocket. White however showed 
little concern and went about her morning rituals. Why such a casual attitude toward 
the thing in her pocket?
Hypothesised constraint: An animal e.g., a monkey as ‘head and tail’ is misleading.
Solution: A coin
Problem D: ISLAND
A woman is dead on an island and there is nothing else on the island with her. How 
did she die?
Hypothesised constraint: ‘Island’ means a tropical island.
Solution: She was hit by a car and is on a traffic island.
Category: ‘Out o f scope’
Problem E: WATER TOWER
A painter was hired to repaint the water tower for the township of Dubbo. The tower 
was located just off a busy street in the downtown area. Every day for 2 weeks the 
man painted diligently, but was never seen working by anyone and no change was 
noticed on the tower. At the end of the two weeks, the painter was thanked and paid a 
large sum by the city. Why?
Hypothesised constraint: He painted outside the building.
Solution: He painted the inside of the tower.
Problem F: TWINS
Marsha and Maijorie were bom on the same day of the same month of the same year 
to the same mother and the same father - yet they are not twins. How is that possible? 
Hypothesised constraint: The sons were twins.
Solution: They are triplets.
Problem G: CAPTAIN
Captain Scott was out for a walk when it started to rain. He did not have an umbrella 
and he wasn't wearing a hat. His clothes were soaked yet not a hair on his head got 
wet. How could this happen?
Hypothesised constraint: He has hair.
Solution: He is bald.
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Appendix D
Experiment 2 - Test Problems (Lengthened version)
Category: Ambiguous words 
Problem A: GUIDE
A mountain climber in the Himalayas took along with him two mountain guides. He 
had been looking forward to his climb for a long time. In his bag he took rations of 
food, flasks of coffee and water and a first-aid kit. After a few hours, one of the 
guides fell into a deep crevasse. The climber and the other guide continued the climb 
and did not raise the alarm. Why?
Hypothesised constraint: The guide was human like the mountain climber.
Solution: The guide is inanimate such as a book or map.
Problem B: SHOOT
A woman shoots her husband. Then she holds him under water for over 5 minutes. 
Finally, she hangs him. She made herself a cup of sweet tea and cleaned the kitchen, 
whilst he remained where she had left him. But 5 minutes later they both go out 
together and enjoy a wonderful dinner together. How can this be?
Hypothesised constraint: Shoot means kill him.
Solution: She took a photograph of him and developed it.
Problem C: COIN
While on safari in the wild jungles of Africa, Professor White woke one morning and 
felt something in the back pocket of her shorts. It had a head and a tail but no legs. 
The night before she had simply made herself supper, changed into her night clothes 
and went to bed. She didn’t remember leaving anything in her pocket. When White 
got up she could feel it move inside her pocket. White however showed little concern 
and went about her morning rituals. Why such a casual attitude toward the thing in 
her pocket?
Hypothesised constraint: That an animal, such as a monkey, is in her pocket because of the 
misleading ‘head and tail*.
Solution: A coin
Problem D: ISLAND
A woman is dead on an island and there is nothing else on the island with her. The 
young woman was wearing jeans, and a red shirt and had been looking forward to her 
day so was excited before she died. How did she die?
Hypothesised constraint: That island means a tropical island 
Solution: She was hit by a car and is on a traffic island.
Category: 'Out of scope’
Problem E: WATER TOWER
A painter was hired to repaint the water tower for the township of Dubbo. In the small 
quaint town, there were a few coffee shops and clothing boutiques, a chapel, and a 
public library. The tower was located just off a busy street in the downtown area. 
Every day for 2 weeks the man painted diligently, but was never seen working by 
anyone and no change was noticed on the tower. At the end of the two weeks, the 
painter was thanked and paid a large sum by the city. Why?
Hypothesised constraint: He painted outside the building.
Solution: He painted the inside of the tower.
Problem F: TWINS
Marsha and Maijorie were bom on the same day of the same month of the same year 
to the same mother and the same father - yet they are not twins. On the day they were
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bom the sun was shining through the hospital window; the view looked over the local 
park, which was filled with trees. How is that possible?
Hypothesised constraint: The daughters were twins.
Solution: They are triplets.
Problem G: CAPTAIN
Captain Scott was out for a walk when it started to rain. He did not have an umbrella 
and he wasn't wearing a hat. Other people around him started to run for cover under 
local shop fronts and bus shelters. His clothes were soaked yet not a hair on his head 
got wet. How could this happen?
Hypothesised constraint: He has hair.
Solution: He is bald.
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Appendix E
Experiment 3- Original format of functional fixedness problems and alterations made 
for the experiment
Original ‘visual’ format of functional fixedness Altered version used for experiment
_________p r o b l e m s _____________ ______________________________________
Training Problems________________________
String problem:
“Each S was told that we wished to hang a couple 
of strings from the ceiling but that we could not 
deface the ceiling and therefore a little construction 
was required” (Maier, 1945, p. 351)
Paperclip problem:
“A piece of white cardboard with four black 
squares fastened to it is to be hung on an eyelet 
screwed into the low ceiling. On the table lie 
paperclips, among other things.” (Duncker, 1945, 
p. 87)
Several wooden poles, clamps, and string have 
been made available. The task is to hang the string 
from the ceiling to the floor without defacing the 
ceiling.
A piece of white cardboard with four black squares 
fastened to it is to be hung from a ring fixed to the 
ceiling. On the table in the room are the following 
objects available: paper, a pen, a ruler and some 
paperclips. How could the cardboard squares be 
hung on the ring?
The word ‘eyelet’ was changed to ‘ring’ for better 
understanding. Objects were selected from a list 
provided by Duncker (1945).
Gimlet problem:
“Three cords are to be hung side by side from a 
wooden ledge. On the table lie, among many other 
objects, two short screw-hooks and the crucial 
object: a gimlet.” (Duncker, 1945, p. 86)
Three cords are to be hung side by side from a 
wooden ledge. On the table in the room there is 
paper, pencils, tinfoil, two short screw-hooks and a 
hand powered screwdriver. How could the three 
cords be hung up?
The term ‘gimlet’ was replaced with ‘hand 
powered screwdriver’. Objects were selected from 
a list provided by Duncker (1945).
Test problems:_____________________________
Two-String problem:
“The experiment was carried on in a large room 
which contained many objects such as poles, 
ringstands, clamps, pliers, extension cords, tables 
and chairs. Two cords were hung from the ceiling, 
and were of such length that they reached the floor. 
One hung near a wall, the other from the centre of 
the room. The subject was told, "Your problem is 
to tie the ends of those two strings together." He 
soon learned that if he held either cord in his hand 
he could not reach the other. He was then told that 
he could use or do anything he wished.” (Maier, 
1931, p. 182)
Candle problem:
“On the door, at the height of the eyes, three small 
candles are to be put side by side. On the table, lie, 
among many other objects, a few tacks, three little 
pasteboard boxes.” (Duncker, 1945, p. 86)
The verbal form was based on the problem
In a room two strings are hanging from the ceiling. 
The distance between them makes it impossible to 
reach one string while holding the other. The task 
is to reach one string while holding the other. A 
variety of objects are available, including a chair, 
paper, a pair of pliers, drawing pins and ajar. How 
may the two strings be tied together?
Objects selected were based on those in a picture 
presented in Isaak and Just (1995).
Your goal is to attach a candle to a wall so that it 
can bum upright. You have available a candle, 
some matches and a box of drawing pins. How 
would you solve the problem?
‘Book of matches’ was changed to ‘some matches’ 
and ‘box of tacks’ was changed to ‘box of drawing 
pins’ to avoid confusion.
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presented in Chrysikou (2006):
“Your goal is to attach a candle to a wall so that it 
can bum upright. You have available a candle, a 
book of matches and a box of tacks. How would 
you solve the problem?” (Chrysikou, 2006, p. 937)
Hat Rack Problem:
“The S was ... asked to constmct a hat rack in a 
certain spot. The available equipment consisted of 
two 1 inch X 2 inch poles (one 6 and the other 7 ft. 
long) and a 3-inch 'C clamp. A hat rack was then 
defined as something sturdy enough to properly 
hold a heavy coat and hat.” (Maier, 1945, p. 352)
Out of scope problems:
Charlie problem:
Dan comes home from work and finds Charlie lying dead on the floor. Also on the 
floor are some broken glass and some water. Tom is in the room too. Dan takes one 
look around and immediately knows how Charlie died. How did Charlie die? 
(Weisberg, 1995)
Hypothesized constraint: Charlie is a human so think of various murder scenarios 
involving two humans (i.e., Tom shot or stabbed Charlie).
Solution: Charlie, Dan’s pet fish, died of lack of oxygen when Tom, Dan’s cat, knocked 
over the fishbowl, causing it to shatter and spill its contents.
Fake Coin problem:
A dealer in antique coins got an offer to buy a beautiful bronze coin. The coin had an 
emperor’s head on one side and the date 544 BC stamped on the other. The dealer 
examined the coin and realized it was a fake. How did he know the coin was phoney? 
(Ansburg & Dominowski, 2000)
Hypothesized constraint: Consider the elements on the coin to determine what might have 
been faked. Was bronze invented? The date and the emperor might not have matched. 
Solution: Christ would not have been bom, so a coin from that time would not have been 
marked BC.
Prisoner and Rope problem:
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found in his cell a rope that 
was half long enough to permit him to reach the ground safely. He divided the rope in 
half, tied the two parts together, and escaped. How could he have done this? (Isaak & 
Just, 1995)
Hypothesized constraint: That the rope was cut in half across the width so there were two 
shorter pieces.
Solution: The rope was unravelled or cut in half vertically so there were two pieces half 
long enough which could be tied together.
Using two poles and a clamp, build a hat rack 
which is sufficiently stable to support a heavy coat 
and a hat. The opening of the clamp is wide 
enough so that both poles can be inserted and held 
together securely when the clamp is tightened.
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Appendix F
Experiment 4 -  Test problems
Problem A: UNSEEN WALKER
On a busy Friday afternoon, a man walked several miles across London from 
Westminster to Kmghtsbridge without seeing anybody or being seen by anybody. The 
day was clear and bright. He had perfect eyesight and he looked where he was going. 
He did not travel by any method of transport other than by foot. London was thronged 
with people yet not one of them saw him. How? (Sloane, 1992, p. 11)
Hypothesised constraint: The man was walking above ground along the streets.
Solution: The man was walking underground through the sewers.
Problem B: ANTHONY & CLEOPATRA
Anthony and Cleopatra are lying dead on the floor in an Egyptian villa. Nearby is a 
broken bowl. There are no marks on their bodies and they were not poisoned. Not a 
person was in the villa when they died. How did they die? (Sloane, 1992, p. 13)
Hypothesised constraint: Anthony and Cleopatra were human.
Solution: Anthony and Cleopatra were goldfish. They died when their bowl was knocked over
by a clumsy guard dog.
Problem C: COMING HOME
A man walked home after having been out drinking. He walked down the middle of a 
deserted country road. There were no streetlights to illuminate the road and there was 
no moonlight. He was dressed all in black. Suddenly a car that did not have its 
headlights on came racing down the road. At the last moment, the driver of the car 
saw the man and swerved to avoid him. How did he manage to see him? (Sloane, 
1992, p. 20)
Hypothesised constraint: It was night-time.
Solution: It was daytime.
Problem D: BOMBS AWAY
One night during the Second World War, an allied bomber was on a mission over 
Germany. The plane was in perfect condition and everything on it worked properly. 
When it had reached its target, the pilot ordered the bomb doors to be opened. They 
opened. He then ordered the bombs to be released. They were released. But the 
bombs did not fall from the plane. Why should this be so? (Sloane, 1992, p. 8)
Hypothesised constraint: The plane was flying the right way up.
Solution: The plane was flying upside-down.
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Appendix G
Experiment 5 - Training Programme
The first part of the training was broken down into two stages. In Stage la, trainees 
were informed that problems are difficult to solve because of incorrect interpretations and that 
they will be trained in a mechanism to help them identify their incorrect interpretations in 
order to solve such problems. The mechanism was described as follows:
‘After reading the problem carefully, select a part of the problem and consider your 
interpretation of it. Then check whether your interpretation is consistent by 
comparing it with the information in the problem specification. If it is inconsistent, 
then select another part of the problem and repeat the above process. However, if you 
generate a consistent interpretation, then consider whether this interpretation can be 
used to solve the problem. If not, then repeat the above process until you have 
generated a solution to solve the problem.’
In Stage lb, an example of how to apply the mechanism to solve the following 
problem was presented: -
Sid Shady works for a large construction company that was very concerned about 
employee theft. Someone tipped the company that shady was the man to watch. Each 
night he passed through security with a wheelbarrow full of scrap lumber, discarded 
electrical wires and chunks of concrete. The security guards checked the contents 
daily but could find nothing of value. What was Shady stealing? (Ansburg & 
Dominowski, 2000)
To answer the question, a possible interpretation concerning what Shady was stealing is 
that something was concealed on his person. However, this is inconsistent with the 
problem statement as it does not explain the taking of the lumber, wires and concrete.
Another interpretation was that Shady was using the lumber, wires and concrete for a 
useful purpose but this is also inconsistent as they are of no value and the guard was 
aware that he was taking them. An alternative interpretation was that Shady was 
concealing something within the contents of the wheelbarrow, which is also 
inconsistent because the statement states that the wheelbarrow is checked daily. The 
correct solution is that solution is stealing wheelbarrows, which is consistent because 
the statement states that Shady leaves with a wheelbarrow each night.
The second part of the training was also broken down into two stages. After reading 
the above example, participants were required to practise using the mechanism to solve the 
following problem (Stage 2a):-
Bamey Dribble is carrying a pillow case full of feathers. Hardy Pyle is carrying three 
pillow cases the same size as Barney’s, yet Hardy’s load is lighter. How can this be? 
The solution was that Hardy’s cases were empty, and hence lighter.
In the final part of the training, participants were required to solve the following 
problem under test conditions (Stage 2b):-
A woman said to her husband “This morning, one of my earrings fell into my coffee. 
Even though my cup was full, the earring did not get wet.” How could this be true? 
The coffee cup contained coffee granules and thus the earrings did not get wet.
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Appendix H
Experiment 5 -  Practice and Test problems
Practice problems
Problem A: Sid Shady
Sid Shady works for a large construction company that was very concerned about 
employee theft. Someone tipped the company that shady was the man to watch. Each 
night he passed through security with a wheelbarrow full of scrap lumber, discarded 
electrical wires and chunks of concrete. The security guards checked the contents 
daily but could find nothing of value. What was Shady stealing? (Ansburg & 
Dominowski, 2000)
Solution: Shady was steeling wheelbarrows.
Problem B: Barney Dribble
Barney Dribble is carrying a pillow case full of feathers. Hardy Pyle is carrying three 
pillow cases the same size as Barney’s, yet Hardy’s load is lighter. How can this be?
Solution: Hardy’s cases were empty, and hence lighter.
Problem C: Coffee
A woman said to her husband “This morning, one of my earrings fell into my coffee. 
Even though my cup was full, the earring did not get wet.” How could this be true?
Solution: The coffee cup contained coffee granules and thus the earrings did not get wet.
Test Problems
Problem A: PEAR TREE
A farmer in California owns a beautiful pear tree. He supplies the fruit to a 
nearby grocery store. The store owner has called the farmer to see how much 
fruit is available for him to purchase. The farmer knows that the main trunk has 
24 branches. Each branch has exactly 6 twigs. Since each twig bears one piece 
of fruit, how many plums will the farmer be able to deliver?
Solution: None because plums do not grow on pear trees.
Problem B: DR APPLE
Shadow opened the door to Dr. Apple’s office and surveyed the scene. Dr.
Apple’s head lay on his desk in a pool of blood. On the floor to his right lay a 
gun. There were powder bums on his right temple indicating that he was shot at 
close range. On his desk was a suicide note, and in his right hand was the pen 
that had written it. Shadow noted that death had occurred in the last hour. All of 
a sudden Dr. Apple’s wife burst into the office and screamed “My husband’s 
been shot!” She ran toward the body and saw the note and cried, “Why would 
he want to kill himself?”
Shadow replied “This was no suicide; it is a clear case of murder.” How does 
Shadow know?
Solution: The gun would have been the last item in Dr Apple’s hand if he had committed
suicide.
Problem C: TRAIN
At 7 a.m., a train moving 90mph leaves Montreal heading for Toronto. At 8
a.m., a train running 1 lOmph leaves Toronto heading for Montreal. Which train 
will be closer to Montreal when they meet?
Solution: When they meet, they would be at the same spot.
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Problem D: DIRECTORY
There is a town in Northern Ontario where 5% of all the people living in the 
town have unlisted phone numbers. If you selected 100 names at random from 
the town’s phone directory, on average, how many of these people selected 
would have unlisted phone numbers?
Solution: None because a phone directory contains listed numbers only.
Problem E: ANTIQUE COIN
A dealer in antique coins got an offer to buy a beautiful bronze coin. The coin 
had an emperor’s head on one side and the date 544 BC stamped on the other. 
The dealer examined the coin and realized it was a fake. How did he know the 
coin was phoney?
Solution: Christ had not been bom, therefore a coin from that time would not be marked 
BC.
Problem F: PROFESSOR BUMBLE
Professor Bumble, who is getting on in years, is growing absent-minded. On 
the way to a lecture one day, he went through a red light and turned down a 
one-way street in the wrong direction. A policeman observed the entire scene 
but did nothing about it. How could Professor Bumble get away with such 
behaviour?
Solution: Professor Bumble was walking.
Problem G: LIGHT
A young boy turned off the light in his bedroom and managed to get into bed 
before the room was dark. If the bed is ten feet from the light switch and he 
used no wires, strings or any other contraptions to turn off the light, how did he 
do it?
Solution: It was daytime.
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Appendix I
Experiment 6 -  Pilot study
Problem 1: UNSEEN WALKER (77 words)
A man walked home after having been out drinking. He walked down the middle of a 
deserted country road. There were no streetlights to illuminate the road and there was 
no moonlight. He was dressed all in black. Suddenly a car that did not have its 
headlights on came racing down the road. At the last moment, the driver of the car 
saw the man and swerved to avoid him. How did he manage to see him?
Solution: It was day-time (target word: night)
Problem 2: MURDER (74 words)
Acting on an anonymous phone call, the police raid a house to arrest a suspected 
murderer. They don't know what he looks like but they know his name is John and 
that he is inside the house. The police bust in on a carpenter, a lorry driver, a 
mechanic and an engineer all playing poker. Without hesitation or communication of 
any kind, they immediately arrest the engineer. How did they know who to arrest?
Solution: Te engineer was the only male playing poker, (target word: men)
Problem 3: PROFESSOR BUMBLE (55 words)
Professor Bumble, who is getting on in years, is growing absent-minded. On the way 
to a lecture one day, he went through a red light and turned down a one-way street in 
the wrong direction. A policeman observed the entire scene but did nothing about it. 
How could Professor Bumble get away with such behaviour?
Solution: He was walking (target word: driving)
Problem 4: SHOT (75 words)
During the world fair a group of scientists were exhibiting their advances in genetic 
engineering. There were cross-breeds of various bulls, cows, and other domestic farm 
animals. Featured on the exhibit were several over-sized prized turkeys. One 
afternoon during the show, a woman walked up to the exhibit, shot the turkeys, and 
then ran out of the building. Although she was known to a number of people, nobody 
made any attempt to stop her. Why?
Solution: Women shot the turkeys with a camera. She was a journalist, (target word: killed)
Problem 5: JUMPED (60 words)
Mel Colly stared through the dirty soot-smeared window on the 26th floor of the 
office tower. Overcome with depression he slid the window open and jumped through 
it. It was a sheer drop to the ground. Miraculously after he landed he was completely 
unhurt. Since there was nothing to cushion his fall or slow his descent, how did he 
survive?
Solution: Jumped inside, (target word: outside)
Problem 6: GUIDE (42 words)
A mountain climber in the Himalayas took along with him two mountain guides.
After a few hours, one of the guides fell into a deep crevasse. The climber and the 
other guide continued the climb and did not raise the alarm. Why?
Solution: Guide was a map (target word: person)
Problem 7: BEACH (61 words)
Rachel was sun bathing at a beach because she heard it was the best way to acquire an 
overall tan. The beach was full of people wearing nothing. Day after day she was out 
lying in the sun, yet couldn't manage the complete tan. What could she be doing 
wrong to prevent her from receiving the even tones she so desired?
Solution: She still had her bathing suit on. (target word: naked)
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Appendix J
Experiment 6 -  Test problems
Problem A: UNSEEN WALKER
A man walked home after having been out drinking. He walked down the middle of a 
deserted country road. There were no streetlights to illuminate the road and there was 
no moonlight. He was dressed all in black. Suddenly a car that did not have its 
headlights on came racing down the road. At the last moment, the driver of the car 
saw the man and swerved to avoid him. How did he manage to see him?
Target word: Night
Solution: It was day-time
Problem B: MURDER
Acting on an anonymous phone call, the police raid a house to arrest a suspected 
murderer. They don't know what he looks like but they know his name is John and 
that he is inside the house. The police bust in on a carpenter, a lorry driver, a 
mechanic and an engineer all playing poker. Without hesitation or communication of 
any kind, they immediately arrest the engineer. How did they know who to arrest?
Target word: Men
Solution: The carpenter, lorry driver, and mechanic were women. The engineer was the only
male playing poker.
Problem C: PROFESSOR BUMBLE
Professor Bumble, who is getting on in years, is growing absent-minded. On the way 
to a lecture one day, he went through a red light and turned down a one-way street in 
the wrong direction. A policeman observed the entire scene but did nothing about it. 
How could Professor Bumble get away with such behaviour?
Target word: Driving
Solution: Professor Bumble was walking
Problem D: SHOT
During the world fair a group of scientists were exhibiting their advances in genetic 
engineering. There were cross-breeds of various bulls, cows, and other domestic farm 
animals. Featured on the exhibit were several over-sized prized turkeys. One 
afternoon during the show, a woman walked up to the exhibit, shot the turkeys, and 
then ran out of the building. Although she was known to a number of people, nobody 
made any attempt to stop her. Why?
Target word: Killed
Solution: Women shot the turkeys with a camera. She was a journalist.
Problem E: GUIDE
A mountain climber in the Himalayas took along with him two mountain guides. 
After a few hours, one of the guides fell into a deep crevasse. The climber and the 
other guide continued the climb and did not raise the alarm. Why?
Target word: Person
Solution: The guide is inanimate such as a book or map.
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Appendix K
Experiment 6 - Neutral primes (length matched with the length of the corresponding 
experimental problem
1 • http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/brain basics/know vour brain.htm (UNSEEN 
WALKER problem - 77 words)
The brain is undoubtedly the most complex part of the human body. For many centuries, 
scientists and philosophers have been fascinated by the brain, but until recently they viewed 
the brain as nearly incomprehensible. Now, however, the brain is beginning to relinquish its 
secrets. Scientists have learned a lot more about the brain in the last 10 years because of the 
increasing growth of research in neurological and behavioural science and the development of 
new research techniques.
2. http://www.dmu.ac.uk/~iamesa/teaching/assessment.htm (MURDER problem - 74 words)
It is the use of assessment which makes teaching into teaching. Assessment should not 
therefore be seen as an isolated process, but as integral to every stage of teaching.
One point to note is that there is no such thing as an “objective test”. Even when there’s a 
high degree of standardisation, the choice of what things are tested and what constitutes a 
criterion of satisfactory performance is very much dependent on the assessor.
3.
http://www.see.ed.ac.Uk/~gerard/Management/artl.html7http://oldeee.see.ed.ac.uk/~gerard/M 
anagement/artl .html (PROFESSOR BUMBLE problem - 55 words)
In a newspaper, the story is introduced in its entirety in a snazzy first paragraph. The next few 
paragraphs repeat the same information only giving further details to each point. The next 
section repeats the story, but developing certain themes within each of the sub-points. This is 
repeated until the reporter runs out of story.
4. http://www.onepine.info/mcult.htm (SHOT problem - 75 words)
A key role for culture is to differentiate the organisation from others and to provide a sense of 
identity for its members. Cultures do not have to be logical, in fact they seldom are and can 
appear quite haphazard and chaotic to the outsider. Culture can also have subgroups with 
varying agendas. A strong culture is one that is widely shared, and makes it clear what it 
expects and how it wishes people to behave.
6. http://www.cinemas-online.co.uk/films/core/earthfacts/facts.htm (Guide problem - 42 
words)
The earth consists of several layers. The three main layers are the core, the mantle and the 
crust. The core is the inner part of the earth, the crust is the outer part and between the core 
and crust is the mantle.
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Appendix L
Experiment 6 LDT sets
Practice LTD
Words Mean RT Nonwords
overpass 631.16 afoustic
initials 631.56 panknote
promises 632.03 dootlace
handlers 632.52 tecisive
majority 632.53 daughtir
forwards 633.09 crominal
1. UNSEEN WALKER problem
Words MeanRT Nonwords
jokes 531.58 avide
hired 540.09 lanks
necks 541.44 burge
lemon 541.70 nams
holds 542.47 vurly
night 540.39 Firch
2. MURDER problem
Words Mean RT Nonwords
hey 538.38 cof
ice 541.47 aid
fly 541.70 fub
red 542.76 bry
key 543.52 dut
men 540.55 bew
3. PROFESSOR BUMBLE problem
Words Mean RT Nonwords
recipes 673.29 addomen
folders 673.38 panquet
pigeons 673.42 sargain
rancher 673.76 millows
hugging 675.56 greadth
driving 673.44 breakop
4. SHOT problem
Words Mean RT Nonwords
hooked 545.79 arides
street 547.00 dalves
search 547.16 harmed
motors 550.71 ganter
second 553.58 faress
killed 551.50 darton
5. OUTSIDE problem
Words MeanRT Nonwords
likely 549.63 atmire
switch 549.97 shests
simply 551.35 phords
winter 552.24 glumsy
moment 554.37 pookie
outside 551.65 cozier
6. GUIDE problem
Words MeanRT Nonwords
labels 613.31 lastle
months 613.42 tasual
fibres 614.00 catnop
tricky 615.12 shamps
glossy 615.50 thapel
person 614.61 pheese
7. BEACH problem
Words MeanRT Nonwords
spice 591.09 theap
lodge 592.84 phoir
ovens 594.16 agout
spear 594.60 nams
jelly 595.47 bolks
naked 594.80 dands
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